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LOYALTY AND LAW IN NEW TESTAMENT TIMES

by The Rev. R. S. BARBOUR

I

There have been innumerable attempts to classify and set forth in order the multitudinous drives or motives which lead men to act as they do in society. Among Christians it is natural and proper to divide all human motives into those which are selfish and those which are unselfish; and further to say that all motives of the 'natural man' are fundamentally selfish, and only those of man under grace can really be unselfish. One thinks here of such analyses as that of *Eros* and *Agape* made by Anders Nygren in his work of that title; or of Augustine's famous distinction between earthly society (the *civitas terrena*) animated by love of self to the point of contempt for God, and divine society (the *civitas caelestis*) animated by love for God to the point of contempt for self. The danger, of course, of such vast generalisations is that they will be misunderstood by the disciples of the great men who originally made use of them—and even that they may mislead those great men themselves. It is obvious, for example, that Augustine is not here making the kind of distinction which is visible to direct empirical inspection. The two principles of which he speaks are principles of order which, he says, can be described *mystically* as two cities.[1] Without attempting to go into the details of the interpretation of this great doctrine, it may be possible to make one point by way of introduction to our theme, a point which applies both to the distinction between *Eros* and *Agape* and to that between the two cities. It is an elementary mistake, but one that is only too easily made, to suppose that the truth expressed in such distinctions must manifest itself primarily in the life of the individual, wherever else it may also be seen. On this view the natural man, taken as an individual, always acts whether he realises it or not from a selfish motive, the love of self in one of its countless forms. What then of the extreme

[1] *De Civ. Dei*, xv.1.

cases of self-sacrifice? Did the Spartans who died to a man at Thermopylae act out of some concealed self-love? The desire for glory, perhaps: the desire to give Simonides the opportunity of glorifying *them* (and of course himself) with his immortal lines

> Go tell the Spartans: as they said,
> So have we done; and we are dead.[1]

The thesis is a possible one; and I do not want to deny that selfish motives may have been present in the heart of every single man in the pass on that famous day. But the point is that this is not the whole import, or even the true import, of Augustine's doctrine of love of self. For love of self is a principle of order, uniting men in society and manifesting itself at every level—in the *pax domestica*, the *pax civica*, and even—perhaps especially—in the peace maintained by that *imperiosa civitas* which was Rome. Must we then say that all these human groupings, small or large, have selves of their own and love themselves? Must we speak of a national soul, or a general will? Not necessarily; or if we do we must see that we are here speaking in metaphors which have their own great dangers, reversing the procedure of Plato, who saw the principles of justice writ small in the soul on the model of those same principles writ large in the State. What must be admitted, however, is that the motives of individual men, when placed side by side (and Augustine speaks of a *compositio voluntatum*[2]) acquire a character which they do not possess when viewed singly. It is not simply that the pure patriotism and courage of the individual Spartan at Thermopylae involved other defects of character, and were devoted to the service of a somewhat ambiguous cause; it is also this, that to view the matter in its wider context is to see that the very desire to maintain the cause against oppression leads to struggle and misunderstanding; the assertion of the cause, even if it is a Gandhian cause of non-violence, topples over into self-assertion, and therefore into love of self—on a social, or national level—and this in turn subtly affects the motives of the individual.

All this and much more is of course a commonplace to those who have read their *Moral Man and Immoral Society*—indeed to

[1] The translation is P. C. Rodger's.
[2] In a chapter very relevant to this subject, *De Civ. Dei*, xix.17.

those who are acquainted with the writings of any reputable theologian. But the legacy of individualism which we have all inherited is so strong, particularly when it comes to our every-day judgments about sin and responsibility, that it seems worth while to stress the point again. And the purpose of introducing Augustine's doctrine was to try to show that we must not assume too easily, or in the wrong kind of way, that all human motivation is selfish except as Divine Grace sheds its light on men. That in the last analysis, and theologically, this is true we cannot deny; but it may be suspected that a real impoverishment of our understanding of the Gospel has come from our failure to take seriously the kinds and degrees of selfishness and unselfishness that are present in the society we know. Here one may consider especially those forms of action about which there is a very real and important element of unselfishness but no obviously Christian motivation—all those forms of action which Josiah Royce of Harvard summed up under the term 'loyalty'. My intention is not to try to take any steps towards the formulation of a philosophy of loyalty; still less to defend Royce's: but only to suggest briefly the way in which these forces of attachment to a group, a place, a people, a nation or a cause operated in the time of Jesus Himself, and something of His attitude to them. With questions of political allegiance and national unity frequently in our minds, and the issues of religious and denominational loyalty raised afresh in our midst, the relevance of the subject in general (if not of what is said in these paragraphs) should be sufficiently obvious. But perhaps it should also be pointed out that these questions are highly relevant to the task of evangelism. Here we should turn, among other things, to the novelists, who if they do their work well should reveal to us what manner of folk we are more clearly than we at times can see it. In twentieth-century Scotland the field is not large; but one thinks for example of the shipowner Leslie Pagan and the riveter Danny Shields in George Blake's *The Shipbuilders*. Why is it that one of these men accepts and the other rejects the claims of loyalty to that region and that industry to which both are so deeply and incoherently attached? Is it simply that one of them is torn away by his love for and loyalty to his wife and child? I think not. But in any case these are not questions which need to be asked at this point. The

question is rather this: what does the Word of God do with these strange deep-seated loyalties and attachments when it encounters them in the unique citadel of each man's heart?

To make the theme manageable it must be confined to those loyalties which find immediate political expression. Even here the field is wide enough. Three facts stand out clearly. The first is that no group or nation, however small or insignificant, can exist for long simply on a basis of geographical contiguity; there must be some idea, some cause, some conception of the good life however rudimentary, to hold it together. Thus from the very beginnings of social life there is implicit a distinction between attachment to the group itself and attachment or loyalty to the 'idea' (for want of a better word) which it represents.

The second obvious fact is that the clash of loyalties, within a group or between groups, can at least in theory only be settled by the substitution of a wider loyalty which includes or synthesises the subordinate ones. At least in theory—but there are limits to the process it seems, for a man needs roots in a community small enough to enable him to have status and significance as a part of it. Thus the philosophical effort to define, and the political effort to establish, a universal loyalty are tasks of supreme difficulty.

The third fact of importance is that men need, and make generous use of, symbols to express their attachments and loyalties. This is especially true when the distinction between the group itself and the cause or idea which holds it together is clearly marked. The less reflective members of the group in particular need some symbol or set of symbols to represent for them what the more philosophically inclined are able to grasp in an abstract form. Occasionally, as with the slogan of the French Revolution—*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*—a formula denoting abstract ideas itself becomes a kind of concrete symbol; but the symbols of French nationality are perhaps rather the tricolor and the Marseillaise, the evocative 'La France', and human figures like that of Joan of Arc, of whom Michelet wrote: 'She loved France so much; and France, touched, began to love herself'—an observation which in the light of our theme takes on a significance somewhat different from that which Michelet no doubt intended.

II

Bearing in mind, then, these three factors in any situation—the distinction between loyalty to a people and loyalty to an idea; the problem of reconciling particular and general loyalties; and the powerful effect of symbolic representations in determining human attitudes—how did matters stand in New Testament times?

It was, perhaps, the Greeks of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. who first succeeded in demonstrating to the world with clarity that loyalty to a group involves a prior loyalty to an idea or purpose animating that group; and the first genuinely *political* statement of this truth—that is to say, the first statement that aims at universality and attempts to ignore the merely particular or accidental—is found, not in Plato's *Republic* but in Aristotle's *Politics*. The development of civic virtue, and of the ideal of the citizen therein embodied, was made possible by law, which thus became in a very real sense the symbol to which loyalty attached itself. So Herodotus, explaining the Greek achievement against Persia, says 'they are free, yet not altogether so; for they have a master over them, namely law, which they reverence far more than your subjects, O King, reverence you.'[1] But law as thus conceived proved at once too general and too local a symbol; too general, because too colourless, and so at Athens, for example, it could not restrain the lust for domination, Athena proved stronger than her own law, and the Melians and many others learnt to their cost that there is one law for the weak and another for the strong; too local, because it was defined in terms of a people all freely assenting to it, and its integration with the wider apprehensions of divine law current among the Greek people was never seriously attempted. Aristotle himself was still alive when his own pupil Alexander of Macedon, in the name of Greek culture and the Greek concept of excellence, carried his sword across the whole known world and more, and by diffusing Greek culture throughout an area from the Danube and the Sahara to the frontiers of India made of it the vehicle of a totally new idea of universal brotherhood. But in so doing he destroyed the innermost being of Hellenism by altering the focus of loyalties which it had built

[1] Herodotus, vii. 104.

up. For the distinction between loyalty to the city and loyalty to the idea which that city represented ceased to be a creative tension when city and idea alike had been universalised beyond the reach of the possibilities of daily life: law ceased to be the product of the citizens' united wills, and came near to being, what it had always been in the Orient, the bare will of the monarch: the concept of civic excellence was displaced by that of the Divine Hero—'Saviour and Benefactor', as Alexander and his successors described themselves. The symbols of loyalty became personal, and with that change no longer stimulated to higher endeavour, because it was Alexander, the man and not the office, who was venerated—and the symbol therefore ceased to point beyond itself; or if it did, pointed towards a divinely benevolent power, which was a somewhat high standard for his successors to emulate. In short, Alexander failed for two reasons (among others less relevant for our purpose): his attempt to establish a universal loyalty failed to remain rooted in the particular; and that universal loyalty could not maintain a double reference to the actual community and to the principles for which it stood, since the divinely-endowed Saviour and Benefactor who represented both proved to be an idol with feet of clay. It is this fallen idol which we encounter at several points in the New Testament; among other things it was the block against which Jewish nationalism hammered out its distinctive shape in the time of the Maccabees, that nationalism which so strongly determined the Messianic misapprehensions of the time of Jesus.

Where Alexander failed Rome came nearer to success. It would be a fascinating task to describe the means by which she did so. Here one can only mention the extraordinary success of the Augustan Revolution in promoting a universal loyalty that nevertheless had its origins in a single visible source: *Romanitas* had sure roots in geography and history, a soil assiduously cultivated by the most gifted and devoted husbandmen the world has ever known, with Vergil at their head. Yet it contrived also, partly through the influence of the Stoics and their conception of law, to present an ideal of universality which was not incompatible with many and diverse local attachments. Here again the symbols of loyalty became personal: the Imperial cult, for all its Oriental antecedents, took root rapidly

in the West. And although there is truth in Tertullian's jibe that the Romans were not great because of their religiosity but religious because of their greatness, it is less than the truth to suppose that the Imperial cult was of no deep religious significance. For as with the Hellenistic monarchs, so with Rome, the exaltation of *arete*, of *virtus*, ends with the deification of man, or at all events of a man. The self-effacing Augustus identified himself with his people, and his power with the supposed popular sources of power in the Roman republic, far more successfully than any of his kingly predecessors in the ancient world; but he, no more than the rest, could avoid making the claim that his *virtus*, his excellence, entitled him and the power which he wielded to a special approval from whatever gods there were. 'Augustus Caesar, sprung from God to bring the age of gold'[1]—Vergil's words reveal the ultimate bankruptcy of the ancient world—indeed of *humanitas*, of humanism itself; for it demands a loyalty which in the end dictates to fortune, or, as we should say, dictates to God Himself, and in so doing proves itself to be *amor sui*—love of self to the point of contempt for God. In the Apocalypse of John the state is seen as Satanic precisely in so far as it makes Divine claims: but this, Oscar Cullmann has recently argued,[2] need not be inconsistent with St. Paul's assertion that it is 'the servant of God for good', since the state is and remains God's servant inasmuch as it carries out faithfully the limited duties which form its proper sphere. Here we should notice two things: the first is that these Divine claims need not express themselves in the form of a demand for worship. Every claim that a nation has a mission is something of a claim to dictate to God; and yet without something of such a claim no state can endure. The second is that we have here passed to the beginnings of a new doctrine to which, in spite of Antigone, the classical world was an almost total stranger: the doctrine that there are two spheres in life, one of which belongs to God and the other to the state. Loyalties, then, and the symbols which express them, must at this point be divided; and the distinctions which we have noted will reappear in each of the two spheres.

[1] *Aen.*, vi. 792.

[2] In *The State in the New Testament*: Cullmann perhaps overstates his thesis at this point.

It is important to notice that this doctrine of the two spheres is not at all the same thing as Augustine's doctrine of the two cities: here it is not a question of two principles of order, but of an empirically characterisable distinction between two segments or spheres of life, within both of which the two principles of *amor sui* and *amor Dei* may operate. This doctrine of two spheres at once calls to mind the words of Jesus, 'Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and to God the things that are God's.' Nor need we deny that the distinction between the sacred and the secular is within its limits a necessary one for all Christian thought on political questions. But it cannot, I believe, be made the basis of that thought, nor, as will be seen, would it be true to other indications in the life and teaching of Jesus to make it so. Its origin appears to be not Christian, in fact, but Jewish, as might be expected of a people who had had for so long to accommodate themselves to alien domination. It became, in the Tannaitic Judaism of the second century A.D., the accepted basis of political conformity to Rome; but, as recent research has made ever clearer, there was no such uniformity on this, or indeed on most other, questions in the time of Jesus Himself; the real exponents of this distinction between a religious and a political sphere of life in Jesus' time were neither the Pharisees nor the Sadducees but the Herodians, who appear in the Gospels precisely in the context of the question put to Jesus about paying tribute to Caesar (one of the accepted tests of loyalty to Rome). For the Herods and their followers, whatever their motives and their faults may have been, set out to establish as a permanent principle and not as a matter of temporary expediency the duality of loyalty between Yahweh and Caesar, with the Herods in some sense as vicegerents of both. The Book of Acts describes the end of one of the Herods, Agrippa I, himself a close friend of the Emperor Claudius, in A.D. 44. 'Herod, arrayed in his royal apparel, harangued the people. The people shouted out "It is the voice of a god and not of a man" (the Hellenistic Divine King)—but at that moment an angel of the Lord smote him' (Acts 12.21-23). And no wonder, the cynic might say, for he had broken both the fundamental rules of the Herodian concordat, usurping both loyalties for himself. But so far as Judaism was concerned, in the end the Herodian policy was

established without their assistance; from A.D. 70 onwards the Jew had little option but to submit to two authorities both of which, implicitly or explicitly, claimed all that he had to give.

Of the remaining parties in the Judaism of Jesus' day, one, the Zealot, was consistent; for them there was one loyalty only, for, to quote Josephus, they showed 'an unconquerable love of liberty which did not allow them to acknowledge anyone except God as their Lord and master'.[1] The remaining parties, it seems clear, accommodated their loyalties as a matter of temporary necessity with varying degrees of success; but on the whole, ill-will to Rome was paramount, and the Zealots became the predominant force in Judaism before the Fall of Jerusalem. In a recent work Professor Bo Reicke has argued that one of the great problems of the early Jerusalem Church was to prevent its members being carried away by the impetus of the Zealot movement[2]; and there is evidence to show that throughout His ministry Jesus Himself was in contact with, and under pressure from, the vision of a theocratic Kingdom of the Messiah to be established by force. Indeed the Temptation narrative makes this clear from the outset—and nobody is tempted by that which does not attract him. But of course He rejected this vision in favour of another wholly different.

III

Are we then to say that Israel suffered the opposite fate to Alexander's Hellenism?—that it perished of a narrow nationalism, unable to overcome its own exclusiveness and to accept its vocation as a light to the Gentiles; that, having established the distinction between loyalty to the people as it was and loyalty to the Covenant with its high demands, it was unable to see these demands and the accompanying privileges as God's will for the whole world; in short, that it was unable to pass from the individual to the universal, and so must yield to a new faith which was universal? Of course there is much truth in this contention; and yet to see it as the whole truth would be profoundly misleading. It is a mistake to regard the nationalism and particularism of Israel as *merely* primitive elements; and yet this seems to be the presupposition of much modern writing about Israel. Thus Professor W. D. Davies, for example,

[1] *Ant.*, xviii.1.6. [2] *Diakonie, Festfreude und Zelos*, pp. 333ff.

discussing St. Paul's love and yearning for his own people, says, 'the conception of Yahweh as Israel's God rather than of Israel as Yahweh's people persisted; Israel after the flesh is still unsupplanted by Israel as an idea. Not only was this true among the masses. Inconsistently enough the prophets themselves did not draw the full implications of their teaching. True they gave birth to Israel as an "idea" or an "ideal", but they also invariably cling to Israel as a nation as still somehow the people of Yahweh. This paradoxical nationalism in their religion we can clearly trace, the survival of the primitive Semitic conception of the solidarity of a god and his people.'[1] But what Davies calls the failure of the prophets to draw the full implications of their teaching is surely no failure, but the key to the whole import of their message. God does not desert His people despite their rebelliousness; Israel 'after the flesh' and Israel 'as an idea' both remain indispensable in the preparation for the Incarnation. Wheeler Robinson is perhaps nearer the truth when he writes: 'Israel's service was unique and indispensable. Its particularity was the condition of its intensity. The true universality is not reached by thinning out our convictions so as to make them spread over as wide a surface as possible. It is reached by so intense a devotion to them that we penetrate nearer to the centre of things and so draw nearer to each other.'[2] This conflict of wounded love we can see in Hosea, in Jeremiah, and in his own way in St. Paul, who still yearns for and predicts the ultimate ingathering of his people. Nor can we fail to see it in the life of Jesus Himself: 'O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets.'

But does this conflict issue in a total rejection of the claims of Israel after the flesh, of Israel as it was and its nationalist pretensions? Many would give the answer 'yes'— but perhaps the word to use is not the word 'rejection'. The senses in which Israel's claims were rejected are clear enough: 'they that take the sword shall perish by the sword'; 'my kingdom comes not from this world, else would my servants fight'; 'the Kingdom of God shall be taken from you and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof'—this last spoken not to the people but to the High Priests and elders. But the Old Testament attempt

[1] *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, 2nd Edn., p. 79. But cf. pp. 321ff.
[2] *Redemption and Revelation*, p. 91. Quoted by Davies himself, op. cit., p. 59 n. 3.

to hold together the loyalty to Yahweh and the loyalty to the people as it was, its land, its Temple, and its Law, is not thereby abandoned in favour of the doctrine of two spheres, a religious and a political. For one thing, few would dispute that the intention to found a new people of Israel, continuous with the old, can be traced back to Jesus Himself. But this by itself does not carry us far enough; that new people might be conceived as a body torn loose of the local attachments of which we have been thinking; we may perhaps get further insight from a brief consideration of Jesus' attitude to two of the great stays and symbols of the Jewish people, the Law and the Temple.

First, the Law. Professor Daube has recently re-emphasised[1] that the Old Testament doctrine of redemption, especially as it is expressed by means of the two Hebrew roots *ga'al* and *padah*, is expounded in language drawn from social legislation. The restoration of rights and status to those who have lost them forms the pattern for the interpretation of God's acts in history, and especially of the Exodus. This interpretation of the Exodus in turn profoundly influenced both the subsequent social legislation of the people and the expectation of the way in which God would once again act. It is within this context that the giving of the Law on Sinai must be seen. The right understanding of the Law depends on a right understanding of Israel's past history (as, at a later date, the understanding of Jesus Himself for the early Christians depends on a right understanding of Israel's past history—hence the constant appeals to the OT throughout the NT). Further, this understanding of the Law must issue in social justice and mercy, in obedience within the Covenant of a perfectly concrete kind in the present; and these two things together must lead through to an understanding of the future. Within this tradition, in which Law is no abstract command but must be seen in the context of the whole life of the people, moulding it and moulded by it—within this tradition Jesus clearly stands. Though not ordained as a Rabbi he speaks with all the authority of a first-century Rabbi, and perhaps more.[2] Indeed, the claims soon made by Him and for Him amount to very much more; but—and here one must be dogmatic for the sake of brevity—he comes not to destroy the Law but to fulfil it, loyal to its inmost meaning and

[1] *The NT and Rabbinic Judaism*, pp. 268ff. [2] ibid., pp. 205ff.

purpose, alike in His understanding of His people's past, in His awareness of the demands of the present and in His consequent expectation of the future. All this, and much more, excludes any question of a rejection on His part of the claims of Israel after the flesh. But this also implies that the Jesus of the Apostolic tradition—and we know no other—could not be understood as simply acquiescing in a doctrine of two spheres, a religious and a political, as the basis for the understanding of the position of the New Israel in the world. To put the matter in another way, the problem of loyalties must not be viewed philosophically but eschatologically, and can only be apprehended in faith, for the New Age presses in at *every* point on the old age, bringing life out of death at every point in the complex of relationships that forms the life of any people on earth.

We may see this truth in the narrative of the Passion itself, and here we come to the question of the Temple already mentioned. There are many unsolved problems connected with the story of the Trial of Jesus; but it seems clear that one of the charges which united all elements against Him was that He had spoken in despite of the Temple, that great symbol of loyalty. The charge, according to St. Mark's narrative, involved a distortion of His words: but His action in the cleansing of the Temple, to which, again according to St. Mark, He had attached teaching—for teaching and action ran close together in the prophetic tradition—this action spoke louder than words. And it seems that, among other things, His action and His words were directed against the distortion of the meaning of this great symbol. What was this distortion? Partly it was that God's house was to be a house of prayer *for all nations*: there *was* a failure on the part of the Jews to understand the universal nature of their mission; the *past* was not being understood aright. But this is not the end of the matter. Partly it was that God's house had been turned into a den of robbers: not perhaps so much that the sacred had been confounded with the secular as that the failure to stand for social justice, to avoid usury and the exploitation of the poor, was seen there at the very shrine and centre of Israel's life. The demands of the *present* were being ignored. But this is not the end of the matter either. Even more it was—and for this too there is

support in the sources[1]—that the Temple had become the symbol of a people who thought that they had reached their goal. The *future* was being denied. This may seem strange, in an age devoted to Apocalyptic and to the earnest expectation of the arrival of a future Messianic Kingdom. But this very expectation was only too often an abdication of Israel's mission in favour of God's action, a sundering of the ties of loyalty to men in order that a supposed loyalty to God might be preserved intact, a tacit assumption that Israel with all her suffering had arrived and must wait at the trysting-point for her God to appear. This reveals itself in the attitude of the Pharisees, forced into hypocrisy by the effort to cling to the past and by the consequent attempt, however unintended, to deny to God His sovereign liberty of action. Loyalty to the symbols, the Law and the Temple, became confounded with loyalty to the living God in whose Covenant mercies Israel was born. The Pharisees, in their own way, commit the same sin as was involved in the ultimate political theories of the Ancient World: they dictate to God, and in so doing prove to be lovers of themselves and despisers of Him. Thus, in attacking the current use of the Temple and the Pharisaic interpretation of the Law Jesus is loyal to the true import of these very things; loyal in fact to Israel as an idea; but also loyal to Israel after the flesh, both because of what these symbols really are when rightly understood, and because He knows that it cannot be that a prophet should perish out of Jerusalem, for a prophet, to be a prophet, must be loyal to Israel after the flesh.

But the death which He died was a Roman death, and the charge, it seems clear enough, was treason; Zealotism, in fact. Few have supposed that He was indeed guilty of this charge; and Cullmann[2] has suggested that it was a matter of misunderstanding, that the fault of the Roman power lay in its failure to probe the accusation deeply enough, or in the weakness of Pilate, who suspected Jesus' innocence but bowed to popular clamour. No doubt this is true; yet even as history it is surely not quite the whole truth. The confrontation of Jesus and

[1] *Inter alia* it is an act of Messianic judgment (cf. Mal. 3.14)—that Messianic judgment which was reserved for the end of time, but which the Jews, in believing that they had 'arrived', invited upon themselves then and there. This 'anticipated Eschatology' (to use a recent phrase) means the bringing forward in time (or into time) both of man's judgment and of his Salvation.

[2] op. cit.

Pilate, as it is portrayed especially in St. John's Gospel—and the Passion Narrative in that Gospel has many claims to a substantial authenticity—carries the matter further. It contains many implications for the theme of Kingship, human and Divine, and carries at least a suggestion that Jesus, aware of His Kingship, both accepts and calls in question the whole basis of the Roman power. Here one can only point to the concluding verses of this part of the narrative, with all their irony and dramatic force. 'It was the preparation of the Passover, and about the sixth hour: and Pilate saith unto the Jews "Behold your King." But they cried out "Away with Him, away with Him, crucify Him." Pilate saith unto them "Shall I crucify your King?" The chief priest answered "We have no King but Caesar."' At that moment the High Priests are completely disloyal to Israel, both to Israel as God's chosen and to Israel after the flesh; and Jesus, for His part, is completely loyal to *both*.

This perhaps gives us a glimpse into the way in which the Word Incarnate takes those loyalties and attachments which lie so deep in the lives of all of us, and does not reject or neglect them, but makes them altogether new—for indeed He makes all things new—so that they still live, but transformed beyond all expectation. Here power is taken seriously, but not deified; nor is it now a question of any division into spheres of loyalty; for in one and the same act all loyalties are fulfilled.

The implications of this for our life in Scotland today are of course unlimited. But perhaps it is legitimate to suggest that there is an analogy between the love of Jesus for Israel after the flesh and the motives of concern and love for our people which ought to animate us. It is of course only an analogy, and it must be handled with great care. For one thing we as Christians must never forget that Israel after the flesh is in our ancestry too, so that we must learn what it means, and what it does not mean, for us to have Abraham to our father. But the analogy can teach us much; it can teach us that on the one hand there is nothing more dangerous to divine and human society than a loyalty which misconstrues the past, seeking to fight bygone battles over again, since this is one of the many ways in which *amor Dei* turns all too soon and all too easily into *amor sui*; and on the other hand, we may thus be reminded that

love for our fellow-men is love for them as they are, with their peculiarities, prejudices, pugnacities and deep particular roots in history. For another enemy to the true faith is that impersonal goodwill which has moved too easily out into cosmopolitanism, which seeks to assist others just because it is all part of the cause, because it is what the Church does, and does not love and share and bring to Christ the precarious virtues, the incoherent loyalties and the tragic distortions of those loyalties which go to make men what they are.

REVELATION AND REASONS

by NINIAN SMART

THE article by Dr Farrer on 'Revelation' in the *Faith and Logic* collection[1] is of special importance, for here we have a theologian attempting to steer between the Scylla of irrationalism and the Charybdis of apriorism. That is, by trying to point out the criteria for determining the truth of revelation[2] he is able to avoid the extreme irrationalism that has characterised much Protestant theology in recent decades; while on the other hand, in concentrating attention upon these checks on religious truth he escapes that metaphysical assimilation of religious to deductive arguments which mars Thomism and (the more immediate cause of the irrationalist revolt) Hegelianism. Whereas the word 'reason' is a chameleon, which changes its colour in accordance with its environment, so that mathematical reasoning has a different style and rigour from reasoning in morals, and this in turn differs from scientific reasoning, etc., philosophers and theologians have tended to overlook such matters. A crude version of a common attitude can be expressed something as follows: 'In religion there either is or is not a proper place for reasoning (and this will be deductive reasoning); if there is, we can divide theological assertions into two kinds, those which are provable by reason and those which are not; and if there is not, we must take religious assertions on faith.' This attitude has two main evil effects. First, because of the numerous objections that can be brought against traditional and idealist arguments for God or the Absolute, it has led to an irrationalism which is likely to make theology more narrow-minded than need be and to encourage intellectual obscurantism, where faith can be commended for its blindness and doctrines for their paradoxicality. And second, the dichotomy 'reason or faith' has so beguiled philosophers and theologians that no determined attempt has been made to consider the style of religious reasoning and the criteria of

[1] *Faith and Logic*, ed. Basil Mitchell (London, 1957), pp. 84-107.
[2] See especially op. cit., pp. 99-107.

religious truth. Admittedly, we are here in rough country where progress is difficult: but this does not entirely excuse the almost total lack of interest in exploration. Therefore Farrer's article (and indeed the spirit of the whole volume in which it appears) is particularly to be welcomed as a move in the right direction. If then I indulge in criticisms of his remarks, this is intended as a compliment.

There is a preliminary point which needs discussing. Farrer says that

> 'The possibility or nature of revelation in general' appears to be a philosophical topic; but it evaporates when we come to consider it. What we can show in general is not the possibility of revelation but the impossibility of forecasting the nature or bearing of God's personal action until He reveals it.[1]

His main reasons for saying this are, first, that, though the self-incarnation of God gives the highest reality to 'personal' language about God, we cannot work out *a priori* the consequence 'self-disclosed in the mode of incarnation' from the verbal notion 'a personal God'; and second, that we cannot deduce the form of God's dealing with us from the mere notion of a supreme personal Being.[2] Briefly: we can neither deduce *a priori* that God will be self-incarnated nor what He will do when incarnated. Despite the fact that Farrer later in the article is concerned to investigate criteria and checks on religious truth which are of a non-deductive nature, he here seems still a little under the influence of apriorism. For the fact that you cannot *deduce* 'God is at some time self-incarnated' from 'God is a personal Being' does not entail the impossibility of *forecasting* 'God will be self-incarnated' from 'God is a personal Being'. Actually, such a forecast may be impossible, but not because of its non-deducibility. (Compare: 'The sun will rise tomorrow', 'Mr Bulganin will get Asian 'flu next week', etc. Some events can be forecast and some not; but none are strictly deducible from the evidence.) Similarly with the form which the revelation will take. Again, though it is true that many Jews were expecting a very different sort of Messiah from the One who arrived among them, there were prophecies which Christ and the Gospel-writers could appeal to. I would myself be inclined to call at least some of them 'forecasts' rather

[1] op. cit., p. 99. [2] op. cit., pp. 96-99.

than mere happy guesses. But in any case, and apart from these considerations, we must distinguish between 'X is a reason for saying P' and 'Given X you can forecast P'. If, given X, you can safely forecast P, then X is a reason for saying P; but the converse does not hold. First, because not all assertions of reasons are assertions of symptoms or causes. And second, because in some areas safe forecasts are rare or non-existent, even though one can see *ex post facto* why an event occurred. Finally, on these points: the notion 'a personal Being' is merely shorthand, and therefore it is not surprising that taking the notion by itself, without regarding what it is shorthand for, we are most uncertain as to how we are to proceed from it. But it does not follow from this that given a certain nexus of assertions about the Creator one cannot see the plausibility of the Incarnation doctrine. To sum up, then, the two important points from the above discussion: (i) the absence of important deductive reasoning in theology and religion does not entail the impossibility of important reasoning in this area; and (ii) the question of whether a revelation can be forecast or not is different from the question whether it can be rationally supported.

I therefore consider that Farrer is being somewhat misleading in saying that the impossibility of deducing the form of God's personal dealing with us from the mere notion of a supreme personal Being is a logical aspect of Revelation itself as Christendom understands it.[1] This is misleading (though true) because the suggestion that such a deduction *could* be made is inappropriate (and Christianity would not be alone in counting it inappropriate). There are no strict deductions, save trivial ones, in theology or religion. There may, however, be a looser relation between propositions in this area. I propose 'suggest' as a suitable expression to describe this relation. 'P suggests Q' would be true where, given P, Q is more plausible than not-Q, other things being equal. Corresponding to 'deduce' and 'infer' we could use 'move to'. Now I do not believe that the impossibility of moving to the form of God's personal dealing with us from the notion of a supreme personal Being is a logical aspect of Revelation in Christianity. Hence I do not agree that Farrer has established that the philosophical inquiry into the

[1] op. cit., p. 98.

possibility and nature of revelation in general evaporates so that one is left just expounding the theology of a particular revelation. There are criteria of truth and kinds of argument, surely, which obtain irrespectively of the truth of any particular faith. (Let C be a group of satisfiable criteria and F a faith: we cannot say that C imply F only if F—for in this case, C would be compatible with both F and not-F and would cease to be criteria; for if F is false, it will not follow that not-C, as we should expect if 'C imply F' were always true—and hence not-F will be compatible with C.) The facts that a theology may incorporate its own criteria of orthodoxy and that some may say that the divine mind is known through infused supernatural wisdom[1] can be got round by making use of a distinction which Farrer makes elsewhere. For he distinguishes between the things *off* which we read God's activity and those *into* which we read it.[2] There must be basic 'neutral' criteria determining whether we read off doctrines correctly even if we then read the doctrines back *into* the manner of operating the criteria. If then there are 'neutral' criteria there is room for a rather wider investigation of the nature of religious doctrines than Farrer allows: this indeed has all along been recognised, naturally enough, by phenomenologists of religion. It may perhaps be objected that there is something cold and irreligious in the notion of 'neutral' criteria. One must believe to understand, etc. Perhaps it is true that some time or other we must have some religious beliefs and try to lead some sort of religious life before we can appreciate what religious utterances are getting at. But it does not follow from this that one must believe a particular faith to be able to appreciate its teachings with some insight. And the question 'How are we to choose between faiths?' is more likely to yield information about criteria than 'How are we to make ourselves understood to agnostics?' Because the latter question is urgent in the present pastoral situation at the intellectual level, it can easily lead philosophers and theologians into supposing that the slogan 'Faith before understanding' means 'The whole Creed before understanding': and this naturally dries up religious argument at its source.

However, though Farrer has perhaps overstated the case

[1] 1 Cor. 2.9-15 quoted by Farrer, op. cit., p. 85.
[2] Art. on 'Examination of Theological Belief', op. cit., p. 13.

against religious thinking in the first two sections of his article, he makes ample amends in the third by introducing the notion of criteria for the acceptance or recognition of revelation and of checks on new revelations and prophecies. The former he divides into three sorts: preparatory, intrinsic and relative. The first are those of other sciences, e.g. history. For example, we establish the truth of the claim that Jesus rose from the dead by employing ordinary historical tests (though these are sometimes affected by belief, and not always unjustifiably). There is no need to discuss these as we have a clear enough idea of them already. Second, the intrinsic criteria are those whereby, denied the aid of ready-made criteria, we make our decision after a scrutiny of the thing itself. He compares this tentatively to what happens when we judge the merit of any great and original work of art. Finally, there are relative criteria, which he sums up simply in the words:

> We should not find revelation intrinsically convincing if everything else made nonsense of it, and it made nonsense of everything else.[1]

He also remarks that the intrinsic and relative criteria are scarcely distinguishable.

Now though he recognises the existence of the latter two sorts of way of judging the truth of revelation, he does not give examples. But certain ones readily occur (though whether they are intrinsic or relative I leave to the reader to decide), and I shall discuss two rather obvious ones.

(i) 'Christ is the Father's *only*-begotten Son.' Why only one Son? Gandhi found that the uniqueness of the Incarnation was a stumbling-block to his acceptance of Christianity. On the other hand, orthodox Muslims consider even one Incarnation to be a great blasphemy. And I think we can agree with them that it is a *prima facie* blasphemy. However, once the principle of an Incarnation is accepted, this is the simplest form of the doctrine. The idea of God's appearing many times on earth might indeed seem to detract from the majesty of the Godhead (especially where God is supposed, Visnu-wise, to have appeared in animal form in some *avatāras*). Thus the Christian doctrine could be defended as (*a*) the simplest of its kind, and (*b*) the least blasphemous-seeming. Another theolo-

[1] op. cit., p. 102.

gical advantage is that the full manhood of Christ is preserved, so to speak, by His uniqueness. There is a tendency in multiple incarnations towards docetism, for fairly obvious reasons. But why not docetism? Because then (*a*) Christ's self-sacrifice could not then be on behalf of mankind, since as a gesture it must be performed by one in a state of solidarity with mankind; and (*b*) His sufferings would share in His unreality and it is hardly much of a gesture for God to put on the appearance of suffering.

A comment on the above considerations. Involving as they do concepts such as (ritual) *sacrifice*, *expiation*, *sin*, *atonement*, *blasphemy*, etc., it is already clear that they are neither straight moral nor straight empirical arguments. Also, the use of these key expressions is given at least partly in worship and related rites of a numinous character (though these may be held to be merely a formal expression of more basic religious experiences—to discuss *this*, however, would be a long story). Another point: the rites mentioned involve directing attention towards God. We cannot therefore say: We understand propositions about God (God's personality, etc.) simply through contemplating the figure of Christ. It is therefore a hard saying to assert, as Farrer does:

> To believe in God is doubtless to believe in a supreme personal Cause; yet His 'personality' is subject to negative qualification, and conviction dissolves in ambiguity when we try to decide how deep the qualifications go. But (our religion holds) while we are immobilised by logical mist, God sends us His *Logos*.[1]

The Father, if not prior in status, is *logically* prior to the Son.

But the reasoning I have indulged in (following others) about the Incarnation may, by making a unique Incarnation plausible, seem to detract from the *astonishingness* of it. There are three points to note. First, the fact that such reasoning can be used does not entail that I or others like me could have forecast the Incarnation if we had lived before Jesus. Hence if we think ourselves back into those times we recapture part of the sense in which Christ's Incarnation was astonishing. Second, the paradox, though mitigated, remains. For although religious discourse is sufficiently plastic for two disparate entities (the Creator and Jesus the man) to be called in some manner one,

[1] op. cit., p. 98.

the entities remain disparate-looking even after we have observed their strange resemblances. Third, that sense of radical sinfulness which the worshipper possesses when confronted by the All-Holy and which is expressed in particularly sharp form by the doctrine of a contingent and transmitted Fall must also express itself, when confronted by Christ, in a deep conviction of the amazing goodness of God in deigning to look upon (let alone sacrifice Himself for) the sinner. From the depths, the Incarnation, however plausible, still astonishes.

(ii) A second simple example: 'Christ is perfectly good.' Suppose that we turned up documents conclusively showing Christ to have been a murderer. Our faith undoubtedly would be shaken—even if some would reverse the argument and try to show that the supposedly evil act had an inner point (to argue thus would show at least that the document constituted a difficulty). Why should Christ's perfect goodness (doctrinally developed to be sinlessness) be a mark of divinity? Roughly (*a*) because God is perfectly or infinitely good, so that if anyone is to be God he must be thus good[1]; and (*b*) because such goodness is a marvellous thing. But why say that God is good? Partly because there is already a suggestion of this in the notion of a God at all. For God is holy and dynamic, and is naturally thought to be the source of (or in some manner intimately connected with) mundane instances of holiness and sacredness. Hence He is the source of that acquirement of holiness which we call salvation (this even apart from the moral extension of the concept of personal holiness). And this indeed is a sign of His mercy. Also (though the evidence here cuts two ways) He has given us life and the splendid beauties of the world. Again (an incidental and negative point) His goodness allows of an integration of religion and morality.

(iii) These simple general considerations are illustrations of the grounds for asserting Christ to be God. In themselves they are not sufficient, but somewhat peripheral. But it is a *convergence* of a number of different points that would tend to be decisive. And perhaps they do not constitute *intrinsic* criteria in Farrer's sense. Maybe he is thinking of such things as the impact

[1] Though there are considerable difficulties in the notion of perfect goodness in this context, as is well brought out by C. B. Martin in his article 'The Perfect Good' reprinted in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, ed. Flew and Macintyre, (London, 1955), pp. 212ff.

of Christ's character as described in the New Testament—the power and holiness of His person as shown in His conduct and words and the pattern of His career as fitting in with the religious situation then and now. It is perhaps difficult to say anything about these matters which is helpful. But if we take Farrer's tentative analogy with a work of art seriously, we can perhaps perform a kind of spiritual literary criticism (though I do not wish to evoke the sense of detached dilettantism which the comparison may suggest). Indeed, I think that it is this kind of appreciation which is made in many sermons and some apologetics. For (*a*) with regard to the impact of His character —this can be accounted for to some extent in words; just as we can say, albeit somewhat inadequately, why a man is likeable and can therefore give reasons for this judgment. And (*b*) as to the pattern—we can say something (even taking a wider view than is afforded by our own religious tradition) as to why riding on an ass and rising from the dead are spiritually appropriate events and why miracles in certain settings are signs of divinity. What *is* true, however, is that it is rather rare to persuade someone who fails to see the truth. This raises an important point connected with Farrer's later remarks about the checks on new prophecies and doctrines.

They are, Farrer points out, sifted thoroughly before acceptance and there are five checks to help us with the sifting—viz. (i) 'the discernment of spirits', or the scrutiny of the effect produced by the supposed revelation on the man who utters it; (ii) efficacy, or the tendency of his message to produce godly states in his hearers; (iii) orthodoxy, or the mutual support of doctrines; (iv) nationality, or agreement with conscience and good sense; and (v) applicability to the facts.[1] Now, as he points out, these checks operate in the Church. It is not simply that individuals can apply the checks independently, for belief in the inspiration of Christians is the believer's starting-point.

Roughly, we can put the inner point about the Church's authority thus: that at vital junctures and in key positions there have been men of deeper spiritual insight than usual. And just as often in moral argument we fail to persuade because we are ourselves not good enough, so often individual argument on religion fails in its objective because we lack inspiration (that

[1] op. cit., p. 106.

right fire in the eyes and right tone in the voice that is the fruit of spirituality). Hence it is easier for the Church as a community to conduct the argument than for the individual members thereof.

Nevertheless, the Church's spiritual teaching may be effective enough for individuals to see the point of doctrines which they might scarcely have understood if left to themselves. (As too in morals: realising that cruelty to animals is wrong is a commonplace today and men, who are little better in themselves than their ancestors, are far more humane.) Therefore, though the individual should acknowledge his debt to the Church he has a certain independence; and it is open to him to try to apply criteria to the revelations on his own and to consider the plausibility of doctrines, using arguments such as I have outlined above or better ones. This seems to give us the possibility of a new kind of natural theology, which is much softer than traditional natural theology, for it does not pretend that its arguments are or have to be deductive; but harder than revealed theology, for it is not just an exposition of revealed truth. Perhaps it is not unlike certain sorts of apologetics (such as the *Cur Deus Homo*), though in a new atmosphere of sensitivity as to what constitutes a spiritual argument and a new awareness of what can be elicited from the phenomenology of religions. To defend Christianity through appeal to religious experience and the principles suggested by this needs indeed such an atmosphere and such an awareness: it is not just Christian religious insights that are our data. And, to revert to the literary parallel: just as wider more variegated reading often throws light on a familiar work, so too even in the mysterious area of religion.

A final squib: I think that once we begin seriously, like Farrer, to consider what sorts of argument and criterion are relevant in matters of religious truth, we shall perhaps be impressed by the comparative softness of them. This is at once a justification and condemnation of dogmatism.

The tenor of these remarks, then, can be summed up first by saying that there is room for soft natural theology, making use of considerations and arguments seen to be relevant in a spiritual context—and here we can employ patterns of interrelated concepts (such as *God*, *sin* and *expiation*) that can, in

a sense, be derived from the comparative phenomenology of religion (since the study of religions can often broaden our vision and deepen our perception). And second by saying that we should scrap the old talk of faculties such as Faith and Reason, and cease to be mesmerised by the crude clearcut opposition. Already its power seems to fade when we use the plural and begin to talk of reasons.

NATURAL THEOLOGY AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

by Professor NELS F. S. FERRÉ

For over a generation now (in Protestant circles) natural theology has fallen on evil days. Barth has stamped ruthlessly on every attempt to ground the Christian faith in any form of general knowledge. 'Back to the biblical faith' became his watchword. Bultmann likewise scorned *Weltanschauung* as the importation of Stoicism into the non-philosophical Christian faith. Between Barth's biblical theology and Bultmann's existentialism there was such a strong bond of common hostility to general revelation that natural theology was rejected outright—for natural theology is most properly defined as any knowledge of God, His will and His ways, based on man's general experience, knowledge, and reason.

Lately, however, for good or ill, there are some signs of return. The thrust of Kierkegaard's anti-rational and anti-empirical polemic is being broken both as its newness wears off and as its negativity stands naked before us. The anti-theological as well as the anti-metaphysical drive of linguistic philosophy is slowing down, and there is even evident most recently a somewhat more constructive mood and method within this philosophical position. The power of Tillich's position, in sharp contrast, has been partly due to a bold system holding that, while recognising the truths inherent in both Barth's anti-liberal stand and Bultmann's existential interpretation of the Christian faith, nevertheless dares to base itself on the fulness of the facts of experience and of human history. Tillich's positive and inclusive approach is commending itself to a fast expanding circle of thinkers. Some theologians in our country, moreover, have come to a new appreciation of the part played by Liberalism. Last year's (1957) heavy handed dealing with the theology of encounter in the Annual Meeting of the American Theological Society was a clear voice calling for the reappraisal of the topic assigned for this year.

It should be obvious that the question concerning the validity

and value of natural theology cannot be approached competently from within any system. To do so is to beg the initial and the determinative question. The subject therefore calls for a decisive examination of theological method as a whole. The aim of this paper, however, is only to describe and to evaluate two common approaches and to suggest a third. We seem to be on the edge of a reformulation of the basic approach to religious knowledge. In any rethinking of this topic, natural theology, in one form or other, should find an important place, for Horace's contention will not die: *Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.*

I

The first approach to be considered is that natural theology is itself the only basis of faith, even of the Christian faith. What other data are there, ask the advocates of this position, than those of this actual world? If there is any reality beyond this world, as soon as it has entered our world and can be grasped by our reason and experience, it is natural knowledge. Whatever can be known, communicated and tested by our experience, is natural knowledge. All valid knowledge, according to this position, is limited by the very fact of our situation to natural knowledge. Therefore there can be no legitimate theology that is not natural theology. Hume and Kant have shown once for all, the advocates of this view of theology contend, that no arguments from this world can attain to knowledge of reality beyond it.

Few theologians, of course, have been content to limit theological knowledge to the reports of scientific inquiry. Those who do, hold that science deals only with the description of facts and functions. It limits its field of knowledge to such data as can be described and publicly verified by objective means. The aspirations and 'revelations' of private devotions and public religion can never claim the status of knowledge. Such theological scientism obviously results in a completely this-worldly theology.

Most other naturalistic theologians go beyond scientism, but reject in the name of philosophy all theological claims to know God beyond this world, at least in the sense of the supernaturalism of classical Christianity. Kant's critical philosophy has usually been presupposed by their method. All proofs of a

supernatural or a 'transcendent' God depend in some way on the ontological, Kant claims, and this proof is in fact only definitional in nature. Existence is no predicate that can be added to a perfect idea, especially since such perfection lacks confirmation necessarily within the realm of the contingent, the perishable and the evil. Furthermore, theologians of naturalism point out, knowledge is either univocal or equivocal. If, in speaking of the supernatural, we use words in the same sense in which they are used in our ordinary knowledge, we have not superseded it; merely to posit another realm of the same kind as this world, furthermore, as Aristotle and Hume both held, is in no way to explain or to account for this world. If the words we use in seeking to go beyond this world, on the other hand, do not have their ordinary meaning, we are appealing to ignorance. The transcendent world, in such a case, has no knowable nature nor ascertainable basis in fact. If appeal is made to analogy, moreover, even to the analogy of proportionality, if such analogy purports to leave the realm of knowledge to become informative of some super-realm, such reasoning, in the final analysis, is subject to the same kind of demolition as that visited upon the proofs themselves. Therefore the final result of the attempt to reach any supernatural order, it is claimed, remains either mere anthropomorphism or mere agnosticism. Neither philosophy nor theology as knowledge can therefore go beyond this world.

A modern form of this argument is linguistic analysis, by whatever name. According to this school, broadly speaking, science alone gives concrete knowledge. Philosophy is uninformative, dealing with the meaning of meaning and the clarification of meaning. Meaning is either propositional and analytical, as in philosophy, or else it is verifiable in some public manner by objective tests, as in science. Such verification is possible only in the realm of sense knowledge, or as this position has now developed, by the most stringent possible check-back of any inference to the sense data from which it was made. No other language is meaningful. Theology is meaningless, it is claimed, as being neither merely analytical nor stringently empirical. God as necessary being is either a statement that is guilty of logical confusion—since necessity pertains to propositions alone and being to contingent probability—or

else it is a logically demonstrable falsehood. No growth of this analytical position can fundamentally alter its condemnation of theology, it seems, without destroying its original basis. In Wittgenstein's later usage philosophy makes language less a matter of convention and less subject to correctional manipulation, but its stress on legitimate usage has never included any realm beyond natural knowledge. Whatever may be said, furthermore, of the existentialist school, such as that of Heidegger and Jaspers, its dealing with transcendence has never reached any point where even the phrase 'natural theology' could be properly used as relevant to the classical Christian field.

It is fair to say that both scientific naturalism and verification philosophy (linguistic analysis) should remind us that we have no right to live in a pre-Humian and pre-Kantian age. The day of an objective, rational metaphysics, deductive or inductive, is over. There is no presuppositionless thinking. Thought concerning ultimates is basically decisional, having at its disposal no full rational proof. Man has, besides, the freedom even not to see evidence. Justification by faith is not only a matter of life but also of knowledge.

The most adequate methodological inquiry in theology within the general assumptions of this first group in America is the work of men like A. N. Whitehead and our own Paul Tillich and Daniel Day Williams. These all reject scientism. They all proceed from validity to adequacy, to use Whitehead's terminology. Whitehead believed that his best writing was on God, but the God he described is accessible to scientific and philosophic confirmation without recourse to any transcendence beyond the order of our natural world. Tillich likewise refuses to be limited to any scientific or even philosophic naturalism, in the narrow sense. He advocates instead "the ecstatic reason" as the door to legitimate transcendence. For the most part the method of correlation elicits theological answers to existential questions. Williams believes that all revelationisms that are unchecked by science and philosophy become arbitrary and ultimately relative. For this reason he feels that honest and competent theology should avoid arbitrary revelationisms and speculative theological extensions that lack full relevance and power for our actual human situation. For these three thinkers

all valid theological knowledge is natural theology in the sense that they cast out the supernaturalism of classical Christianity.

From the stance of those who no longer believe in any ontological reality beyond this actual world, or who believe positively that our theological task is correctly to analyse this world and prescribe remedy for it, natural theology, in the classical sense, appears within a radically altered perspective. It is not right to observe this view of natural theology from within the assumptions of supernaturalism. For these thinkers, instead of there being a realm beyond nature and history where God basically is and works and whence He has come to reveal Himself and to save us, the whole revelational content of classical theology is simply part of the data of Christian theology in the post-critical modern sense. Thus whereas those who hold to supernaturalism interpret as naturalism all theologies that do not, and consequently class and compare these, in intent and field, with the historic doctrines of natural theology generally, from the point of view of those who consider classical supernaturalism untenable, the old naturalism is itself untenable because it was built upon a fallacious dualism.

In general the theological content of this position, by whatever name, stresses dependable cosmic order and resources for human life. This theology is no humanism. It testifies to objective powers that make for being and for harmony of being, to principles of concretion, to streams of reality that afford victory over anxiety. The human situation is accepted realistically and subjected to keen analysis, with its hopes and frustrations, its fulfilments and its demands. History itself becomes a matter of answering man's basic questions of embarrassment, reason becomes problem solving and ecstatic. Needs reveal the resources in reality to meet them. Usually the Christian content of love is accepted as a way of believing and of walking, with powers available in reality to answer such seeking for love. Christian words are taken over with a fresh meaning. Although God is no longer considered to be a supernatural, personal Being, He is both the ground and the goodness of life. Creation and providence are no longer deemed to be due to God's personal initiative from beyond our world but are rather conceived of as divine activity within our world and history. With these interpretations Christ is still central to

Christian faith, not, to be sure, as the Son sent by God into the world to save the world, but as the revealer of the true meaning of existence and its saving power. The Cross and the Resurrection for them are still the power of God for salvation, not as God's literal going to death and rising again as a victor over it, and not as salvation in terms of continued personal life after death, but as God's victory within history and human life over man's chief enemies and the tragedies of existence. God, in a new sense, is ultimate meaning and effective power for good. 'Natural theology' as traditionally considered, becomes from within this context the general religious experiences of men, apart from the central revelatory and redemptive acts of the Christian faith.

The honesty of this position is unmistakable. Its advocates are among our most competent and creative thinkers. If the facts of the situation demanded that we thus reduce our faith, we should all be willing, I hope, to join them. My own inability to do so is due to an insight that has captured me, namely that the history of creation when seen in the light of the Incarnation indicates a transcendent Ground of creation and a transcendent Goal of human history. When Christ as Agape, furthermore, is taken univocally as the revelation of God, we have within human experience Him who promises fulfilment of it and who, nevertheless, cannot be accounted for by general experience. By situation all men must live by faith; and this faith in the transcendent God, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is for me, although unprovable, the least arbitrary and the most convincing. An explicit or an implicit faith in the world we now know, apart from some explanation of the history of its long coming to be and the sudden appearance of the whole realm of life and meaning, would for me be begging the basic questions of ontology. This is my answer to the Hume-Kant rejection of all knowledge of the transcendent. It is not pre-critical but post-critical. In such a faith, meaning and mystery are both present; faith and reason join in the task of living. Within naturalism, by whatever name, there is no real God as Creator, no sovereign Ruler, no ultimately inscrutable personal Providence, no Cross as the identification in redemptive suffering of the Infinite God with man, and no actual Resurrection from the dead on the part of Christ or man, now or ever.

There is, therefore, no requisite answer within this position to the presence and power of evil in the world and no legitimate acceptance of the ontology of Love as ultimate. Such is the case whether salvation is conceived of as a victory within man in this life or some finding final rest and fulfilment in the ocean of being. Every ocean of being at last drowns not only man's hopes, but man. The accommodation of this position to our actual world, moreover, robs faith of its power for the people as soon as they see through the richness of the language to the poverty of the promises. We turn therefore to another way of looking at natural theology.

II

The opposite way of looking at natural theology is to accept a self-contained, authoritative revelation. From this standpoint the method for determining whether or not natural theology is Christian is to search the revelation. If it is Christian the next step is to ascertain what natural theology means in the light of the accepted authority and what place it has in the faith. There are three ways of doing so: (1) to search the teachings of an authoritative Bible; (2) or of an authoritative Church; (3) or to draw legitimate inferences from the given revelation.

Biblical scholars find that God in the Old Testament works in nature—witness the testimony of the Psalms; and in general history—witness God's use of Cyrus. In the New Testament occasional verses give evidence for natural theology, as for instance the statement of Jesus: 'Why judge ye not of yourselves what is right?' Similar testimony is Paul's explicit reference to the Gentiles' having a conscience whereby they judge what is right and wrong. Other suggestive statements may be added, such, for example, as that God has made himself plainly known ever from creation, 'even his eternal power and deity'; or that the Gentiles worship the same God as the Jews, 'for God is one'. Against these verses must be balanced, of course, such claims as the assertion that the natural man cannot know the things of the spirit. Such affirmations, however, refer not to natural theology, but rather to natural knowledge of revelation. Kraemer's basic analysis of natural theology in *Religion and the Christian Faith* is weakened by his failure to distinguish these two kinds of knowledge. The result of biblical exegesis, in any

ase, is that what may be called natural theology is plainly resent in the Bible, but exceptionally and unimportantly.

If, on the other hand, the Church is accepted as authority, he fact is that most of the Fathers assumed some form or easure of natural theology, not only writers like Justin Martyr nd Clement of Alexandria. In Augustine, God's presence and ork outside the Christian revelation is definite and large caled, and in Aquinas natural theology is a twin pillar of faith. ven if Bultmann should be right that such teaching is an im- ortation of Stoicism and not a part of the original Kerygma, hose who depend on the authoritative teachings of the Church hould, on the whole, consider natural theology a part of the hristian faith. Even the Reformers, as McNeill has ably emonstrated, kept natural theology within their exposition of he Christian faith. The Fathers who in the main rejected atural theology, like Tertullian, are exceptional. The Church as therefore taught natural theology in some form.

In contemporary biblical and Reformation theology, however, here has been generally an outright denial of natural theology. his radical rejection has not come mainly from exegesis, in ny case, but mostly from the acceptance of Søren Kierkegaard's ictum that there is a qualitative distinction between time and ternity. Barth drew radically the consequences of this thesis. here is nothing of God in man, in history or in nature, Barth rowled, and no revelatory or redemptive work there either. ven after Barth came to see that his extreme stand was due o Kantian philosophy and not to the biblical revelation, he evertheless kept taking it. Barth, to my knowledge, has never ndicated that he sees any organic relation between God's pecial presence and work in Christ and the realm of creation nd history. In *Fides Quaerens Intellectum*, in *Christengemeinde nd Bürgergemeinde*, and especially in *The Doctrine of Reconcilia- ion*, Barth has begun to deal with the question of God's general work. His treatment of the Noachic Covenant in *The Doctrine f Reconciliation* is of real importance at this point, as are also is treatment of the Abrahamic Covenant, the Deutero-Isaiah ommission of the Suffering Servant and the New Covenant of eremiah. But even in his frank and sweeping acknowledgment n *Die Menschlichkeit Gottes* of his definite failure at this point n his early writings, Barth is still so confiningly Christocentric

that he does not begin to fathom the extent and importance of God's general presence and work in nature and history in preparation for the fulness of time in Christ. (I am now informed that he is at present remedying this defect in lectures which will be published as Volume V of his *Church Dogmatics*.)

What has obviously happened in Barth's case is that he has rejected the importation of philosophical considerations and conclusions that on the whole are unbiblical so passionately that he has also rejected basically the minor allowance made for natural theology within the Bible. He has done so, evidently, on the ground that all natural theology is damaging to a vigorous and forthright Christian confession. In this his main concern, I believe, he is right. He is wrong, however, not only in his general neglect of whatever natural theology there is in the Bible, but, much more, in his narrow biblicism whereby he isolates Christ from God's comprehensive indirect work pedagogically in human experience, in nature and in history.

The approach of an authoritative, self-contained revelation threatens us with an arbitrary faith and therefore, ultimately, with relativity. Inasmuch as revelation, in this understanding of it, cannot by its very nature be related to general knowledge, it lacks relevance for life and thought. Although there was decisive need for the emphasis on the primacy of revelation, the time is long since past, or should be, when scholars had to obtain knowledge of nature from the Bible or from theology and were willing even to dispute the facts of nature for the sake of a self-contained fully authoritative revelation. The time should be equally past when man's religious knowledge, on any level or in any realm, can be isolated from his total knowledge. For me, consequently, recourse to an arbitrary revelation to determine the nature and meaning of natural theology, if any, is anachronistic and unreal. Such a faith is arbitrary, relativistic, and solicits a capricious acceptance.

Thus, just as I could not find adequate the position that assumes natural theology as the only available basis for faith, no more can I accept what to me is an arbitrary and authoritarian position in this matter. I turn, then, to an understanding of natural theology that I believe accepts the distinctive truths of both positions while doing fuller justice not only to faith and reason, but especially to the nature of the full Gospel.

III

We have now sketched possibilities for natural theology: first, from the standpoint of reason informed by general experience, and secondly from the point of view of revelation. There is, besides, the Thomist position which holds natural theology to be accessible within the realm of reasoned experience, but which superimposes upon such theology the distinctive revelation of the Christian faith. Although the method of Thomism gives expression to profound truth, it is as a whole a convenient historic solution, not sufficiently integrated organically to serve as the most inclusive context for unified inquiry and as the definitive discourse of religious knowledge.

What I propose, in place of the positions we have discussed, as the correct approach to the problem of natural theology involves our going neither from reason to revelation nor from revelation to reason; nor is it, furthermore, as in Thomism, a keeping them both apart, no matter to what extent they may also point towards the same conclusions. My suggestion is, rather, that we rethink natural theology within the context of incarnational theology. The Incarnation is Christ as the Event-meaning of Agape; it is the revelation, for the world's redemption and fulfilment, of the personal Spirit who is holy Love. Both revelation and reason then centre in Christ at the start, while branching out afterwards into the supernatural and the natural realms. We do not start methodologically either with God or with man, but with the God-man. Incarnation is in, but basically not confined to, the world. The new Being of Christ cannot be accounted for by general experience nor reduced to it. At that He most fully gives meaning to experience, not only to personal experience but to that of history and of nature as well. His origin cannot be explained in terms of what we know, and yet He gives both reason for, and context to, that origin.

While the Incarnation is in itself selective, it yet involves all we know, even reorienting and reshaping aggregative reality into an eschatological expectation by the power of the Incarnational centre. The Incarnation of Christ as Agape has the power of supernatural transcendence. While it can never be definitely limited to the observation of the actual, calling as it

does upon the illimitable mystery of the God of eternity, Incarnation nevertheless is not arbitrary since it offers definable meaning that can be tested, at least partially and secondarily, for its right to claim transcendence. In other words, Christ, the God-man of the Cross and the Resurrection, is the Event which gives us eternity in, beyond and for time, gives light for explanation, judgment and salvation, and affords the power for the redemption and the fulfilment of life.

Christ is therefore no bridge between the natural and the supernatural. He is the common corridor that must be entered and traversed if either is properly to be reached. We can neither presuppose supernaturalism, unfolding thereafter its content in Christ, nor assume naturalism while reaching the full meaning of the natural in Christ. Instead, the only door to full truth is Christ as the Event-meaning who is Agape. In the light of the life, teachings, Cross and Resurrection of Christ we discover that no supernatural order can be known decisively apart from Christ while no natural order of this world can contain and confine Him. The supernatural order is the eternally transcendent reality and power of the love of God revealed in Christ for our judgment, salvation and fulfilment. The natural order is the realm of creation *in response to* the realm of redemption: the conditions of nature and history that make our process pedagogical. Thus both the supernatural and the natural, to be correctly known, must be seen in Christ. Accordingly, after Christ's coming natural theology is no realm of investigation apart from Him. Before His coming the full scope of problems concerning natural theology could not be had. He alone gives the full context to God's plan and purpose for nature. Besides, natural theology cannot be carried on competently apart from the eyes of faith that kindle sight. Believing and knowing are twin requirements for theological adequacy. Discipleship and scholarship must be wed for legitimate theological children to be born.

At the same time, natural theology cannot be curtailed to the human nature of Christ, as Barth generally does. Even when he allows the Noachic and consequent Old Testament covenants, thus providing more room for natural theology, even protesting a freedom to which he never gives content or concrete significance, as in his *Doctrine of Reconciliation*, he is still

confined for his view of natural theology to a specialised biblical focus on God's activity. The study of natural theology can be carried on aright, however, only when with the eyes of faith and with ungrudging allowance for whatever measure of objective investigation of nature and history is possible, the theologian genuinely comes to terms and grips with the facts and relations of the natural order, as a whole and in specific parts, and then places all his findings within the context of God's eternal purpose in Christ. Christ as theological context alters no fact *as fact*, but the Christian pattern involves change in the meaning and the relations of the facts. The configuration of Christian revelation, Christ as Event-meaning, rearranges, revalues and reconstitutes facts. Christian theology can never impose its truth; it cannot lord it over any other subject. Christ, when rightly known and accepted sets men free to study the orders of nature in history. Christian love as *context* gives ultimate meaning and motivation to both life and study without distorting or prejudicing any content of knowledge in any field. Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is complete freedom of mind, of task, and of field. If we abide in Him who is the truth we shall take the way of meaningful but open inquiry and be set free by the truth. Only against the background of such natural theology does revealed theology display its ampler truth and relevance. Only God's patient work on the level of creation makes intelligible, in the face of evil, the claim of God's self-revelation to be from the beginning creative Love.

In our day, there should be no need for a reminder that the supernatural is not to be thought of directionally or geographically. The eternal Spirit does not relate Himself to His creation or creatures basically in spatial terms. Supernaturalism should be considered not directionally but dimensionally. Wherever God is, He is incommensurably more and other than His creation. Even in His presence with nature, He is completely transcendent of it. Similarly in His presence with man, even in Incarnation, God retains His unbridgeable, qualitative distinction from man. Even when 'filled with the fulness of God', man never becomes the slightest bit God. Whether in His deity or in His humanity, God remains forever God. However much 'in, with, and under' any creature, God is wholly other and entirely transcendent in the sense that, while

truly present, God never becomes part of, or commingles, His nature with any creature. Thus no matter how fully God is present with a creature and no matter how fulfillingly He participates in its life, God remains God without localisation or limitation.

Dimensional transcendence has been brilliantly and weightily treated by Paul Tillich as categorical necessity (non-existent as a realm of transcendent being or of pure being within existence) the impingement of the unconditional on the conditional for the sake of being and harmony of being. Dimensional rather than directional transcendence in my understanding, however, presupposes difference of being from our time-space existence, but not the absence of transcendent being. The clue to such an order of being is God as Spirit. Theological content and context come together in Christ the God-man. Such super-naturalism as results from this conjunction is subject to no demythologising. Such naturalism as results can have no limits of investigation set for it by revealed theology. The contents of the orders of redemption and creation are different, needing distinctive methods; the context for the knowledge of both is the same.

Simply to go from revelation to reason is to fall prey to the problems of an arbitrary faith; merely to go from reason to revelation is to centre revelation in the natural order and, therefore, never decisively to rise beyond it. Rather, we should so start with Incarnation that the special revelation of God's self-disclosure is related to general revelation as its fulfilment by transformation while the general revelation becomes secondarily a resultative check on the special, delivering the special from the charge of arbitrariness. Revelation should disclose to the trained eyes of faith at least the proper nature and meaning of the order of creation. In this way faith and reason, for us finite creatures, become dynamically interrelated, neither ever reducible to the other or independent of it. In the primary revelation of Christ, the Agape of God, has come the full light. This light has not come apart from either man's realms of darkness nor the faint lights of God's preparatory dawn, but it is a light which, when rightly seen, cannot be dimmed by the natural order, but seen only in richer rays when reflected and diversified in God's glory in creation.

THE BISHOP-IN-PRESBYTERY: AN AUSTRALIAN REACTION

by The Rev. Professor J. F. PETER

The proposals contained in the Report entitled 'Relations Between Anglican and Presbyterian Churches'[1] are sufficiently far-reaching to command wide attention. And this is what, in some quarters, they have attracted—though one suspects that the attention given them has not always been born of knowledge, or of an interest quite devoid of mercenary considerations. In essence, the proposals call for a modification of Church polities to provide for 'Bishops' in Presbyterian Churches and for 'Elders' in Anglican Churches[2]; and it is the effect of such a modification, as it relates to Presbyterian Churches, and to the Presbyterian Church of Australia in particular, that is the subject of these comments.

I

First, we must see clearly just what is proposed, as well as what the proposals are intended to achieve.

1. The suggested modifications in polity are not proposed with the object of promoting a union of the four Churches, or of any two or three of them.[3]

The Conversations which have resulted in this Report were intended to carry a stage further the results of Conversations (between the Church of England and the Church of Scotland with representatives of the other two Churches present as observers) which took place in 1932-4 and 1949-51. These Conversations, as well as disclosing considerable doctrinal agreement, had brought forth recommendations concerning such practical matters as admission to Holy Communion and

[1] Published simultaneously, April 1957, in Edinburgh (by the Saint Andrew Press) and in London (by the S.P.C.K.) My references are to the Scottish edition. The four Churches represented in the Conversations are: The Church of England, The Church of Scotland, The Episcopal Church in Scotland and The Presbyterian Church of England.

[2] Both terms are placed in inverted commas at this point, to indicate that their connotations may not be just what they are in other contexts.

[3] This is stated specificially on p. 23.

the exchange of preachers (these were spoken of as 'a short-t term policy looking to the establishment of such closer relations between the two Churches as may be immediately practicable'), and had also envisaged the possibility of 'a long-term policy looking to the ultimate fulness of the Church's life'.[1] It is this long term task that the latest Conference has tried to serve[2]; and what is envisaged now is 'a *fulness of sacramental communion* . . . involving fully authorised interchange of communicants and mutual recognition of Ministries'.[3] The central question which the Conference sought to answer is: 'What changes in the conferring Churches are held to be requisite for full intercommunion and also for mutual adaptation in the interest of a fuller expression of Catholicity?'[4]

2. The atmosphere surrounding these Conversations has been one of marked agreement on fundamental issues which finds only passing mention in the Report, but without which a Report of this kind would have been quite impossible. 'It has been of primary importance for the present series of Conversations that all four Churches represented in them have been associated with one another within the Ecumenical Movement and have also shared in the revival of interest in biblical theology which has been a notable feature of the last few decades.'[5]

To appreciate this atmosphere, which is the one prevailing throughout the Christian world today, is to see at once the irrelevancy of a good deal of the criticism (based as it is on past differences) levelled at inter-Church consultations, and at any possibility of one Church taking into itself features, and even doctrines, which have hitherto been regarded as characteristic of another.

3. Those who have subscribed the Report do not claim that its proposals are the last word on the matter: 'we have made what we recognise to have been no more than an exploratory survey',[6] they say; and they specifically request that some time be spent in study and examination of their suggestions before any considered judgment is formulated.[7] Moreover, they claim

[1] The results of these earlier Conversations are referred to summarily on pp. 9-10, and Appendices (pp. 33-42) give extracts from the earlier Reports and from the consequent decisions of the several Church authorities.

[2] pp. 9, 15. [3] p. 23. [4] p. 29.

[5] p. 11. The Report indicates four 'initial and largely tacit agreements' (pp. 12-15), and five 'Biblical and doctrinal considerations' which should be held in view in any scheme of mutual adaptation (pp. 17-18). [6] p. 16. [7] pp. 17, 29

that each Church must allow the other a measure of freedom in interpreting the changes proposed and, while free to develop its own full inheritance of life and worship, must allow the possibility of a change in interpretation of what is in its own tradition.[1] It is recognised, too, that 'other and not less fundamental changes' may come about as the Churches grow in spiritual fellowship together.[2]

Thus in fact, and in accordance with the wishes of those who took part in this Conference, the matter is still an open question, both as to principle and as to detail. None of the Churches has yet made a decision to accept the suggestions made in the Report and, if and when they do, it does not follow at all that the 'Bishops' and 'Elders' who then arise will be similar in every resepct to any who bear these titles today.

4. With this understanding of the background and intentions of the Conference, we are in a better position to see just what modifications to Presbyterian order and procedure are envisaged. The following are the relevant paragraphs.

> Bishops, chosen by each Presbytery, from its own membership or otherwise, would initially be consecrated by prayer and the laying on of hands by Bishops from one or more of the Episcopal Churches and by the Presbytery acting through appointed representatives. Thus consecrated each Bishop would be within the apostolic succession as acknowledged by Anglicans on the one hand and as required by Presbyterians on the other. He would be the President of the Presbytery and would act as its principal minister in every ordination and in the consecration of other Bishops. He would exercise pastoral oversight over his fellow-ministers in the Presbytery, and act as its spokesman to the community. He might well have a particular charge of his own besides exercising this wider pastoral function. Some modification in the number and size of Presbyteries would be necessary, so that each should be large enough to give the Bishop an adequate sphere, and small enough for him not to be overburdened, in his spiritual and pastoral functions.
>
> It is envisaged that the rite of admission to full membership or confirmation would still be administered by each parochial minister, but the rite might come to be shared by the Bishop and parish minister acting together.
>
> The Presbytery would still retain its full and essential place in the life and government of the Church, except that a permanent Bishop-in-Presbytery would take the place of the changing Moderator. The General Assembly would retain its full existing authority in doctrine, administration, legislation, and judicature. Bishops would be members of the General Assembly, without constituting an Upper House within it, although decisions

[1] p. 23. [2] p. 28.

on doctrinal and constitutional matters might well have to require their consent.[1]

The following points may be underlined:

(*a*) The question whether the adoption of these proposals would mean a diminution in the power of the Presbytery, as we know it, is given a definite answer in the negative. Its procedure would be changed only in so far as its election of a Moderator is concerned: once chosen to fill this office, a man would remain in it for a considerable period (probably the intention is that he would remain in it for life, though I do not see that this could be held as necessary). But there is no suggestion that, because he would be its permanent Moderator, such a Bishop could take into his own hands any of the functions presently belonging to the Court as a body. Others of the functions ascribed to him (pastoral oversight of his fellow-ministers and acting as spokesman to the community) are such as would fall naturally, under our present procedure, to anyone who occupied the office of Moderator for a considerable period, but we shall later, in Part II, devote some space to considering whether such a placing of one man in oversight of others would be acceptable to Presbyterians. The suggestion that he act as the Presbytery's 'principal minister in every ordination' raises another question, to which we shall also give some attention later, in Part III, though it might be remarked in passing that, as a matter of fact, this is what happens now.[2]

(*b*) The question whether such a Bishop would stand within the apostolic succession, as that is usually understood by Episcopalians, is given a definite answer in the affirmative by the suggestion that those first chosen by the Presbyteries should be consecrated by Bishops from existing Episcopal Churches and that thereafter a Bishop will be the Presbytery's principal minister in the consecration of other Bishops. This is the question of 'recognition', to which we shall return in Part III.

(*c*) The questions whether such a Bishop should share in the rite of admission to full membership, and whether the Bishops as a group should have some power of veto over decisions of the General Assembly are not given a definite answer; no doubt

[1] pp. 25-26.

[2] A significant change, of course, is that the participation of the Moderator would be thought of as *necessary* to the Ordination.

hey could remain within that area of freedom of interpretation o which reference has already been made.[1]

II

What questions of principle are raised by these proposals? t seems to me that there are but two: that of episcopal over- ight, and that of recognition by existing bishops. We shall consider each of them in turn.

Can the proposal that one minister should be appointed to exercise the oversight of his fellows commend itself to Presbyterians?

1. There can certainly be no objection on our part to the idea of oversight as such; for to have oversight exercised by a group is of the very essence of Presbyterianism, and the point at which it differs from Congregationalism (as it is commonly understood) on the one hand, and Episcopalianism (as it is commonly understood) on the other hand. That is to say, the *episcope*[2] which is held by some to rest in the Congregation, and by others to rest in the Bishop, we hold to rest rightly in the Presbytery.

The proposed modifications do not envisage any departure from this principle, the Bishop-in-Presbytery, like the Governor-in-Council (the term seems to have been borrowed from this situation), would be bound to exercise his authority in accordance with the 'advice' tendered him. It is interesting to read in the Report that 'the Anglican representatives moreover were anxious to emphasise that the Bishop's office is rightly exercised only within the context of the corporate life of the whole Church, a principle which has been too often obscured in practice'.[3] One wonders which of the Churches, in the event of the

[1] The Episcopalian members of the Conference made this comment: 'There might be anxiety if the place of Bishops as collectively having a necessary voice in matters of doctrine were not safeguarded. Episcopalians, regarding Confirmation as a pastoral link between the Bishop and the lay members of his flock, would express the hope that the way might be left open for the episcopal administration of the rite of Confirmation in the proposed changes and that in the experience of the new Church order it might come to be widely and in the end generally used' (p. 26).

[2] Among the five 'biblical and doctrinal considerations' mentioned in the Report as agreed upon is this: '*Episcope*, far from being exclusively concerned with administration, can be considered under five aspects: (*a*) Apostolic mission and authority; (*b*) The pastoral office; (*c*) The continuance of the Ministry of Word and Sacraments through ordination; (*d*) Guardianship of truth and exclusion of error; (*e*) Representation of the Church in its unity and universality' (p. 18).

[3] p. 22.

suggested mutual adaptations being practised, will undergo the greater changes.

2. The fact remains, however, that there is among Presbyterians a deeprooted dislike of 'prelacy' and a fear that any form of 'episcopacy' will lead to this. A glance at the past will be instructive.

The objections which the Reformers had to the episcopacy lay in the fact that the Bishops they knew were far from being shepherds of the flock, since they both neglected the spiritual welfare of their people (and clergy), and made pretentious claims to superiority over them. 'The attempt to return to a simple ministry of Word and Sacrament', writes G. D. Henderson, 'was a natural consequence of the political, social, moral and spiritual character which the episcopacy had assumed by the beginning of the sixteenth century, the inadequacy of the superintendence which it offered, and the failure of the Papacy to justify its claim to the Headship of the Church.'[1] And a noted Anglo-Catholic of our day asks pertinently: 'Was it surprising if they (the Reformers) failed to see in the sixteenth century prelate, as much temporal magnate as spiritual ruler, distracted by cares of State and local government, in juridical rather than pastoral relationship with his flock, the successor of an apostle?'[2]

It can therefore be well argued that what objections the Reformers had to the episcopacy were on the grounds of their perceiving, in the bishops they knew, only a hindrance to true religion, and the refusal on the part of the Bishops (or practically all of them) to join in the movement for reform of the Church along the lines which the Reformers demanded. In the one place where the Bishops as a whole (whatever their reasons) did see fit to join in the reforming movement, the Church continued to be episcopal, and this continuance does not seem to have aroused unfavourable comment on the part of other Reformed Churches. 'There seems little doubt', says Henderson, 'that if bishops had embraced the Reformation as in England, they might almost everywhere have been retained as administrative officials.'[3]

[1] G. D. Henderson, *Presbyterianism*, Aberdeen, University Press, 1954, p. 160.
[2] T. M. Parker, in *The Apostolic Ministry* (edited by K. E. Kirk), London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1946, p. 384.
[3] G. D. Henderson, op. cit., p. 39.

But since one of the reasons which led to the abolition of the episcopacy was the pretentiousness of the claims which the Bishops made to superiority, it was only to be expected that Reformed churchmen would be particularly sensitive to any suggestion that any of their own number should be placed in a position of superiority to their fellows. Hence there arose that interpretation of the 'parity of Ministers' which objected vehemently to any suggestion that any Minister should oversee the work of others[1]—an interpretation which still holds some sway in our Churches. It does not follow, however, that this is the right one.

3. As a matter of fact, there have always been, and there are at the present time, Presbyterian Churches in which some Ministers have been appointed to the oversight of others[2] while we in Australia, with our Superintendents of Mission stations, and of the Australian Inland Mission, our Commissioner for South Australia, and some others, have tacitly acknowledged the fact that (in some circumstances, at least) it is advantageous to have the work of a number directed generally by one.

And it has been made plain, in many of these instances, that to be superintended does not mean to have one's own responsibilities (or, if the term be preferred, one's 'rights') removed.

4. If, then, there can be no objection in principle to the appointment of some to have the oversight of others, we may go on to ask what advantages would accrue from the appointment of a Bishop in each Presbytery.

There are several.[3] Not only would there be a much greater assurance than there is at present of meetings of the Presbytery being conducted efficiently, and of sound and mutually consistent suggestions coming from the chair, but there would be, between meetings and over a period of years, a greater degree of planning by an acknowledged and generally trusted leader; there would be someone to whom any difficulties within parishes might naturally be taken, and whose guidance might

[1] G. D. Henderson gives a number of examples of this way of thinking in the sixteenth century; op. cit., pp. 46-50.

[2] One thinks immediately of the 'bishops' in the Reformed Church of Hungary and of the 'presidents' in the Reformed Church of France, as well as of the 'superintendents' proposed in the First Book of Discipline.

[3] For a good deal of what follows I am indebted to J. M. Ross, *Presbyterian Bishops?*, London, Presbyterian Publishing Committee, *c.* 1953, pp. 5-6.

enable matters to be quietly straightened out before they reach the stage of being past mending; there would be someone to whom any Minister could turn for advice and not feel, as many do at present, that in the absence of anyone to whom he should go as a matter of course, he would rather not go to anyone at all; the visitation of Charges by Presbyteries would be under the guidance of a man continually in touch with their activities; the burden of extra-parochial duties (such as interim moderatorships) would be lifted from many ministers' shoulders; the bishop would be free, as no ordinary minister is, to devote time and energy to church extension; and, finally, there would be less tendency than there is at present to call upon the Moderator of the Assembly to perform a host of functions which are not part of the duties of his office.

All these advantages could accrue, without any material alteration of our present system: certain minor changes in our Rules (and even these may not be strictly necessary)[1] would make it possible for each Presbytery (or two or three Presbyteries together, or even the Assembly) to elect to the office of 'bishop' or 'superintendent' a Minister who would exercise oversight in accordance with whatever principles and procedures the Presbyteries themselves laid down. And, in the light of what has gone before, it can hardly be claimed that such an appointment would constitute an infringement of Presbyterian principles.

III

There arises as the second question of principle that of the Bishop-in-Presbytery being recognised as a Bishop by existing Episcopal Churches, for the Report envisages something more than oversight of the sort commended in Part II.

Episcopalians see the Bishop as filling a distinctive office, the essence of which lies in the coalescence of certain functions in a single person.[2] 'These functions together make up the office

[1] For instance, there is nothing in the present Rules to prevent a Presbytery electing the same man as Moderator for a number of years in succession and giving him whatever authority it chooses.

[2] These functions are represented in the Report as: 'to be the chief minister of the Word and Sacraments; to be the proper minister for the ordination of men to the ministry of the Word and Sacraments; to be the chief pastor of clergy and laity alike; to represent the whole Church to the diocese and the diocese to the whole Church; to have authority in matters of doctrine-vested in the collective Episcopate but exercised in connexion with the Church as a whole' (p. 21).

of a Bishop, as Father-in-God, with succession in his see and succession of consecration, within the continuity of the body of the whole Church.'[1] It is this idea of 'succession' which underlies the insistence that the Bishops first chosen by the Presbyteries should be consecrated by Bishops from existing Episcopal Churches, and that the Bishop should act as the principal minister in every ordination and in the consecration of other Bishops.

1. The Reformers' contention that they were restoring the face of the primitive Church, and that they found in Scripture the authority for certain 'ordinary and perpetual' officers in the Church, suggests that they regarded Ministers as occupying an office which Christ had intended to be always in His Church, and which, despite neglect and even positive abuse, had always existed. There is this sense in which they held a doctrine of succession. But the line generally taken by Reformed churchmen is to rest the claim of Presbyterian Ministers to stand within the Apostolic Succession upon functional rather than historical grounds. That is to say, they believe that the form of the Ministry in Presbyterian Churches is in accordance with whatever the Apostles, in accordance with the teaching of Christ, laid down as a pattern for the organisation of the Church; and they regard this as sufficient, counting as of little consequence the matter of whether that Ministry has any direct 'lineal' connexion with the Apostles.

The question of the continuance of the Ministry with that of the primitive Church was not much thought of in the first years of the Reformation. It was only subsequently, and in the face of assertions that the Ministry of the Reformed Churches was not a true one, that thought seems to have been given to the question.

It was then that there arose the idea (which has at times, and in some circles, found favour, but has never been generally adhered to by Presbyterians) of a *perpetua successio presbyterorum*, the power of ordination resting in a Bishop being thought of as his because of his status as a presbyter.

Neither of these views of succession seems satisfactory to Episcopalians.

2. Another approach to this question is suggested by those

[1] p. 21.

who contend that the Reformed Churches are in fact episcopal Churches, with the parish Minister as the equivalent of the diocesan Bishop.[1] It is not difficult to show that the sort of 'Bishop' known to the early Fathers, such as Ignatius, who wrote of the importance of the episcopate in the life of the Church, had responsibilities very much like those assumed by the 'Minister' known to most people today.[2] With the expansion of the Church, the unit of episcopal oversight became larger, and many of the Bishop's responsibilities were delegated to 'presbyters' ('priests') in particular localities. Eventually the cares of administration took away from the Bishop his primary functions of being a pastor, and the Reformers found themselves unable to recognise, in the prelate of their day, a person corresponding to the Early Church Bishop. What happened then (according to this contention) was not (as is often said) that the Reformers abolished the episcopal office but that, replacing the diocese with the parish, they *continued* the episcopal ministry of Word and Sacraments and discipline.

Clearly, if such a contention were generally accepted, there would be no difficulty about 'succession', and we would have no need of such proposals as we are here considering in order

[1] The lines along which such a contention may be advanced appear in two articles contributed to the *Scottish Journal of Theology* by D. C. Lusk (vol. 3, pp. 255-77, 'What is the Historic Episcopate?'; vol. 8, pp. 1-19, 'Scotland and England: Our Next Task in Church Union') and one contributed to the same journal by G.S.M. Walker (vol. 8, pp. 238-54, 'Scottish Ministerial Orders').

[2] It is interesting to observe what has been written on this score by two of the contributors to the Anglo-Catholic *apologia*, *The Apostolic Ministry* (edited by K. E. Kirk), London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1946.

Gregory Dix writes: 'An infinitesimal proportion of our laity have been baptised by their own bishop, or have even once in their lives made their communion at his hands. The second-century laity expected to do so as a matter of course every Sunday. They had all not only been confirmed by him but baptised by him (or at least in his presence); they were married by him, and if they fell into grave sin were disciplined and absolved by him personally. They expected to be visited by him when they were ill, to be pacified by him if they quarrelled with one another, and buried by him when they died. All this was his ἐπισκοπή—his particular 'function' in the life of his Church. They all expected, too, to have some voice in the selection of his successor' (p. 293).

And K. D. Mackenzie writes: 'The (Presbyterian) minister surrounded by his elders, "ordained" by the minister as they are commonly supposed to be, though without imposition of hands, does remind us irresistibly of the primitive bishop with his "crown" of presbyters. Indeed, the functions of the modern Presbyterian group exhibit a remarkable correspondence with those of the primitive one. The primitive presbyter (at any rate after the first century) was not, normally, a liturgical person. . . . It was in "ruling" that he came into his own. There his voice and vote were weighty, and no bishop would be likely to take any disciplinary or administrative action without being sure that he had his presbyters with him' (p. 481).

to enjoy 'a fulness of sacramental communion' between Anglican and Presbyterian Churches.

But this sort of contention is *not* generally accepted, even by Presbyterians. For it is not sufficient to show that there is a marked similarity in responsibilities between the Minister in the Reformed Church and a Bishop in the Early Church. If one wants to show that episcopacy was not abolished, it is necessary to show that there is an identity of 'order' between these two. And it would also be necessary, I think, to show, in a way more clearly than it is possible to show, that the continuance, or restoration, of the episcopacy after this primitive pattern was in mind at the time of the Reformation.[1]

It seems clear, in any case, that no amount of discussion will convince our Anglican brethren that our Ministers are the equivalent of their Bishops, and it is useless to pretend that such a contention offers a fruitful avenue for discussion concerning closer relations between our Churches.

3. This means that, in the present situation, 'a fulness of sacramental communion' between our Churches depends upon Presbyterians agreeing to have their Bishops initially consecrated by Bishops from existing episcopal churches and thereafter to regard them as the principal ministers in ordination and consecration.

The Report states clearly that the Conference 'takes its starting-point not from any pronouncement on the validity of Orders on either side, but from consideration of what should belong to the fulness of the Church in that ultimate unity which we are called to seek'.[2] But the proposals show that, though a pronouncement on the validity of Orders may not have been the starting-point, the Anglicans have made plain that they do not regard Ministers in Presbyterian Churches as having proper standing[3] and that any steps towards fuller unity must involve an indication that this deficiency will be remedied.[4]

[1] Compare, however, the attitude of Lusk who underlines, as 'a thing to make us worship' (op. cit., vol. 9, p. 10), the fact that the Reformers, following principles derived from Scripture, reproduced the pattern of the second century without knowing that they did so.

[2] p. 10.

[3] It should not be forgotten that the proposals show that the Presbyterians have made plain that they do not regard laymen in Anglican Churches as having proper standing.

[4] There is no insistence that all Ministers in Presbyterian Churches should be 're-ordained' at a bishop's hand, only that episcopal ordination be the rule for the future.

Can we agree to proposals which contain this implication of present invalidity in our Ministerial Orders?

I think we can. For to declare (as I should declare) that the Ministers of my Church are true Ministers of the Word and Sacraments, and that the Ordination carried out within my Church is to the Ministry of the Catholic Church, is not the same as to declare that these Ministers must be everywhere and by all recognised as such. We (Anglicans, Presbyterians and all of us) know only in part; and I find myself unable to insist that, in this matter of the Ministry, there must be an unyielding assertion of infallibility on our part. If, in the cause of fuller unity between Christian Churches, one finds itself bound by conscience[1] to insist that others conform to what the one feels to be essential to the proper ordering of Christ's Church, I am prepared to yield to that insistence (and avoid being 'a stumbling block to them that are weak')—so long as my yielding does not involve me in an assertion of anything that I feel to be inconsistent with the Gospel as I have experienced it. And I do not see that any assertion of this nature is involved in acceptance of the present proposals.

Of course, such an argument as this will have no appeal to a man who has no care for the fuller unity of the Churches. But it was the presupposition by each of the conferring Churches that 'our Lord's will for His Church is full unity' which called into being the Conference from which these proposals have come. 'It seems clear that if the presupposition is not accepted with complete seriousness—accepted, that is to say, as laying an absolute obligation upon separated Churches to seek reconciliation with one another—then it is hardly likely that they will seriously consider modifying systems sanctioned and endeared by centuries of usage. And if the working assumption of the policy is not taken with equal seriousness—if it should be supposed that two Church systems which have grown apart through centuries of time can be reconciled, either by unilateral surrender or by pious thinking, unaccompanied by definite, and perhaps difficult, processes of change—then the hope of a reintegration of Christendom becomes completely unrealistic.'[2]

[1] The Report says of both Churches: 'each claiming to possess gifts from the Head of the Church which it cannot in conscience deny or resign, and each being as desirous of respecting the conscience of the other as it is bound to obey its own' (p. 16).

[2] p. 15.

The question resolves itself to this: is the cause of a fulness of sacramental communion between Anglican and Presbyterian Churches a cause greater than that of each Church continuing its way in disregard of what it may gain by taking into itself (and then adapting them as it sees fit) some features of the other? If we are persuaded that the right answer to this question is 'Yes', we cannot avoid the responsibility of paying serious attention to the proposals which have been put before us, and of showing why, or why not, we are going to adopt them.

IV

What sort of action is called for immediately?

1. There can be no doubting our present duty to encourage a wide study of these proposals, for the questions which they raise are relevant to situations in other lands, and other communions, than those from which they have emanated. As the Report itself states, 'discussion turned on the Episcopalian and Presbyterian systems of Church order, rather than on the particular Churches which held to them', and the questions arising between Episcopalians and Presbyterians lie 'at the heart of the differences evidenced by other divisions in the Body of Christ'. Moreover, the worldwide ramifications of Episcopal and Presbyterian Churches mean that 'a reconciliation in Great Britain would bear fruit over a much wider area'.[1]

2. Among Presbyterians, the reconsideration of traditional, and existing, attitudes should be carried on against the background of a practical attempt to experience some of the values of episcopacy. That is to say, Presbyterian Churches should at once address themselves to the setting up (even if for only a trial period) of a form of superintendency which would enable them to see more clearly what it would be like to have some Ministers charged with the special responsibility of exercising a wider pastoral function. The introduction of such a form of oversight would call for little alteration of our existing Rules, and may not call for any. We may, for the present, avoid the term 'bishops', and speak of 'superintendents' or 'commissioners', or simply of 'Moderators', or we may think in terms of full-time Clerks.

[1] p. 11.

It is, I feel sure, along such pragmatic lines as these that we shall first come to know the virtues of what has been proposed to us, and we should commence to move along these lines at once. The question whether we want our 'superintendents' or 'Moderators' (or whatever name we give them) to be recognised by others as true Bishops in the Church of God can be left until later.

BIBLICAL THEOLOGY AND PREACHING

by Professor DONALD G. MILLER

I

Biblical theology is difficult, if not impossible, to define. In broadest terms, however, we may say that it is the conviction that the central concern of the Church is with the Word of God in the Bible.

But the very nature of that Word demands preaching. For in the Bible, God's Word is His Deed. His Word is the expression of Himself in action to create, or judge, or redeem. The psalmist has put this clearly in Hebrew parallelism in the thirty-third psalm:

> For the *word* of the Lord is upright;
> and all his *work* is done in faithfulness.

Here God's *Word* and His *Work* are equated. The Psalm continues: 'By the word of the Lord the heavens were made. . . . For he spoke, and it came to be.' Another Psalm tells of the rebellious children of Israel who 'were sick through their sinful ways, and because of their iniquities suffered affliction. . . . Then they cried to the Lord in their trouble, and he delivered them from their distress; *he sent forth his word, and healed them*' (Ps. 107.17-20). Here God's *Word* was His *healing Act.* Supremely is this seen in the declaration of the Fourth Gospel that 'the Word became flesh', and in the insistence of the writer to the Hebrews that God's final Word to man was spoken 'by a Son'. In both instances, the Word of God through this Son is identified with His creative and redemptive acts. It was His Word through this Son by whom God 'created the world', and it was His Word through His Son by which He made 'purification for sins'.

In its deepest sense, therefore, the Word of God in the Bible is God's self-manifestation in action in history. It is this which has led Suzanne de Dietrich to say that we may speak indifferently of the Bible as 'the Word of God' or as 'the Acts of God'.[1]

[1] *Le Dessein de Dieu* (Neuchatel: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1948), p. 8.

It is this, too, which has led G. Ernest Wright to entitle a most stimulating book on the Old Testament *God Who Acts*, or *Biblical Theology as Recital*.[1] The Word of God is the recital of God's saving acts in history, of the things He has done in the solid stuff of historic reality 'for us men and for our salvation'.

Since this is the nature of God's Word, it follows that the acts must be told, they must be heralded, they must be proclaimed as 'good news' both to those who have never heard and to those who have—'for those who know it best, seem hungering and thirsting to hear it like the rest'. Hence, as H. H. Farmer has put it: 'Who so said Christianity said preaching.'[2] The two go together like living and breathing—they are mutual aspects of one reality. Biblical theology's rediscovery of the dynamic nature of the Word of God, therefore, has moved in the direction of restoring the centrality of preaching in the mission of the Church.

This conviction has been furthered by the stress now laid on the fact that the Bible itself is the record of the preaching of prophets and apostles. G. R. Beasley-Murray has recently reminded us that not only can we say that it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save those who believe, but that it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to give men the Gospels.[3] The Bible is history, but not mere history, set forth with detached objectivity, preserved for the purpose of adding to the world's knowledge of past events. The Bible is what Forsyth called 'evangelical history', history retold as the record of God's saving activity; history recounted in the passionate proclamation that here, in these events, and nowhere else, is God's answer to the human dilemma; that in these happenings the nature of God, the purpose of history, and the destiny of man are all to be seen by those who will examine them and respond to them in faith. From one standpoint, the Bible is an anthology of sermons, the extant record of the preaching of the prophets and Apostles. If, then, the Bible by its very nature is oriented toward preaching, it would follow that to make it central in the life of the Church is likewise to make preaching central in the life of the Church. If the Bible

[1] Henry Regnery Company: Chicago, 1952.
[2] *The Servant of the Word* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), p. 18.
[3] *Preaching the Gospel from the Gospels* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1956), p. 13.

itself is proclamation, it is quite likely that it will make its impact on our time through proclamation.

II

But let us ask ourselves what the nature of this proclamation is. Have we not worked ourselves into an insoluble contradiction? We have argued that the Word of God is not words, but His act, His deed. But then we have said that the Bible is the record of men's words about God's deed, and that the central thing in the Church's ministry ought to be words about God's deed. Is it not a hopeless contradiction that men should say words about a living Word that is also a deed? And would not our proclamation by words become something quite different from God's own Word, His saving Deed in history?

Yes, quite frankly, this is a contradiction—a blatant one, an unresolved and unresolvable contradiction, from the human standpoint. But until we reach this point of desperate contradictoriness about preaching, we shall never know what it is to preach. Biblical theology has once more made of preaching what it has always been—a rank impertinence! And until we know that it is a daring act of presumption to stand in a pulpit and to speak human words about the living God who dwells in light inapproachable, we shall quite likely never get beyond the mere speaking of human words. There will be no Word of God in our words.

It is this more than any other one thing which is frightening about our modern education of preachers. We are in danger of grooming men for a ministry the nature of which they do not understand, and it is possible that the very grooming process may make it more difficult for them to understand it. We offer courses in the various realms of knowledge—theological, biblical, historical, sociological, psychological. Then we add to all this voice training, instruction in gesturing, counsel as to group psychology and the best methods of winning the approval of listeners, specialised information as to the mechanics of liturgy, and even the latest tricks of the trade in evangelism and in radio and television broadcasting. Armed with a body of knowledge and the techniques with which to present it, we send men out to preach. And the tragedy is, many of them think they can preach!

On the other hand, listen to a Moses, when he was confronted by the task of being God's messenger: 'Who am I that I should go . . .? Oh, my Lord, send, I pray, some other person.' Or, for a modern example, R. W. Dale, whose shoes most of us are not worthy to unloose, once wrote to a friend: 'I try, and sometimes have a partial success. . . . Four or five months ago, I preached a sermon on *Rest in the Lord*, and began to think I had found the track; but if I did, I lost it again'.[1] Dale understood the nature of preaching; that is why he knew he could not preach. And paradoxically enough, because he knew he could not preach, that is why he could preach!

We shall never understand what preaching is until we tremble before the impossibility of doing it. As Karl Barth put it so vividly in one of his earliest books: the question of questions about preaching is not 'How *does* one do it, but How *can* one do it?'[2] Are we not in danger, in our theological training, of trying to teach each other how one does preaching, without raising the prior question of whether it can be done at all, and most of all, whether *we* can do it? Barth continues to warn that 'we should feel a fundamental alarm. What are you doing,' he asks, 'you man, with the word of *God* upon *your* lips? . . . Who dares, who can, preach, knowing what preaching is?'[3]

Biblical theology sharpens this incongruity of a man speaking God's Word. It deepens the contradiction growing out of the fact that God's true Word is His Act, but that men must talk about His Act in words, thus changing its character entirely. What is the solution to the dilemma thus created? How can a man, speaking mere words, get his listeners beyond those mere words to God's Word, God's Act? This can be done in one way only—by realising that preaching itself is an act, and a divine act. No man can preach; but God may preach through a man.

I have expressed elsewhere my indebtedness to P. T. Forsyth for making articulate for me a conception of the nature of preaching which I felt long before I read Forsyth but could not quite phrase.[4] 'The Gospel is an act of God,' said Forsyth.

[1] A. W. W. Dale, *Life of R. W. Dale* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1898), p. 525.
[2] *The Word of God and the Word of Man* (Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1928), p. 103.
[3] ibid., pp. 125f.
[4] Donald G. Miller, *Fire in Thy Mouth* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1954), pp. 17ff.

'Its preaching must therefore be an act, a "function" of the great act. A true sermon is a real deed.'[1] To preach the Gospel, then, is not merely to say words but to effect a deed. To preach is not merely to stand in a pulpit and speak, no matter how eloquently and effectively, nor even to set forth a theology, no matter how clearly it is stated nor how worthy the theology. To preach is to become a part of a dynamic event wherein the living, judging, redeeming God reproduces His act of judgment and redemption in a living encounter with men through the preacher. True preaching is an extension of the Incarnation into the contemporary moment, the transfiguring of the Cross and the Resurrection from ancient facts of a remote past into living realities of the present. A sermon is an act wherein the crucified, risen Lord personally confronts men either to save or to judge. Ruskin's famous saying that a sermon is 'thirty minutes to raise the dead' was not far wide of the mark. Preachers cannot raise the dead; only the living Christ can do that. In a real sermon, then, Christ is the Preacher. The Preacher speaks through the preacher.

No man has really preached until the two-sided encounter between him and his congregation has given way to a three-sided encounter, where God Himself becomes one of the living parties to it. Ideal preaching would go even one step further, where the presence of God becomes so real that the preacher himself drops almost entirely out of the consciousness of the worshippers, so that even as the preacher speaks, they and God seem to be left alone.

It was thus that Paul described his own preaching. 'We are now Christ's ambassadors,' he wrote to the Corinthians, 'as though God were appealing direct to you through us.' The function of the preacher is to announce to men amazing news so much greater than he is that men shall lose sight of the preacher in the news. What is the news? 'God Himself is with us!' The redeeming God is actively present, judging and redeeming now in the solemn realities of this moment. Then God really becomes the Preacher. The sermon is no longer the effort of a man to speak moving words; it has become the Deed of God. True preaching is the re-enactment of the Deed of

[1] *Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind* (New York: Eaton and Mains, 1907), p. 22.

redemption as both the atoning love and resurrection power of Christ express themselves once more through His Body, the Church. To preach is so to bear witness to that which is done *for* men that it is actually done *in* men. Preaching is a part of the *doing* of it. A Swedish scholar has recently written: 'For the early Christian and Israelite comprehension "Words" and "Deed" are not distinguishable. The Word is identical with the soul of the speaker. When the Word of the Lord comes to someone, so it is as when . . . the Lord Himself comes.'[1] True preaching, then, is not achieved until the words of the preacher become the Deed of God. The ultimate question for the preacher is not, 'Has my sermon *said* something?', but, 'Has it *done* anything?'

III

Now, from this basic conception of the nature of preaching as God's act wrought through man, certain concomitants flow.

The first is this, that *the task of the Christian preacher is unique.* He has something to tell men and to do for them that no one else is doing. A good test to put to one's own preaching is the question: Am I really prepared to say something to people which they do not hear anywhere else? Am I to be God's messenger to confront men in a way in which they are confronted nowhere else?

The devil has many ways of working. If he cannot cancel out the effectiveness of the Church's ministry by inducing outright apostasy, he often works by indirection through the prostitution of something which in itself is good. One of the devil's favourite devices in our generation has been to pervert the quite legitimate insight that the Church's ministry is to the whole man—not just his soul. But in our effort to minister to the whole man, have we not been in danger frequently of becoming just another human agency for the betterment of mankind? It is good for the Church to teach, to do social work, to counsel, to provide recreation, to furnish employment, and to foster all the other activities in which we often engage. But when these activities are detached from their roots in the Church's specific task, when the Church loses its unique role

[1] Hjalmar Lindroth, *En Bok am Bibeln* (Lund: Gleerups Verlag, 1948), p. 191, quoted in *Source Material Study*, No. 50G/112, World Council of Churches.

in the life of a people and becomes just another human agency, it has lost its reason for existence.

The Church is more and other than a school, a social agency, a counselling clinic, a community recreational centre, an employment bureau. It has something to do for men that none of these is doing, nor can do. These other agencies are trying to make human life better. The Church is to raise the question whether even the best human life, judged by worldly standards of better and best, is worth anything. These other agencies are set to enable men to achieve the good life in earthbound dimensions, so that they can say: 'I am rich, I have prospered, and I need nothing.' It is the Church's task to say to those who are thus well off: 'You are wretched, pitiable, poor, blind, and naked,' and to counsel them to buy from the risen Christ the 'gold refined by fire'. It is the task of these other agencies to make men at home in this world. It is the task of the Church to disturb men, to make them homesick for another world, to uproot their attachments to 'this age' and to make them heirs of 'the coming age', to call them out like Abraham of old from man's highest civilisation to become 'pilgrims and strangers on the earth', seeking the city which hath foundation, whose builder and maker is God. It is easy to lose this unique, this distinctive, mission in the quite legitimate effort to minister to the whole man.

But if we fail in our unique task, where will it be fulfilled? It most certainly will not be done by the service clubs, nor the women's clubs, nor the fraternal orders, nor the Chamber of Commerce, nor the Parent-Teachers Association. If men are hearing nothing more, and having nothing more happen to them, in our Churches than they are in these other organisations, then the Church has ceased to be the Church, and is not really obeying the mandate laid upon her by her Lord to preach the Gospel to every creature. There are many agencies to inform the mind, to divert attention from life's bitterness, to amuse, to fulfil social needs—most of them quite needed and legitimate. But the biblical view of preaching lays upon us a task which transcends all these. It is to confront men with the question: 'What think ye of Christ?' And out of this question, to have the encounter shift into the dimension of a personal confrontation by Christ, who Himself asks: 'Who do you say

that I am?' This is the unique task of the Christian preacher.

A second concomitant of the nature of preaching is that in order to confront men with the crucial question of Christ, our *preaching must centre in the history of redemption.* We do not confront men with Christ by preaching theological ideas, nor by ethical exhortations, but by rehearsing the saving events witnessed in Scripture. The preaching of the early Church was the announcement of 'good news', and news is not ideas but the telling of events.

Floyd Filson has recently put this clearly in the following way: 'When we present the biblical message,' he writes, 'we do not outline a system of ideas. We rather tell a story, a story of God's special dealings with men to judge and save them. . . . History, and more specifically God's working in history, is . . . the indispensable form of biblical theology. If we ever forget that our task is to tell a history and show where each biblical figure and each later Christian fits into that history, we have not only abandoned the biblical framework of the Gospel, but we have also abandoned a vital essential of that Gospel. We cannot substitute for this history a philosophical formulation of Christianity, or offer in its place an outline of spiritual and moral principles, without losing the very nature of the Christian message.'[1]

H. H. Farmer has, to my mind, put this decisively in the form of a hypothetical illustration.[2] He suggests that if we could imagine every living Hindu exterminated and every scrap of Hindu writing destroyed, so that not one living soul knew that there ever was such a thing as Hinduism, it is quite conceivable that within a thousand years Hinduism would arise again. Since it involves a pattern of ideas, these having once been formulated by the mind of man could conceivably be formulated again. But suppose every living Christian were exterminated, and every scrap of Christian writing destroyed, so that not one living person knew that Christianity had once existed, it is absolutely inconceivable that Christianity should arise again. The Christian faith centres in a story of historic events, not ideas. These events are made true not by thinking about them, but by happening. If, therefore, nobody knew that they

[1] *Jesus Christ the Risen Lord* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1956), pp. 14f.
[2] op. cit., pp. 18f.

had happened, Christianity could never again be known. The heart of the faith, that which makes Christianity Christianity, is the history of God's redeeming action in His people and in His Son. To propagate this faith by preaching, then, means that the preaching must basically be a rehearsal of these saving events.

A third consideration is that our *preaching should be God-centred and objective, not man-centred and subjective.* Biblical theology reminds us that the starting point of all our religious thinking is God, not man. And this has a very definite relevance to our preaching.

Much of our preaching consists in the effort to analyse man, to try to understand man's need, to try to clarify the human problem, then to go to the Bible for some answer. This ends in so-called 'problem preaching', or 'life-situation preaching'. The Bible exists, then, to furnish answers to human problems: 'What to do with your worries'; 'How to maintain health through spiritual means'; 'Religion the cure for mental strain.' Faith as the means of solving one's economic problems, or gaining social poise, or making friends, or even the means of always finding available parking space! And so it goes, on and on. The whole tenor of this approach is to make God the servant of man. God becomes a cosmic Doctor, a giant Aspirin Tablet, an over-sized Psychiatrist, an illimitable supply of Nerve Tonic, an expert economic Adviser, or even—heaven help us!—an Unseen Bellboy to park our cars! It would seem, as Henry Drummond once remarked, that the old catechism answer has been revised to read: 'Man's chief end is to glorify himself, and to enjoy himself for ever,' with God as the Cosmic Means to this end.

The Bible is a mighty corrective for such an approach. It places God and His glory squarely at the centre of all reality, whether in time or eternity, and reminds us that the only thing that really matters is His purpose and His work. Man is here not to be served by God, but to serve Him, even as 'the Son of Man also came not to be served but to serve'.

The old Calvinistic theologians who struggled to be willing to be damned for the glory of God may have been mistaken, but their instincts were right. I can find no hint in the Bible that God ever damns men for His glory. But at least these men

knew that God did not exist for them; rather they existed for God. And if it should be that their eternal damnation should give glory to God, then it was well and good, for God's glory, not their salvation, was the only thing that mattered. Let us laugh at them if we will, but our smile may be cut short by the remembrance that they at least demonstrated a measure of release from self-centredness which we know nothing about, which, with all its ruggedness and harshness, stacks up pretty well against the selfish, self-centred, man-centred religion which turns God into a servant of man and sometimes goes even so far that—as I heard a pastor say recently—men think that He might even be pleased with a generous tip!

No, our task, according to the Bible, is not to give answers to man's problems; it is rather to let them know that they are asking the wrong questions. It is not to offer them God as the answer, but to confront them with God in such a fashion that they will discover that He is their problem. It is not to present them with a God who is an idol of our own making, carved out in our image, the sum-total of all that man in his natural state desires; it is rather to confront them with the living God who dwells in light inapproachable, who when He moves out toward man evinces the response seen in the story of Adam and Eve in the garden: 'They heard the sound of the Lord God walking . . . and the man and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God. . . . But the Lord God called to the man, and said to him, "Where are you?" And he said, "I heard the sound of thee in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself".'

What man needs is not an answer to his human problems—he needs rather to discover what his real problem is. His problem is not that he is physically ill, mentally strained, economically insecure, socially maladjusted, culturally deficient. His problem is that he has tried to exchange his manhood for deity. He has refused to be man, and has tried to usurp the place of God. He has consistently shut his eyes to the fact that he lives a derived life, and has sought to be independent and self-contained. He has closed his eyes to the fact that he is a creature of time, that all that he knows is passing, that his destiny can never be fulfilled in this world, and has tried to view time as though it were eternity, has sought to give per-

manent value to life's transiency, and has forgotten that he is a pilgrim and a stranger and has become domesticated in this world, with the sunset as a hearth fire. If man had *no* problems in the ordinary sense, this problem would remain. And were he hopelessly plagued with *problems*, it would not matter too much if this *problem* were solved.

Biblical theology confronts us with the *real* problem of man in all its starkness—his rebellion against God, his independence of God, his deluded self-centredness which deceives him into thinking that if he could only solve his little problems, life would be whole. To minister to man on his own level was the first temptation presented to Jesus—man needs bread, therefore turn these stones into bread! And from the human standpoint the request seemed so legitimate, so reasonable. But from the temptation to minister to man's felt needs, to the problems of which he is aware, Jesus turned away. No, said He, 'man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.' It is our task, as His heralds, to confront men with the living Word which comes from God's mouth, with all the demand of His lordship over life, with the insistent proclamation that man finds life only by dying to himself and living to the glory of God.

Another aspect of our preaching flows directly from this; it is that our *preaching must always be for decision.* Our aim is not merely to inform the mind, to stimulate the feelings so that men have a rather pleasant emotional experience; it is rather to strike directly at the will with the demand for decision. The outcome of preaching should always be not discussion, but action. Preaching should be the demand for unconditional surrender, for the laying down of arms on the part of rebels against God. And until we have confronted men with the issue so that they either have to surrender or rebel further, to accept or reject, believe or disbelieve, it is questionable whether we have really preached.

This decisive aspect of the Christian Gospel came home to me forcefully recently in a conversation with a non-Christian Japanese friend. I spoke to him of the fact that the Christian faith centres in the resurrection of Jesus. If that is not true, then nothing else about the faith is of worth. At long last, my friend smiled and said: 'Well, maybe some day I will come to

think as you do.' To which I immediately replied that it was not at all a question of thinking in a certain way, but a question of a decisive demand. If Jesus is risen, then this is a fact with which we are confronted which is the one decisive, unique break-through in the cycle of death. If it is true, then here is hope—the one hope which solves the human dilemma. And to be confronted with this hope is not to ponder it with a view to changing one's way of thinking. It is to accept it, or be lost. My friend replied: 'I think I see what you mean.' In other words, our discussion was not a theoretical one regarding the superiority of one religion over another, or the relative merits of one view of life with respect to another. It involved rather the confrontation of a professed fact which, if not true, brings all Christian claim to an end, but which, if true, summons to acceptance. If Christ is risen, acceptance is life, rejection is death. It is this quality of decisiveness about the Christian faith which must characterise Christian preaching.

W. H. Auden has recently written, with reference to poetry: 'A sacred being cannot be anticipated; it must be encountered. On encounter the imagination has no option but to respond.'[1] Can we not rephrase this with reference to preaching by saying: 'God cannot be anticipated, He must be encountered. On encounter the will has no option but to respond'?

A further insight into preaching to be drawn from biblical theology is that *preaching must always be set in the context of the Church*. Modern revivalism has tended to over-individualise the Gospel, and to make men think of it purely in terms of going to heaven when they die. This tends to make the faith ego-centric, and often ends in a rather harsh rigidity, the outgrowth of giving religious sanction to self-centredness. This has tended, too, to the fragmentation of the body of Christ, until it is broken almost beyond recognition. Recent study of biblical theology has led in the direction of correcting this.

It has shown that the Gospel is personal, but not individual. In the New Testament, men entered the faith by baptism. This was an act which brought them into living relations with a community of faith. To believe the Gospel was to pass from the realm of the old Adam to that of the new Adam, to pass from involvement in corporate death to corporate life. In fact,

[1] 'Making and Judging Poetry', *The Atlantic*, January, 1957, p. 51.

Pentecost shows that what the Church is, in essence, is a community of the Holy Spirit, a bringing together of individuals of all races, personality types, backgrounds, and cultures, fusing them into a unity through faith in the Resurrection. To be a Christian, then, is to be in the Church. The two are synonymous. One does not enter the Church by joining it. That is merely a public ceremony witnessing to what is already fact. To be in Christ is to be a member of His body, and that is to be in His Church. No one can be rightly and vitally related to Christ without at the same time, and inescapably, being vitally related to everyone else who is in Christ. To belong to Christ is to belong to every Christian.

The New Testament also indicates that the Church is not made up of the aggregate of the Churches, as though, if one should add together the individual Churches, he would total it all as the Church. This would mean that the essence of the Church, the life of the Church, is drawn from its members, rather than the life of the members being drawn from the body. Quite the contrary is the case. The members draw their life from being incorporated into the body—it is the life of the one body which gives life to the individual members. The Church is one. Local congregations are merely expressions of the one Church at a particular place and time. Both ideally and actually, the whole Church is there, looking out at that particular point in history. Since that which makes the local congregation a part of the total body of Christ is the presence of the Spirit of the risen Christ, all others who are in Christ are present in Him. So, in any ordinary congregational gathering of Christians, whether they be no more than two or three, the whole Church is there, because Christ is there. Abraham, and Moses, and David, and Jeremiah are there, as well as generations of believers yet unborn. The writer to the Hebrews indicates that apart from us the Old Testament worthies were not made perfect. They somehow are participating with us in what we do now in our work and worship. And the same is true for us—certainly apart from them we would not be made perfect. And so on, down to the last syllable of recorded time, all believers participate in one another, for they are all in Christ. We 'have come to Mount Zion and to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to innumerable angels in festal

gathering, and to the assembly of the first-born who are enrolled in heaven . . . and to the spirits of just men made perfect, and to Jesus.' It is only time and space which keeps every believer, from Creation to the Parousia, from gathering at each service of worship. But beyond all limitations of time and space, they are all there in Christ. He is there, and they are in Him, as we are in Him. Our preaching, therefore, must be an activity of a believing community. It is the recalling of the redemptive events by which the community was called into being, by which it now lives, and by which the whole human race has been redeemed by God.

This means the end of all hyper-individualism and the idea that one can be a Christian by himself. And it also indicates that in preaching, the congregation plays a major part, as well as the preacher. Preaching is the community speaking to itself and to the world. The preacher does not speak as an individual. He is only the voice of the whole Church expressing itself in a single moment. Both preacher and people, therefore, in a true preaching situation, are brought under the judgment and grace of God. We must, therefore, try to train our people to understand that in preaching they have a vital part to play, that they are not there merely to listen to someone make a speech, which they either like or dislike, or with which they either agree or disagree.

Kierkegaard expresses this most effectively.[1] He says that most people think of a church service in terms of an audience in a theatre. The preacher is the actor, and the congregation is the audience, critically evaluating the work of the actor. But, said Kierkegaard, maintain the theatre situation, but transpose the parts. In a theatre, he said, there is, hidden behind the wings, a prompter, whose part is not to be seen at all but to enable the actors to perform their role well. This, in a church service, is the part of the minister. The congregation are the actors, whom the minister is prompting to right action. And the audience? God! He is the one who with critical eye scans the congregation to evaluate the quality of their response to the prompter!

If we could get our people to see this, then they would know

[1] *Purity of Heart*, tr. Douglas V. Steere (New York: Harper and Bros., 1938), pp. 163f.

that the point to a preaching service is not whether they like the sermon or not, but whether God likes their response to it! This would transform the whole meaning of going to church for most of our people. In the light of this, it would be almost impossible for people to say at the close of the service: 'I enjoyed your sermon,' or: 'I enjoyed your little talk!' Can you imagine people saying that to Peter after his Pentecost sermon? No, what they said then was: 'What shall we *do*?' How shall we act to gain the approval of the critical eye of God?

One final word must be said: biblical theology has led us to see that all *preaching should be Christian preaching, even the preaching of the Old Testament.* Preaching is not made Christian merely by being done in a Christian church building. It is made Christian only when it speaks of Christ. This means, then, that even the Old Testament must in some sense be preached from the Christian standpoint. This involves very difficult problems, I know. But whatever the problems, it is a patent fact that the early Church found the Old Testament a Christian book. A European theologian has recently made the statement that the Old Testament is still the Christian Bible, the New Testament being in the nature of a glossary which clears up the meaning of the otherwise obscure terms of the Old Testament. In any case, the Church preached Christ from the Old Testament, and bound it with the New Testament as their authoritative Scripture. Paul insisted that it was Christ who made sense out of the Old Testament. He insisted that Jews read it with a veil over their eyes, that apart from its fulfilment in Christ, it remained an unsolved enigma. Christ had removed the veil, said Paul, and through Him alone can we rightly understand the Old Testament. We do not read the Old Testament, nor preach from it, as Jews but as Christians.

This means that we must preach the Old Testament in the light of its movement toward Christ, not as illustrative of ethical and moral principles. Take the Genesis stories, for example. So often character traits of Abraham and Joseph are preached for our imitation. In the case of Abraham, at least, one would be blameworthy if one imitated him in all his behaviour! No, Abraham is presented in the Bible in the framework of the recollection of Israel's own history and her struggle for faith. The struggle of faith and unfaith in Israel finds its counterpart

in the Abraham story. And Lot, and Ishmael, and Esau are there to depict the world in which, and against which, faith had to work itself out. The Joseph stories reflect, in Joseph's struggle with his brothers, the constant conflict between the true Israel, the Remnant, and Apostate Israel. They carry the undertone of Israel's efforts to destroy her conscience—the prophets. But in God's overruling of their evil design, the final triumph of the purpose of God, in spite of, and even through, Israel's unfaithfulness, is clearly promised. Genesis is a book about God, and involves the early stages of a great historic drama which reaches its climax in Christ. It must, therefore, be so preached.

The same is true for the New Testament. It is a book about God in Christ. The parables are not to be preached to enforce moral lessons, but to enforce Gospel. The miracles likewise are there as witnesses to the Gospel. I heard Paul Scherer preach some time ago on one of the Gospel miracles. He was at the Cross and the Resurrection by the second paragraph of his sermon! This is as it should be. The Sermon on the Mount must be preached not merely to reinforce character traits, such as Benjamin Franklin tried to develop by human effort, as revealed in his *Autobiography*. The Sermon on the Mount should be preached as the charter of the Kingdom of God—as the pattern of the new life wrought by faith in Christ and by entrance into His Kingdom.

Hence, all our preaching should be Christian preaching, kerygmatic preaching, Gospel preaching, confronting men again and again with the basic 'good news' that God has acted in Christ—through His death, resurrection, and ascension—to save us all and to achieve the purpose of history; that in Christ the new age has dawned; that by the Holy Spirit we are summoned now to enter it. This will give ethical instruction a kerygmatic basis, and make it the ethic of the Kingdom of God, the pattern of the glad response of faith to God's redeeming act in Christ. There is no substitute for this sort of preaching. Neither architecture, music, drama, liturgy, sacraments, theological teaching, nor personal counselling, separately or collectively, can achieve what true kerygmatic preaching can. There is no substitute for the preaching of the living Word of God in the fellowship of God's people.

This conviction has been well summed up by France's lay theologian, Suzanne de Dietrich: 'The biblical renewal of which we speak . . . consists only in this, that the Bible is preached, taught, and received for *what it is and wishes to be*: a word of the living God alone capable of restoring man to his true destiny and revealing to him the meaning of his own history and the history of the world. Our responsibility is that this message be authentically announced. The rest is the affair of God.'[1]

[1] *Le Renouveau Biblique* (Neuchatel: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1949), pp. 8f.

THE NEW TESTAMENT DOCTRINE OF ELECTION

ITS ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS

by The Rev. A. A. SOLOMON

'Election is the love of God enacted and inserted into history in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, so that in the strictest sense Jesus Christ is the election of God.'[1] In these words of Professor T. F. Torrance, as I hope to show in this essay, lies the heart of the New Testament conception of election. It is 'in Christ' that the primitive Church understands the meaning and purpose of Election rather than in the Old Testament 'teaching' regarding election; although, of course, she does look back to the Old Testament as ground for claiming the existence of an election as such. That is to say, the Church does not *invent* the idea of the Election, but rather takes up that idea and finds in her own existence and nature the meaning and purpose of election. It is the New Testament that illumines the shadowy Old Testament figure of Election with the light of the glory of Christ. Because of this, we must expect not only to see Election more clearly, as it were, in the New than in the Old Testament, but also we must expect to find in it new truth and new implications.

At precisely what point in the biblical witness did the act of election begin? Who are the elect or chosen in the sight of the biblical writers? Writers tend to vary among themselves as to the answer to these questions. For example, Principal N. H. Snaith[2] sees election as beginning with the choice between Cain and Abel and continuing on through Isaac and Ishmael, Jacob and Esau, and Joseph and his brethren. On the other hand, H. H. Rowley[3] sees it as beginning in Abraham and then a transformation in meaning taking place in it as gathered up in Moses at the Exodus. And perhaps, after all, to ask 'When?'

[1] T. F. Torrance: 'Universalism or Election?', *SJT*, Sept. 1949, p. 315.
[2] N. H. Snaith: the article, 'Chosen', in *T.W.B.*, p. 42.
[3] H. H. Rowley: *The Biblical Doctrine of Election*, pp. 19-33.

of Election is to invite many answers, all of them correct; for it is not quite a legitimate question: it is a question which draws to itself the answer, 'always'! For Israel, 'election' describes not only her status, but also her religion and her God. In the beginning Yahweh chose or elected Israel, and it is only within that election that Israel knows the God who chose her. The Old Testament itself, and as we shall see, the New Testament also, is written from within the framework of Israel's election and speaks always in the language of election, as it were. Whether Israel looks forward to the Age to Come or backward to the mists of antiquity, she sees her election mirrored in all history, so that Abel—Cain, Jacob—Esau, Joseph—Joseph's brethren, and also Abraham—his countrymen, Israel under Moses—the world under Pharaoh are but the many images on time's screen of the one eternal act of election of the God of Israel. There is but *one* Election and the name of that election is Israel. In the New Testament the elect is still Israel, but is not Israel κατὰ σάρκα[1] but the Israel τοῦ θεοῦ[2] the ἐκκλησία of God. Israel is not Israel by virtue of physical descent but by virtue of Divine action.[3] That is to say, the Election is not known by Israel, but Israel is known by the Election; for Israel is God's choice and God's choice is the Election. It is God's act, His elective act, that creates Israel and not vice versa. Now, since it is the firm conviction of the New Testament writers, indeed, the fundamental tenet of their faith, that the Church is God's peculiar act in Christ, it is not surprising to find that the New Testament sees the Church as the elect.[4] We can sum up the Church's assurance that she is the elect of God in the words of 1 Peter 2.9, 'Ye are an elect race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a people for God's own possession.' This is the answer the New Testament gives to the question, '*Who* are the elect?', or to be precise, it is part of the answer; the complete answer as we shall see, is one that embraces this also. This is the New Testament's answer, as we say, but it must be kept in mind that here we are dealing with the primitive Church's *conviction*, her belief, and not with a self-evident proposition. It was far from evident to many people within

[1] 1 Cor. 10.18. [2] Gal. 6.16.
[3] Gal. 3.7, 3.29; Luke 3.8; John 8.33ff; Rom. 16.13.
[4] Rom. 8.33; Col. 3.12; 1 Thess. 1.4; Ephes. 1.4; 1 Peter 1.1; 2 John 1.

the early Church, to whom the *natural* view was, 'Is not God's elect Israel, the people whom He chose in Abraham's day?' And, indeed, it is a view still alive among some present-day Christians and non-Christians alike. In Paul's time, it was a natural view, a view to be expected, and one with which he found it necessary to deal in his Epistle to the Romans[1]; and there he distinguished carefully between Israel κατὰ σάρκα and the *Election* itself (Rom. 11.7)—'that which Israel seeketh for, that he obtained not; but the *election* obtained it.' So that it is necessary for us to probe deeper into the Church's assurance that she is the elect.

What are the grounds for the Church's assurance that she has the election? Why is the Church elect? Israel κατὰ σάρκα could plead two reasons—(*a*) because of 'the fathers' sakes', and (*b*) because 'the Lord loves'[2] them. Both of these reasons press back into the mystery of God's grace, but at least Israel could point to the affirmation of her claim by tradition accepted by Jew and Christian alike. The primitive Church says only one thing and that is pregnant with meaning: Christ! *The Church is elect because she is elect in Christ.* Now this is a statement with two sides to it—(1) the Church is elect because Christ is Chosen, and (2) the Church is elect because she is chosen by Christ. Let us consider the first statement.

(1) *The Church is elect because Christ is Chosen*; that is, because Christ Himself is the Elect, the ἐκλεκτός. This does *not* mean that the Church is the elect because Jesus is the Messiah[3]—the Church's election lies in the fact that the Messiah is Jesus. That is to say, it is because the Messiahship of Jesus is itself *the* Election that the Church *partakes* of *that* Election. This can, I think be shown in a number of ways. (*a*) Paul's great word for 'election' is υἱοθεσία, 'adoption'. Speaking of Israel κατὰ σάρκα, he says they 'are Israelites, whose is the *adoption*, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises' (Rom. 9.4). Here, clearly 'adoption' stands for Israel's adoption in Abraham, or perhaps under Moses[4]—that is her 'election', for whichever way we take Paul's use of this word, it means a gracious act on God's part,

[1] Rom. 11ff. [2] Deut. 7.6f, 23-5f.
[3] I.e. ὁ Χριστός; it is Jesus who determines the Messiahship and not *vice versa*.
[4] Exod. 4.22.

a choice of His, *not* of Israel's. It comes first in Paul's list because it is that initial act of God's from which all the rest stem. It is a deeper, warmer word for Paul, and at the same time it emphasises, as 'election' perhaps cannot, how the act is preeminently and completely God's. In Rom. 8.15, Paul tells the Roman Church that they 'have received the Spirit of adoption whereby we cry, Abba, Father'. It is because the Church has received the election that she may call God 'Father', that she stands in a filial relationship with Him. Election for the Church means an adopting into the family of God with Jesus as 'elder brother'[1] and God as 'Father'. In Rom. 8.23, Paul uses 'adoption' eschatologically, where he equates it to 'the redemption of our body'. Does this disprove our contention that for Paul 'adoption' is equivalent to 'election'? Surely not; surely 'redemption' is the end, the τέλος of 'election'. That is, the consummation of our election is surely our redemption; and this is even more certainly the case if we assume that what Paul means here by 'the redemption of the body' is in fact, the redemption of the cosmic corporality. Now the *important* point for Paul is not that we, the Church, are adopted, but that we are *adopted through Jesus Christ* (Eph. 1.5)—God foreordained us 'unto adoption through Jesus Christ'. That is we become sons through Him who is the Son. Christ is the Son, but we are the adopted children. It is because Jesus is the Son, that we become sons through Him; that is, because He is the Chosen, we are chosen.[2]

(*b*) Leaving aside Paul's use of the word adoption, we have abundant evidence of the fact that in the New Testament, Jesus Himself is regarded as *the Elect*. (i) Paul himself speaks of individual Christians as being 'elect *in* Christ'.[3] The writer to the Hebrews expresses a similar thought when he speaks of the Church as being 'partakers in a heavenly calling'—that is, Christ's. 1 Peter speaks of Jesus as 'a living stone rejected indeed of men, but with God, a chief corner stone, *elect*, precious'.[4] Selwyn asks, 'In what sense was Christ "a (the) living stone"? He was a Stone in the sense that He had applied to Himself,

[1] Rom. 8.29-30.

[2] Does Mark's alleged 'adoptionism' not perhaps centre in 'Election', in Jesus' identification with Israel and her election or 'adopting' (Exod. 4.22) rather than in a metaphysical theory of Christology?

[3] Rom. 16.13. [4] 1 Peter 2.4.

and claimed to fulfil, the passage about the Stone in Psalm 118.22. The Stone, there, as in Isa. 28.16, stands for the Jewish theocracy, God's chosen people.'[1] Christ is the basis for the writer of 1 Peter for the 'building' which God builds, a building which is elect because its keystone is Elect. (ii) It must now be asked, Do the Gospels speak of Christ as the Elect? On one level, of course, they do, in the incidents or events of Jesus' Baptism and Transfiguration, where Jesus stands revealed as the Unique One—the ἀγαπητός, the Beloved,[2] or the μονογενής, the Only-Begotten, the Unique.[3] But it is Luke who specifically refers to Jesus as the *Elect*, the ἐκλεκτός. This occurs in two places. In the first place, it occurs in the Lucan version of the Transfiguration, where the Bath Qol says, 'This is my Son, the Chosen' (ἐκλελέγμενος)[4]; and in the second place, it occurs in the Lucan Passion Narrative, in the Crucifixion scene, where the 'rulers' taunt Jesus, saying, 'He saved others, let Him save Himself, if this is the Christ of God, His Elect' (ἐκλεκτός).[5] Here it must be admitted that the possibility exists that Luke is using ἐκλεκτός merely in the sense of an equivalent for 'the anointed', although the previous occurrence might throw doubt upon this hypothesis. Confirmation for the fact that the Synoptists at least see Jesus as the ἐκλεκτός of God, might be found in the fact that the Baptismal narratives have behind them in all probability Isa. 42.1 with its Servant figure. Rowley[6] has pointed out that in this passage of Isaiah, the 'ideas' of 'election' and 'service' are brought together for the first time. It should also be pointed out that an even more important thing occurs here for NT exegesis—the 'figures' of the *Servant* and the *Elect* are equated for the early Church. 'Behold my *servant* . . . my *Chosen*.' Cullman[7] thinks it likely that the original LXX version of Isa. 42.1 had υἱός instead of παῖς, and refers to 'a well attested variant' of John 1.34 which has not υἱός but ἐκλεκτός, the inference being that since υἱός and ἐκλεκτός were already associated (if Cullman is correct) the substitution is understandable. In this case, the 'figures' of the Elect of the Old Testament (LXX) and the Son (NT) are associated for the

[1] Selwyn, E. G.: *The First Epistle of St. Peter*, p. 158; cf. Skinner, J.: *The Book of the Prophet Isaiah*—chs. 1-39, pp. 225ff. [2] Cf. Mark 1.11 and parallels.
[3] John 1.18. [4] Luke 9.35. [5] Luke 23.35. [6] H. H. Rowley, op. cit.
[7] O. Cullman's *Baptism in the New Testament, infra.*

primitive Church. It seems therefore, to me that it is quite likely that Luke stresses the point: 'Christ is the Chosen, *the Elect.*' However, this and the previous arguments are cumulative rather than conclusive, and it remains to produce what I regard as *the* conclusive argument, to show that the Church saw Jesus as embodying in Himself the Election, that He was *the* Elect. This is *the argument from the Remnant.* It is necessary to digress here to examine briefly the significance of the Remnant in the Old Testament. The Remnant and the Election are not identical concepts, but it is not always easy to spotlight the difference between them. The Remnant is a result of an elective or choosing act of God and *the Remnant ensures the continuance of the Election of Israel.* The Remnant might be said to be the *form* in which Israel emerges from judgment, but the Israel that so emerges is the Israel-Elect. It is the Remnant that 'stands in' for Israel in respect of the Election. As J. C. Campbell writes, 'To define more clearly the nature of the Remnant . . . It is further necessary to regard them as exercising a *vicarious* function. It is characteristic of the Remnant of prophetic and biblical witness that they do not seek a destiny for themselves apart from the judgment that falls upon the mass of the people, as if they merited a better fate.'[1] T. W. Manson[2] comes to a similar conclusion by tracing out the earlier phase of the Remnant concept as that of a Saved Remnant, and the latter phase as that of a Sav*ing* Remnant. He says, 'The old doctrine of the Remnant, passed through the fire of their affliction (the Captivity), emerges in a new form and with a new context. The difference may be stated simply in this way, that whereas the Remnant was to be a *saved* few, the Servant of Jehovah is to be a *saving* few. The brand plucked from the burning is to become a light to lighten the Gentiles.' In other words, the vicariousness of the Remnant as seen in earlier strata of Old Testament thought is now no longer for Israel alone but for the whole world. Yet is there not a certain confusion here between Remnant and Election? Perhaps this is true to a certain extent, but in the final analysis Manson is right. For that which is the Remnant with respect to Israel becomes in fact the Election with respect to the Gentiles. Or

[1] J. C. Campbell: 'God's people and the Remnant', *SJT*, March 1950, p. 81.
[2] T. W. Manson: *The Teaching of Jesus*, pp. 179ff.

to put it another way, Rowley's serving-Elect[1] are equivalent to Manson's saving-Remnant. There is one important thing, however, about the Remnant, a point that lies behind all that has been said, and it is this: the purpose of the Remnant is to *preserve* the Election for Israel. Israel, true Israel, Israel-Elect, *continues* in the Remnant. The Remnant is vicarious for Israel because it *is* Israel. The Hebrew concept of corporateness lies behind this: preserve a part of the nation and you preserve the nation. Abraham lives on in his seed. As Nygren says, 'A "remnant" is not just a group of separate individuals, taken out of a people doomed to overthrow; it is itself the chosen people, it is Israel *in nuce*. It is the seed which, after the winter, will bear the harvest.'[2] Yet there is another reason why the Remnant preserves the election: it preserves the election because it, the Remnant, exists on a *basis* of grace, on God's free elective act. If sometimes the Remnant is a faithful[3] Remnant, it is also true that, in Rowley's[4] apt words, it is 'a torn and bruised Remnant, which God in His mercy spares'[5] or 'an *un*repentant Remnant'.[6] The *one* thing that is clear is that the Remnant exists because of God's mercy; it is 'chosen' or elected on the basis of God's unfathomable love. The Remnant does not *deserve* to be a Remnant—it just *is*; so that in the end there is neither merit nor reward for the Remnant—only grace. And thus Israel continues, whether in knowledge or ignorance, purely because God is gracious.

We have seen, then, that in the Old Testament 'doctrine' of election, Election and Remnant are two facets of the one reality; and we might well expect to find it so in the New Testament also. If we could show that the New Testament sees Jesus as *the* Remnant, would that not also show that the primitive Church saw Him as the Elect also? Undoubtedly, it would, for the Remnant preserves the Election; and if Christ alone is the Remnant, then Christ alone is the Election. Now at the outset we must face the fact that the Remnant is only mentioned *once* by *name* in the New Testament, where Paul uses the word (λεῖμμα) in Rom. 11.5. Here Paul, speaking of his own countrymen, says, 'At this present time also there is a remnant accord-

[1] H. H. Rowley, op. cit.
[2] A. Nygren: *Romans*, p. 393.
[3] 1 Kings 19.17ff.
[4] H. H. Rowley, op. cit., pp. 72, 73.
[5] Amos 3.12; 4.11.
[6] Isa. 1.9.

ing to the election of grace'—*κατ' ἐκλογὴν χάριτος*. Now both Dodd[1] and Nygren[2] concur in saying that Paul is equating *λεῖμμα* and *ἐκλογή* at this point. Paul's point is that Israel 'according to the flesh' lives on in the Remnant (now a part of the Church) preserving Israel *κατὰ σάρκα*, so that Paul can speak of the Remnant now no longer as the Remnant (i.e. *Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα*) but only as the Election. In any case, the Remnant here is certainly not Christ for Paul labels it as contemporaneous with himself—'at this present time'. What are we to say then, if the only mention of the word 'Remnant' does not refer to Christ? Is there no doctrine of the Remnant in the New Testament? In reply to these questions, it must be pointed out that in the Old Testament the main references to the Remnant were not in the use of the word 'remnant' but in happenings, predicaments of men and acts of God.[3] Should we not expect to find it so then in the New Testament? If the Synoptics make it clear that Jesus from the beginning of His ministry stood in a unique relationship with God, then it is just as true that at Jesus' passion, He stands in a unique relationship to His disciples and to all men. That is, Jesus is deserted by all at the hour of His atoning death. From the moment of His arrest, Jesus was deserted by all men. In the pregnant words of Mark 14.50, 'they all left Him and fled'. (The Fourth Gospel, of course, also supports this portrayal of the *One* who died for all.) It is just this that makes Jesus *the Remnant*. At the decisive hour for Israel, she met her God in one person—Jesus. Israel the nation continued on in Israel the man, Jesus. Jesus was the Remnant of Israel 'according to the flesh'. If Israel had not continued on in Jesus, it would have been pointless for the NT Church to think of herself as the *true* Israel. *The evidence for Jesus being the Remnant is eventually to be equated with that showing that the Church considered herself the true Israel.* As the evidence[4] for this[5] is abundant and incontrovertible, I do not intend to lengthen this essay needlessly by referring to it. The point remains that the Church could only consider herself the 'true' Israel if Jesus was the true Remnant, thus preserving in Himself

[1] C. H. Dodd: *Epistle of Paul to the Romans*, pp. 74, 75f.
[2] Nygren: *Commentary on Romans*, pp. 393f.
[3] G. Henton Davis: article 'Remnant', in *T.W.B.*, p. 188.
[4] See N. Flew, *Jesus and His Church*.
[5] I.e. for the Church being Israel.

the Election. As Barth[1] says, 'This Israel's name is now Jesus of Nazareth'. Paul's use of 'Remnant' in Rom. 11.5 can now be seen in its right perspective. Israel 'according to the flesh' is preserved in a remnant that is a Remnant only because it is engrafted into the true Remnant, Christ; that is to say, the Jews baptised *into* Jesus, members of His Body, the Church, preserve ancient Israel. Yet at bottom Israel is preserved only in Jesus who is the Remnant for at the Cross the apostasy of Israel κατὰ σάρκα is complete and so is her judgment. As Campbell says, 'In that judgment Christ alone abides. In that sense, He is the true Remnant, fulfilling all that the others had seen afar off.'[2] This also explains, I think, why the New Testament has no 'doctrine' of the Remnant as the Old Testament had, for to the Church, Jesus was the Remnant and there more meaningful terms than 'Remnant' to express the dependence of the Church upon her Lord. 'Remnant' pointed back to the failure of men in the 'Ισραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα, whilst 'Election' pointed ahead to the Returning Christ,[3] in whom the purposes of God were perfected.

(2) *The Church is elect because she is chosen by Christ.* The Synoptics portray Jesus as choosing His disciples, the Twelve, the foundation of the true Israel. Jesus calls His inner circle of disciples, Simon and Andrew, James and John. Luke's Gospel puts Jesus in the context of election by saying 'When it was day, he called his disciples, and he *chose* (ἐκλέγειν) from them twelve, whom he also named apostles.'[4] Of course, it might be argued that Luke is just using the ordinary, untheological meaning of the word; but if that is the case, why does the defection of Judas from the ranks of the Twelve become an occasion for the selecting of another disciple to make the full quota of Twelve?[5] It is clear I think, that Jesus' selection of the Twelve had far more behind it than a Rabbi's selection of pupils or disciples. Nor should it be thought that the *full* significance of the selection of the Twelve lies in the being symbolic of the twelve tribes of Israel and thus of the re-constitution of Israel, rather does it lie in the *act of selecting*, or rather, electing. It is abundantly clear, I think, that the early disciples attached great importance to the choice made

[1] K. Barth: *Dogmatics in Outline*, p. 79.
[2] J. C. Campbell: op. cit., p. 84.
[3] Mark 13.27 and parallels.
[4] Luke 6.13.
[5] Acts 1.15f.

by Jesus.[1] Much more emphatic than the witness of the Synoptics to the fact that Jesus exercised the prerogative of the Divine electing, is that of the Fourth Gospel. Here the verb ἐκλέγειν is a technical term, laden with the Divine prerogative and grace of electing. Jesus here is *shown* as He who exercises the Divine right of election. Jesus is shown asking His disciples, 'Did I not *choose* (ἐκλέγειν) the Twelve'[2]; and again, He says to them, 'I know whom I have *chosen*.'[3] What the Fourth Gospel understands by election is summed up in the words of Jesus, 'Ye did not choose me, but I chose you.'[4] True, the Fourth Gospel does not use the word 'elect' (ἐκλεκτός) or 'Election' (ἐκλογή), but this, I think, is to be expected in a book which focuses attention not on those elected but on Him who elects, in whom the grace of God has appeared.[5] The Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel agree in one, I believe—that Jesus chose the Church in the Twelve, that He exercises the Divine prerogative of election. Again the Church is forced to see her election driven back to the election of Christ. Jesus' election is both an elected election and an electing election. In the last analysis the Church is elect because she is elect in Christ, for He chose her, that she might be chosen in Him, who is the Elect of God.

We have seen thus far that for the primitive Church, the Church is the elect and that her election finds its source and ground in her Lord, who Himself is the Elect of God. We must now ask the meaning of the *Church's* election. What does election mean for the Church? In the light of the New Testament teaching, the answer would appear to be twofold:

(1) *The Church in her election stands in an unique relationship with God.* 'Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth.'[6] The Church in her election is 'beloved' of God.[7] She is also 'a people for God's own possession'[8] because she is 'an elect race'. The Church is thus a privileged community and stands outside the judgment of men[9]; she is answerable to God alone. But then she has all this because she partakes of the Election of Christ. The terms applied to the Church—ἀγαπητός and ἐκλεκτός—are the predicates belonging

[1] See here Acts 1.24.
[2] John 6.70.
[3] John 13.18.
[4] John 15.16.
[5] John 1.17.
[6] Rom. 8.33.
[7] Col. 3.12 (ἠγαπημένοι).
[8] 1 Peter 2.9.
[9] Rom. 8.33.

to Jesus.[1] It is because she is *in Christ* that she is 'elect' and 'beloved'. And this, I think, leads us to an important point: while it is true that in Christ the Church has received the election, it is just as true to say that only *in* Christ does the Church *retain* the election. (Admittedly it is true that the 'real' Church, to use Barth's[2] important concept, is that which *is* in Christ; but here, if we are to discuss the matter at all, we must allow ourselves to speak more loosely.) It means that only as she is, to use a concept beloved of Anglican theologians, the 'extension of the Incarnation', that she can be sure of retaining the election; or, in other words, she must manifest in her life the life of her Lord, through the Spirit who dwells[3] within her. 'Put on, therefore, as God's elect, holy and beloved, a heart of compassion, kindness, humility, meekness, longsuffering'[4] . . . etc. 'Wherefore, brethren, give the more diligence to make your calling and election *sure*; for if ye do those things ye shall never stumble.'[5] This does *not* mean that the Church retains her election by her 'good works', or even her fine moral or spiritual life; in fact, if she concentrates on these things she is likely to endanger her election, and come perilously close to ceasing to be the Church in reality. Her retention of the election depends on one thing and one thing only: *that she remains in Christ.* Yet, on the other hand, it does *not* mean that she retains her election by her own faithfulness. In Rev. 7.14, it is true, those with the 'Lord of lords and King of kings' are promised that they shall prevail and they are 'called and chosen and faithful'. Now, it is *Christ alone* in the New Testament who can claim to be 'called and chosen and faithful'. The Church not only has no calling, and no election of *her own*; she has also no faithfulness of her own. The only faithfulness she can claim is Christ's. The only 'good work' she can claim is God's good work in Christ. The only 'heart of compassion, meekness, longsuffering' she can claim is Christ's. Paul told the Corinthian Church, 'Ye are Christ's'[6] and he might well have added 'And Christ is yours'—for that is the truth of the matter. *All that the Church has is Christ's.* It is truly 'the election of grace' that has passed to the Church. Only in her utter

[1] Matt. 3.17; Mark 1.11; Luke 3.22, 9.35.
[2] Karl Barth: 'The Real Church', *SJT*, Dec. 1950.
[3] 1 Cor. 3.16. [4] Col. 3.12. [5] 2 Peter 1.10. [6] 1 Cor. 3.23.

dependence upon Christ can the Church retain what she has received in Christ.

(2) *The Church in her election is holy* (Col. 3.12). That is to say she is 'holy' in the New Testament sense of 'being separated'[1]—separated unto God in Christ. Because the Church is the elect of God, she is singled out from the world. The Church is 'sanctified' in Christ; that is, she is made 'separate' in Christ,[2] and indeed, unto Christ.[3] In her election the Church stands out from the world as that which is not of the world.[4] In this sense the Church is Divine and not human; her humanity indeed makes her human, but her Divineness makes her Elect. To put it another way, the Church never *attains* 'holiness' (in the NT sense), she never creates her 'holiness' or separateness—just as she never creates or earns her Election. It is 'in Christ' that she is 'holy'; it is because she has been called out of the world to be Christ's[5] that she can be called 'holy'. She has been 'made holy'[6] in Christ. The Church is Elect or Chosen in Christ and it is *this* fact which in itself means that the Church *is* 'holy'.

What is the purpose of the Election? The purpose of the election as far as the Old Testament was concerned tended to be rather vague, a hidden purpose, concealed in the mysterious will of God. To Abraham it was that in him 'all the families of the earth should be blessed'.[7] In Deutero-Isaiah's eyes, it also was soteriological. 'I, Yahweh, have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand, and will keep thee and give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light to the Gentiles, to open the blind eyes. . . .'[8] The fact that Israel's[9] blessing was involved also, tended to obscure the more universal note. It need hardly be emphasised that Deutero-Isaiah's sublime vision of the election's purpose was not a universal precept in Israel at any stage of her existence. His was rather the knowledge that comes in trial and affliction; the knowledge that Yahweh had given Israel 'for a light unto the Gentiles' came when *in fact* she was already *given* in captivity to the Gentiles. In the Old Testament the will of God tends to be hidden whilst in the New it is revealed, revealed in Christ.[10] The Church sees

[1] O. S. Rankin: article 'Saint,' in *T.W.B.*, 214. [2] 1 Cor. 1.2.
[3] 1 Cor. 3.23. [4] John 15.19. [5] Rom. 1.6. [6] 1 Cor. 1.2.
[7] Gen. 12.3. [8] Isa. 42.6ff. [9] Gen. 28.14. [10] Col. 1.27f.

the meaning and purpose of her election in Christ, for she shares His Election. In the first place, the meaning of Jesus' Election is that He should do the will of His Father—for this reason came He into the world.[1] In the same way, the Church sharing His Election, finds that her election has its meaning in the 'purpose of God', the *πρόθεσις τοῦ θεοῦ*.[2] That is, the Church has nothing to do with any purposes that stand outside or apart from Christ's purpose, which is God's purpose. Christ's purpose is always to the primitive Church a soteriological one,[3] even if it moves through wrath and judgment, death and life. In fact, it is a little foolish to talk about the Church *having* a 'purpose' at all, as though it were a prize possession—rather is it that she fulfils a purpose, God's purpose. And that purpose is soteriological because it is Christ's. The Church then is Christ's,[4] His servant, and her purpose is to do His purpose and will. She is not in the world with the 'purpose' of social welfare, political reform or moral reform, nor as the disseminator of a palliative called 'religion'—she has no purpose but God's, and that she fulfils only 'in Christ', as she is open to His mind and will. Just as the Church has no election of her own, no holiness of her own, no faithfulness of her own; so she has no purpose of her own. All that she has is Christ's; and that she has only as she partakes of it *in* Him: in her election in Christ, she has an *identification* with Christ, which means ultimately that whatever is predicated of Christ must be predicated of the Church. Just as the Son has no purpose of His own,[4] but fulfils the Father's purpose, so does the Church fulfil no purpose but the unfolding purpose of God. The Church herself, however, does *not* identify herself with Christ and take to herself brazenly and blasphemously that which is predicated of her Lord. No! Rather is it that the Church because of her election in Christ, because *God* chose her in Christ, has been identified by God Himself with His Son, so that when He looks upon her in her faithlessness and sin and distress, He sees beneath her grime the 'Real Church' (Barth) the glorious image of His own beloved and holy Son—His Elect. Now because, whenever we talk about the Church's election, we are in fact talking about God's *πρόθεσις*, His 'purpose,' we find

[1] John 18.37.
[2] Rom. 9.11, 8.28; Eph. 1.11, 3.11.
[3] John 3.16.
[4] 1 Cor. 3.23.

ourselves standing on the threshold of mystery. For while we are correct in saying that God's *πρόθεσις* is inextricably linked with the *σωτήρια* of the world, we can say little *more* than that—for who will say that he knows the whole counsel of God, when even Christ did not?[1] Yet, notwithstanding this, there are things here which the New Testament says and which, indeed, must be said. It is apparent, for instance, that God's *πρόθεσις* did not begin *with* the Incarnation nor even with the birth of Abraham in the dawn of history. The Church insists that she had 'been ordained according to the *πρόθεσις* of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His will'.[2] So that with respect to election, the New Testament must needs speak of foreordination and foreknowledge. But one thing should be noticed. As far as the New Testament writers are concerned, men are *not* foreordained or foreknown *in themselves*—they are foreordained and foreknown *in Christ*.[3] We are dealt with by One who is the Eternal and whose purpose also is eternal. We are dealt with 'according to the eternal purpose which He purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord'.[4] If we are foreknown and foreordained, it is not in ourselves but in Christ the Pre-Existent One. It is this that renders perilous any doctrine of Double Predestination, or for that matter, of Universalism. The New Testament does not see Election or Foreordination apart from as-in-Christ, any more than it sees holiness or salvation or life except in Him. What lies outside of Christ is the world which lies in sin,[5] and under judgment[6] and condemnation,[7] under the wrath of God.[8] If we wish to oppose the Church to the world, and to call the one the 'Elect' and the other the 'Reprobate' then that, perhaps, is reasonably correct; provided, of course, that we do not *presume* that we know the actual content of either of these categories. It is unwise to speak of predestination as a thing in itself; it is only correct to speak of predestination-in-Christ. The basic difficulty, as I see it, is that we are using terms and categories of which we are ultimately ignorant. We say, correctly, I think, that the Church is 'predestined'—but 'predestined' to what? We say the Church is 'saved' or 'being saved'—but 'saved' to

[1] Acts 1.6, 7 etc. [2] Eph. 1.11; cf. Eph. 1.5; Rom. 8.29, 30.
[3] Eph. 1.5; Rom. 18.29f. [4] Eph. 3.11. [5] 1 John 5.19.
[6] John 16.11. [7] Rom. 8.1. [8] Rev. 1.18 and 1 Thess. 1.10.

or for what? We speak of God's 'purpose' as being written soteriologically—but what in the last analysis do we mean? We men who are confronted by God in Christ, are confronted—no, enveloped by the Ultimate—and the Ultimate is Mystery. The New Testament felt that no less keenly but the primitive Church realised the truth: that it is to Christ alone that we look to find meaning for our 'truths' and 'doctrines' and 'terms'. In the last analysis, the only thing the New Testament Church can say precisely about God's purpose is that 'whom He foreknew, He also foreordained to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren'.[1] Not only her beginning, but her end also is Christ, the 'First and the Last'.

We have argued thus far that the Church's election is received by her participating in Jesus' Election. This now raises a problem. We have seen that *His* Election was an *electing* election[2]; His Election was not merely a static possession but rather a possessing dynamic. If this is so, does it mean that the Church's election also is an electing election? Does the Church exercise a 'delegated' power of ἐκλέγειν? Jesus was not only the Elect but He who elected men into His own Election. Does this apply to the Church also? I think it most surely does. (1) *In the first place, the Church exercises the electing power of her Lord within the Church herself.* In the Book of Acts, the assembled Church is shown as 'choosing men' for offices within the Church.[3] But in these cases it is not the decision of the Church, but that of her Lord[4] whose mind is known through the Holy Ghost[5] who dwells in the Church. It is not a multitude of men gathered together who elect or choose men for specific offices but rather the 'whole Church'.[6] It is not individuals, separately or en masse, who 'elect'; it is the Church. This surely is a vital matter for the polity of the Church. The Church must never confuse 'electing' in the NT sense with 'voting' in the modern. Election *in the Church* never means the mind and wish of the individual, but the expression of the will of God, the fulfilling of His πρόθεσις, His purpose. What is at issue in any decision of the Church is not *her* will but God's, not her 'objectives' and 'aims' and 'hopes', no matter how

[1] Rom. 8.29-30. [2] p. 10 of the essay. [3] Acts 6.5, 15.22 and 25.
[4] Acts 1.24. [5] Acts 15.28. [6] Acts 15.22.

noble, but only the πρόθεσις τοῦ θεοῦ—the Purpose of God. The Church has no mind or purpose of its own; its mind and purpose is the Christ in whom the πρόθεσις of God is fulfilled. (2) *And again, the Church exercises the electing power of her Lord in that she 'calls' men to her election.* In her evangelism, in her calling men to Christ, she calls men to the Election of Christ. In that sense, it is not the Church herself who draws men to Christ; it is not the Church who by her 'propaganda' or 'influence' draws men into her fellowship. It is *her Lord alone*[1] who works through her, calling men to Himself, electing them to His Election. The Church elects only because it is Christ within her, 'the hope of glory' who elects. It is as she is 'in Christ' that she is able to elect men to the Election; it is not her strength or her wisdom that prevails but her dependence upon her Lord. She has no wisdom nor power of her own; all that she has, she has 'in Christ', who is the Elect of God.

'Election is the love of God enacted and inserted into history in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ so that in the strictest sense, Jesus Christ is the election of God.'

[1] Acts 2.47.

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BOOK REVIEWS

God and Us. By JEAN DANIÉLOU. Translated by WALTER ROBERTS. A. R. Mowbray and Co., London, 1957. Pp. 203. 22s. 6d.

THIS is a most interesting book by a very eminent French theologian, in which he undertakes to produce what might be called a guide to the knowledge of God. As Barth says, 'only God speaks of God.' And in this book Father Daniélou points out that his plan is not to say what he thinks of God but what God has said of Himself. 'God has spoken several times. He spoke and He speaks to all men through creation, which is His handiwork, and through His Spirit, which is His image. Then He spoke by His prophets. And finally He spoke by His Son. It is the same God who made himself known to the heathen and to the philosophers, to the Jews and to the Christians.' That being Father Daniélou's standpoint, he deals in turn with the God of the religions; of the philosophers; of faith; of Jesus Christ; of the Church and of the Mystics.

In the first chapter, 'The God of the Religions', Father Daniélou considers the biblical doctrine of pagan religions, namely that before God spoke through Moses and Jesus Christ, He spoke to all men through the universe and through conscience. But as men's intellect and conscience are marred by original sin, this revelation of God finds difficulty in penetrating into the souls of men. In pagan religions, God is revealed through the regularity of seasonal cycles, such as rain and storm, but in the biblical religion He reveals Himself in the uniqueness of historical events. Pagan religion is bound up with permanent patterns, whereas Bible revelation places us in the presence of new, decisive divine acts which modify the human situation in a definite way and are not to be repeated. The difference can be illustrated like this: Adonis, the symbol of biological life, dies every autumn and is reborn every spring. But Christ died and rose again once for all. Pagan religions, Father Daniélou further points out, contain three main wrong ideas of God—they are polytheistic, pantheistic and dualistic—and each of these he discusses in turn with much deep insight.

The following chapter, 'The God of the Philosophers', is perhaps the best in the whole book. Much learning is shown in dealing with the ancient pagan writers, early Fathers, medieval theologians, and modern rationalist and Christian philosophers. It is impossible to summarise this chapter for on practically every page there is some-

thing which stands out clearly and vividly to illustrate the limitations of reason and the necessity for faith in our knowledge of God. God cannot be dealt with as a problem. The error of false philosophies is precisely that of making God an object, of claiming to possess Him through the intellect. But what the intellect possesses cannot be God. Reason, of course, is necessary; it is the means of knowledge which prevents us from placing God where He is not, and it thus keeps us from idols; but as it cannot find out God in Himself, it shows by its failure that the true knowledge of God consists in seeing that He is invisible and that He transcends all knowledge. So to this extent even wrong philosophy redounds to the praise of God by its failure to reveal Him. On the other hand, true philosophy maintains that God exists and that He surpasses reason, and declares that a more perfect knowledge of Him can only come from God as a free gift, a gift which we call revelation.

Revelation comes to men in the Word of God, and is grasped by faith. The Bible reveals God's truth, righteousness, love and holiness. Each of these is examined at considerable length with many references to the Jewish conception of these qualities of God. With regard to Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit and the doctrines of the Trinity, much reliance is placed upon Gregory of Nazianzus and Irenaeus for expounding the New Testament view of the revelation of the Word of God in Jesus. After discussing the work of the Holy Spirit in the cosmos, and then in history and the Christian era, Father Daniélou leads on to a discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity—a doctrine which, difficult though it is to understand, is inevitable when the evidence presented by the facts written in the Old and New Testaments is examined.

The next chapter, 'The God of the Church', is devoted chiefly to a defence and exposition of the Roman Catholic attitude towards Tradition, and consists mainly in examining the position of Professor Cullman, who, Father Daniélou claims, stands midway between the radical Protestant position—which rejects the authority of Tradition—and the Roman Catholic position. This exposition is extremely lucid and should be read by everyone who wishes to grasp the Roman Catholic standpoint at first hand. Towards the end of this chapter, Father Daniélou turns to theology, which, using Anselm's phrase, '*fides quaerens intellectum*', he defines as the faith that seeks to understand its object. Theology has two main purposes: firstly to protect Christianity from the errors of men by defining the faith by virtue of the assistance of the Holy Spirit; and secondly, as its essential purpose, to bring to light what is implied by Christian revelation. For example, the Bible shows us Christ declaring that He is greater than the Sabbath, which was established

by God. Theology will show that this implies His divinity. Theology is the work of human intellect, but it is not rationalist, for if the intellect really knows God in the revelation which He makes of Himself, then the intellect becomes aware of its limitations. Thus theology does not explain the mystery of God in the sense that it renders it wholly intelligible. It knows the mystery as a mystery but it proclaims it in an exact manner. It does not for example explain how it is possible for there to be Three Persons in God. This remains an unfathomable mystery. But theology declares that there are Three Persons in God, and so it passes beyond what can be known by reason. In addition, there is a brief survey of the theology of the Trinity of both the Greek and Latin fathers, which in a few pages supplies a great deal of information on the views of Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Basil and Augustine.

The final short chapter called 'The God of the Mystics' is necessarily included since God does not only make Himself known through the evidence which He provides in His works, and whose meaning is disclosed by theology; He also reveals Himself directly to the soul of the saints through the Holy Spirit who comes to dwell within them. This coming of God into the soul of the Christian who has thereby undergone a rebirth is related to baptism in the name of the Trinity. Christ is born in us at baptism. In each of our souls He must reach His full stature; and so the whole exercise of the Christian life consists in developing in ourselves this resemblance to Christ, so that every soul may become an image that reproduces the features of Our Lord.

This is a most interesting and enjoyable book to read. It is full of wise remarks to be pondered over. It seems a great pity that a book containing so much learning should have no index.

G. V. R. Grant

The Burning Bush. By G. D. Henderson. Saint Andrew Press, Edinburgh. 30s.

The publication by the Saint Andrew Press of this collection of papers on Church History by the late Professor G. D. Henderson is sure of a cordial welcome.

One marvels afresh at the author's erudition, and evident familiarity with a great mass of material, much of it in the form of obscure works and pamphlets relating to Scottish ecclesiastical history. Many of Professor Henderson's paragraphs are a close mosaic of quotations, ten or more to a paragraph, and in these circumstances it is particularly damaging to the usefulness of the work that all source references have been omitted. Not all of the papers have been published before, and some of those published are relatively

inaccessible. To be unable to trace references and quotations is a constant irritation, and has seriously impared the value of the work, nor can it be pleaded in extenuation that this has enabled the book to be published cheaply.

Despite this, there is much here of interest, much that is stimulating (and for the practically minded preacher, many excellent quotations).

The range of contents includes the major issues in Scottish Church History from the Reformation onwards, visits some intriguing byways, and concludes with the author's Moderatorial address to the General Assembly in 1955. If one looks for a central theme it may be found by considering the series of papers which deal with the development of the Presbytery from the Exercise, the Place of the Laity, the Priesthood of all Believers, Democracy in the Church, and Church Unity. Here we are presented with the historical background to live contemporary problems, and indeed throughout the book the reader is always being reminded that the Church exists today, and today still wrestles with problems to which the past is not irrelevant.

There is a keen professorial eye upon contemporary churchmanship. One is told that much preaching in the Church of Scotland is defective, having 'the vaguest theology', and seeming to 'avoid exposition of Scripture and serious doctrine' (p. 60), and one is reminded too that the ministry is today burdened unnecessarily and beyond its powers, so as to become 'almost intolerable' (pp. 180-1). For this, as well as for other reasons, the responsibility of the laity must be more and more emphasised. It is of the 'utmost urgency and importance, not only in connexion with actual Church affairs, but in connexion with the maintenance and promotion of true religion and a good life everywhere, and the achievement of a Christian world' (p. 218).

There is another side to this, however. Sometimes there is almost a tendency to idolise the laity, as if they held all the answers. Anyone tempted to do this should read 'The Witness of the Laity', where Professor Henderson notes that in the past it has been so often the laity who have provided the greatest resistance towards change (one could add to his list the attitude of many laymen towards interchurch relations), and he notes too that they lack not only training but 'ardour of the soul' (p. 214).

Concern for the part to be played by the laity appears in several of the essays. In one, which originally appeared in the *Scottish Journal of Theology*, Professor Henderson studies the idea of the Priesthood of all Believers.

The idea and the phrase is characteristic of Luther's early period,

but, when the logic of it began to be more rigorously expounded by the Anabaptists, 'we hear little more of the priesthood of all believers' (p. 191). The contrast between Luther and Calvin, who avoids the phrase, has often been made. Some have argued that with Calvin the doctrine of the Church as the Body of Christ is so fundamental that the thought of the priesthood of believers is set aside; Professor Henderson would rather accept the view that Calvin, while he makes no formal expression of the doctrine, in fact uses it, and uses it more effectively, than Luther.

The comment might be offered on the material collected in this essay, that it shows that at all periods the emphasis on the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, at least in what we might call its 'popular' interpretation amongst non-Romans, has tended to be in terms of privileges and rights (cf. Henderson, p. 120: 'All were alike human beings with rights; the right to approach God. . . .) The extreme is reached in the view of the Independents, 'essentially every man is his own priest' (p. 193). This includes not only access to God, but individualistic interpretation of Scripture. Thus Milton can claim that every man has 'the right to interpret the Scriptures for himself' (p. 193). In fact the Protestant version of the priesthood of all believers is date-stamped by the egocentricity and individualism of its era.

Calvin is much more truly catholic. As against Milton's claim he would answer: 'Observe well, it is not said that God has left the Scriptures for everyone to read, but has appointed a government that there may be persons to teach' (R. S. Wallace, *Calvin's Doctrine of Word and Sacrament*, p. 115).

Luther never quite shakes himself free from the idea that priesthood is a 'thing' to be possessed, and perhaps never got away from the Roman idea of some sort of 'grace' handed on to the priest and exercised by him. Calvin avoided the error. For him priesthood is not a right which Christians possess, but a deduction from their oneness in Christ (p. 187). The only priesthood which believers can possess is not one which can be stated individualistically (i.e. I am my own priest). No man can be his own priest. All priesthood, like all sacrifice, is a sharing in the one priesthood (and sacrifice) of Christ. It is only in Christ that the believer can in any sense be a priest. This is the Catholic interpretation, e.g. of Augustine and Jerome, and it is that of John Calvin.

One can approach this from another angle. Professor Henderson draws attention to the fact that the 'proletariat' had little attention paid to them, and tended to form the mass of the 'moderate' section of the Church. 'The unroused proletariat has thus never been in the democratic religious group' (p. 130). This is one of the

difficulties of applying any doctrine of the priesthood of all believers to the laity, and may have been one of the factors in the decay of the doctrine. Thus G. H. Williams has just been pointing out (*Ecumenical Review*, April 1958) that the problem goes back to the time of Constantine. With the rapid expansion of Christianity subsequent upon its official recognition, the laity became assimilated to the turbulent masses of the city population (loc. cit., p. 229). The theological significance of the laity and of the priesthood of all believers began to be lost precisely where the separateness of the Christian community from the world becomes blurred.

From earliest days the separateness of the Christian was linked with his baptism, which was the 'ordination of the laymen'. This took place, however, not by the transference to the baptised person of any grace or right, but in virtue of his baptismal insertion into the Body of Christ, and hence of his sharing in Christ's priesthood. 'Those who are baptismally consecrated in Christ . . . share in His unction of the Spirit and are made priests in Him' (*Commission on Baptism, 1956 Report*, p. 23). Any theology of lay action must therefore also be a theology of baptism, and it must also take seriously the question of the 'separateness' of the baptised, i.e. the question of discipline.

Another point which Professor Henderson's paper suggests is that all discussion of the priesthood of believers has suffered (as the paper itself suffers) from inadequate biblical theological background. Merely to quote texts is not to constitute an adequate theological basis. Luther's expounding of his own doctrine of the priesthood of believers grew under the shadow of the Roman priesthood, accepting its interpretation of itself in terms of privileged access and oblation. It was not asked if this were in fact an adequate biblical interpretation of it. Any discussion of the priesthood of believers today has to take account of a greatly widened understanding of the Old Testament background. For example, the biblical view does not limit priesthood to sacrificial duties. It had a function in times when laymen were competent to offer sacrifice—that of ascertaining the will of God (*Theological Wordbook of the Bible*, ed. Richardson, p. 210). Men should 'seek the law at his mouth; for he is the messenger of the Lord of Hosts' (Mal. 2.7; cf. Hag. 2.11-13). Priesthood is not only access to God, it is a declaring of God's Law, a way of witnessing to the revealed Word.

All this must be taken into account, and from it there comes a clear widening and enriching of the doctrine. Priesthood is a corporate (perhaps better an 'incorporate', because 'in Christ') function concerned with offering obedience to God, and witnessing to His revealed Word.

How can we understand the priesthood of an individual layman? Perhaps a parallel can be taken from the problem of the relation of the local to the universal Church. The local church is not a component from which, by aggregation with other similar components, the universal Church is assembled, so that the latter is the summation of the former. The local church is the Church here, in this given situation.

So the Christian is not a component from which the local church is built by a process of aggregation. You do not make the Church by adding together believers, nor do you make the priesthood of the priestly people by adding together individual believers each of whom has priestly rights. The individual becomes wherever he is, the on-the-spot embodiment of the priesthood of Christ. He is, and has, nothing in himself, yet in him, wheresoever he may be, the Church which is Christ's Body is present, the sacrifice of obedience should be offered, and the witness to the revealed Word should be taking place. That is the priesthood of the layman.

Though on occasion the path gets obscured in a veritable jungle of quotations, it leads to many places from which instructive and thought-provoking landscapes, either of past history or present problems open out. There is a great deal to be pondered over, and not only regarding the laity.

The question of episcopacy occurs at various points. Regarding the Knoxian superintendents, 'the intention . . . is not so easy to determine'. If some of their work was of a temporary character, still 'the church required permanently some authoritative office such as that of the superintendent. . . . The office . . . justified itself, and that not merely as an emergency arrangement' (p. 50). It did not conflict with the doctrine of parity, for the 'emphasis was never such that one minister could not be placed over others' (p. 124).

However, the exigencies of the situation forced changes upon the Church, and the Exercise, developing into the Presbytery, eventually took over the powers exercised by the superintendents. All through the story what has to be remembered is that the Church of Scotland was never left in peace to develop what might appear to her the best 'government of the Church according to the Word of God'. She was forced to look for the best immediate defence against the encroachments of secular powers. This put a stamp upon the mode of her development, and often her theory was 'an afterthought, a rationalisation, an apologetic; and what rank as principles are in some degree, if not inferences from accepted practice, protests against detested practice' (p. 222). Hence 'it remains for the Presbyterian very seriously to reflect upon the extent to which mere accidents of history have contributed to the hardening and canon-

isation of the system to which he has been accustomed' (p. 223).

In fact one could sum up by saying that, to a far greater extent than is admitted, episcopacy in Scotland is a 'non-theological factor'.

IAN A. MUIRHEAD

The Early Christian Church. By PHILIP CARRINGTON. Cambridge University Press, 1957. 2 vols., pp. 520 and 520. 52s. 6d. per vol.

HISTORIANS of the ancient world, including those who write of the New Testament and the Early Church, tend to belong to one or other of two schools. There are those who distrust tradition and seem determined to accept no fact as historical except on very clear contemporary evidence. There are, on the other hand, those who tend to accept tradition, sometimes with a special delight in its more picturesque stories, unless there be a positive reason for rejecting it. Eusebius, with his 'glorification of martyrdom', although, 'in view of the standards of the age, he must be regarded as reasonably critical', was of the second school; so, in our own day, is Sir Winston Churchill in his story of early England; and so is Archbishop Carrington. He, too, gives the picturesque touches, not only in the familiar martyr stories, but in such revealing details as the fact that Polycarp did not take off his own shoes, or that Justin, wearing the philosopher's gown, responded to Trypho's friendly greeting with a tag out of Homer. Yet what Carrington says in praise of Eusebius is true of himself; he, too, is 'reasonably critical. . . . He is faithful. He never invents . . . . He uses sources which he generally identifies.' Carrington, in his introduction, provides very substantial grounds for his reliance on tradition from his own experience in Quebec. 'Fifty years is as nothing; there are always people who clearly remember the important facts. . . . The sixth bishop of Quebec is still living at the age of ninety-six, and has told me about long conversations which he used to have with an old man who had clear memories of the first bishop. These two memories cover a hundred and forty years of time, being securely dated by a reference to the battle of Waterloo.' The Christian writers of the late second century had this kind of link with the time of our Lord and His apostles.

What gives unity to the story recorded in the thousand pages of this work is just the sense of a living memory of the events of the New Testament. Almost at the end of the second century, Irenaeus could describe how he had listened to the blessed Polycarp tell of his intercourse with John and the others who had seen the Lord, and Polycrates too looked back to the 'great lights' of Asia, beginning with Philip and John and going on to those whom he himself must have known. There were many such possibilities not explicitly

mentioned in this book. Hegesippus, to whom we owe so much of our knowledge of Palestinian Christianity, had in all probability before he came to Rome about A.D. 160 met people who had actually known Symeon the successor of James the Just at Jerusalem, and probably a nephew of Joseph the carpenter. Justin, a typical Christian philosopher of the second century, could have known in his native Samaria men who remembered Simon Magus, and, during his visit to Ephesus, men who remembered St. John. It is the convergence of so many personal links that makes the tradition so reliable, and the acceptance of the four canonical Gospels so significant. It is a pity that Carrington in his last chapter includes as an epilogue a survey of the third century which brings his story down to Eusebius and the Council of Nicaea. The men of the third century, great as they were, were away from a living contact with the beginnings of Christianity; they had not known men who had known the apostles.

The Church of the first two centuries was in no way a mere accumulation of separate congregations; it was first and foremost a Catholic Church. Carrington rightly emphasises 'the solidarity of all Christians' in New Testament times; the tensions which we certainly find in the New Testament epistles must not blind us to the 'genuine sentiment of loyalty and affection for the mother Church'. The message of Ignatius to the Christian world was 'the importance, before everything else, of unity'. Polycarp prayed for all the Churches. In the second century 'the idea of a catholic church was not an imposed idea; it was simply a recognition of the historical realities'. Church leaders moved here and there throughout the Christian world in a way that Protestant leaders at any rate did not do again until the twentieth century. We think of Irenaeus, born in Smyrna, but bishop of a diocese in what is now France, and yet with his special mission to meet heresy in both Rome and Asia Minor both of which he had visited before writing his great work.

In spite of its catholicity, the Church of the first two centuries appears in these volumes as a 'gathered' Church. Persecution saw to that, and there were always 'schools' to counteract any attempt to make the demands of Christianity less rigorous. In this connexion Carrington makes almost no reference to infant Baptism in spite of the implications of certain passages in Justin and Irenaeus and the explicit statements of Hippolytus and Origen. His one reference to it is in connexion with Hermas, who felt a deep mortification over the sins of his children. Carrington's silence about infant Baptism is surprising, as in the early period he emphasises the place of the household in the life of the Church, and children were surely a very important part of any household. We get the impression that, while

the early Church has much to say to the *Volkskirche* of today in its attitude to the lapsed, it has little to teach it in the even deeper concern of the upbringing of children within a Christian community.

We have in this book a very lively picture of the varieties of episcopacy. In one part of the Church or another a bishop seems to have been chosen in almost every conceivable way, except, of course by the nomination of a Prime Minister! There are indications of bishops being appointed by apostles, of bishops being chosen by the presbyters, of bishops being chosen by their flock, of bishops being appointed or at least approved by their fellow-bishops, of bishops being nominated by their predecessors, and even of bishops succeeding in some kind of family succession. Carrington considers that we can distinguish two principal forms of the apostolic order; 'a system of plural bishops in the Pauline Churches of the far West, lacking powers of ordination and dependent upon apostolic persons, or churches with apostolic leaders, for certain purposes or services; and an autonomous episcopate in the Eastern churches, in which plenary authority was vested in a single bishop with a council of presbyters'. One wonders whether the lack of powers in the Western bishops was widespread or exceptional; there does not seem to be sufficient evidence to say: 'There is no sign in Ignatius that the (Eastern) bishop had any large powers apart from his council of elders, or indeed apart from the ecclesia.' There appears to have been in the Early Church a freedom and variety both in the conception and the actual functioning of a bishop that is lacking in most of the episcopal Churches today. If that freedom and variety could be recovered the path to unity would certainly be much easier.

Carrington is conservative in his attitude to the New Testament and this is probably true of his treatment of the later period. While such conservatism is, I believe, fully justified, sometimes it goes too far, as when he suggests that 'the silence of Acts is fatal to the theory of the Ephesian imprisonment'. Principal G. S. Duncan has given sufficient evidence to demonstrate the extreme probability of such an imprisonment, apart from the question of the 'imprisonment epistles' having been written in Ephesus. It is surprising to find such a cautious scholar as Carrington accepting without question Plooij's translation of Gal. 2.10. Many of us would like to believe that ἐσπούδασα αὐτὸ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι means 'I was occupied with at that time', but the linguistic evidence is very small in favour of such a translation.

There are many points, like the two I have just mentioned, where the more critically minded reader wishes that Carrington had given his authority and other references in footnotes, but to do so would have enlarged greatly what is already a long work, and, in any case,

it is probably not for this class of reader that the work is intended. The reader is greatly helped in following the ramifications of the story not only by the author's pleasant style, but also by most excellent chronological tables and maps, carefully annotated so that their relevance is clear. The illustrations too are plentiful and well reproduced. One envies the student who hears the story of these two centuries for the first time under the Archbishop's guidance and those who have heard much of it before can find a new interest and pleasure in it.

The Cambridge University Press are to be congratulated on the production of two such handsome volumes. Except for the price, they bring back to us the days when publishing did not have the economy standards to which we in Britain have become used in recent years. There are few typographical errors; on p. 34 of vol. I, 'critized' should be 'criticized'; on p. 253 of vol. II, there is a blank in the middle of the word, 'Hieronymian', on l. 17 of p. 424 of vol. II, the second 'of' should be 'or'. WILLIAM LILLIE

Theology of the Old Testament. By EDMOND JACOB. Hodder and Stoughton, London. 30s.

Old Testament Theology. By LUDWIG KOEHLER. Lutterworth Press, London. 35s.

IT is not easy to write a book on the theology of the whole Old Testament, and it has rarely been done successfully, though selected parts of the field, such as the Prophets and the Psalms, have been thoroughly expounded. The Old Testament documents cover a period of well over one thousand years, whereas the period of the New Testament books is under one hundred years. Accordingly, the range of thought and the levels of insight and witness are much wider and varied in the Old Testament, and the problem of the co-ordination of ideas more complex.

No important book on Old Testament theology has appeared in English since A. B. Davidson's in 1904. The famous ones have mostly been in German—Schultz, Koenig, Sellin, von Rad, and above all Eichrodt. Now here are two in English, translations from the French and German respectively. It is expected that another by Professor Vriezen of Utrecht will appear very soon; and it is good news that Eichrodt's *Theologie des Alten Testaments* in three volumes, and also von Rad's, is being translated. So the field is getting crowded with major works. Not indeed that there is much wrong with Schultz or A. B. Davidson. Naturally there is much material to take account of since they wrote more than half a century ago, but in substance they are most valuable still. They are, of course, rare to come by nowadays. What is mainly defective in

A. B. Davidson's book is that it was edited badly by his successor in his chair, who seems to have found various versions of important parts of the book and without discrimination to have superimposed them on each other, with resultant confusion and contradiction.

Jacob is professor at Strasbourg, and his book has been splendidly translated by A. W. Heathcote and P. T. Allcock. He is quite obviously an excellent biblical scholar, and probably also a good systematic theologian—a most desirable combination, though rare. For all its detail, this book never loses sight of the main fabric of Old Testament thought. Each chapter has its own bibliography so that the total bibliography is vast; and there are five full pages of subject index and fifteen triple-column pages of Scriptural references. In the opening pages we have a succinct review of the approach to this subject in the life of the Church, and the vital point is made that the New Testament itself is a theology of the Old Testament—so that the whole Bible picture is coherent. Jacob's book is a good corrective to writers like Vischer with his far-fetched method of finding testimony to Christ in the Old Testament; and he takes history very seriously, properly maintaining that 'there is no history without theology and no theology without history'.

Jacob's treatment revolves around two main themes—the Presence of God and the Action of God—and these two divide the book almost equally. There is much good material here on such subjects as the essential anthropomorphism of men's thought of God, the significance of the Divine Names, the figure of Satan, the attributes of holiness, righteousness, faithfulness, wisdom, wrath, and love; and all this is done with thorough, deep search into the roots of great terms without making a tyranny of the terms. Some of the very best pages are on the theme of Creation. Happily Jacob recognises that there is in the Bible a doctrine of man as well as a doctrine of God—and there are thirty valuable pages on the nature and destiny of man. On the theme of Election, there are important differences between Jacob, Rowley, and Koehler; and we also find some penetrating criticism of Mowinckel and the Uppsala School.

Perhaps considerations of space have to be held responsible for some of the examples of slight treatment and some of the gaps. We might have expected more on how the great prophets reached their monotheism, and more too on the divine control and judgment in history. Much more is needed on the sacrificial system in its threefold significance as gift, expiation and communion. A fuller examination of the doctrine of redemption would have been welcomed—it is much more prominent in A. B. Davidson and Eichrodt—and the same has to be said about the future life and the consummation.

Dr Koehler is professor at Zürich, and his rather heavy book has

been well translated on the whole by the Rev. A. Stewart Todd, a young minister of the Church of Scotland. When it appeared, Professor Rowley hailed it as 'superior to anything we have in English on the subject', and Professor F. F. Bruce said that he could think of 'no comparable work in English'. These judgments have to be somewhat modified now, with the others in the field.

It is a more difficult book to use, and there is something elusive about its style. There are some curious sentences, even in their context, e.g. 'We have come to the end of our section on the nature of God as we find it in the Old Testament, and it is clear that we have really said very little'; 'the Old Testament knows Jahweh only as a name, which in itself says absolutely nothing about God, and from which no conclusions can ever be drawn about the nature of God, simply because the name as a mere name affords no information at all'; 'as teachers of Holy Scripture we must produce a theology which does not settle but decides'. There should be better ways of saying these things.

The book is in three sections—God, Man, Judgment and Salvation. It has a balance which at certain points corrects Jacob's book, especially in the third part. Much discussion is given to the Divine Names, and the special significance of 'Lord' is investigated; but he wisely reminds us that 'philological theology is faulty theology'. The emphasis on God's action—in the covenant with Israel specially, and in the wider sense as Creator, Upholder, Protector, Shaker and Guide of the whole life of the world—is in keeping with all Old Testament in our time. It is obvious that there is a mind of massive learning behind this book, and it would be difficult to think of a relevant issue which is not raised and briefly dealt with.

Although the translation is from the revised edition of 1953, Koehler's book was first published in 1935. No account seems to have been taken in the revision of the work of scholars in the last twenty years, not even of Eichrodt and Vriezen. Probably the greatest theological weakness of the book is its superficial understanding of the whole sacrificial system in Israel.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Saint Peter. By JOHN LOWE, Clarendon Press. Oxford. 10s. 6d.

THIS small book of 65 pages is worth its high price. The author is the scholarly Dean of Christ Church, and he has given us a thorough, condensed study in which almost every relevant reference is used, and yet it is readable and clear. Anyone writing on Peter in recent years must take account of Oscar Cullmann's book published in 1953, and Dr Lowe acknowledges his indebtedness.

The purpose of the book is to raise 'a mediating voice' amid the controversies which have raged round St. Peter so long. Dr Lowe holds that the evidence for the traditional picture of Peter as an impetuous, unstable wobbler is very thin, and that it is certain that his place was quite outstanding. All the Synoptics are agreed on this and Mark is in no sense anti-Petrine, except in so far as he does not conceal his faults, and that is a noble sense, when we remember that it is commonly held that Peter provided Mark with his materials. The leadership of Peter is confirmed by the evidence of Paul, though Paul admits no authority of Peter over himself. He does not admit that Peter himself is the author of our First Epistle of Peter —still less of 2 Peter.

In the chapter on Peter the Martyr, Dr Lowe argues that the New Testament gives no clear witness to his martyrdom. Acts leaves him 'in a kind of twilight'. The most important evidence is that of 1 Clement and it is examined. By the end of the second century the tradition was established that Peter and Paul were founders of the Church in Rome and were martyred there. That their bodies were reburied in the year 258 is a theory not in favour. The excavations since 1938 are described and on this whole matter Dr Lowe's conclusion is: 'If Peter's grave has not been found, this does not prove he did not come to Rome. If it has been found, it does not in the slightest degree support any papal theory.'

The key passage, Matt. 16.18-19, is kept to the third and most important chapter—to this all the rest has been working up. While the context of the passage may be questioned, it is beyond doubt that Christ did have in His mind the Church as 'the eschatological people of God'. From this, Dr Lowe proceeds to argue that, while Peter's confession of Jesus as the Christ is basic to the life of the Church, pure exegesis demands the view that the reference is to Peter himself personally. Peter must not be levelled down to be just on the same footing as the others. The closing pages, however, show that the Roman Catholic theory has gone wrong too, 'in the assumption that the commission to Peter includes successors, and a very limited line of successors at that'. GEORGE S. GUNN

The Dead Sea Scrolls and the New Testament. By H. H. ROWLEY. S.P.C.K., London, 1957. 2s.

PROFESSOR ROWLEY, according to a note on the cover, 'ruthlessly exposes' the weaknesses of certain recent pronouncements on the subject of the Scrolls. 'Ruthlessly' is the *mot juste*. Point by point, the allegations of some 'authorities' are relentlessly pursued, and slaughtered without mercy. Seldom has there been a more devastating critique of any theory.

It is much to be hoped that this little book will find its way not only into the bookshops but also on to the bookstalls. It is an effective counterblast to recent sensationalism, and provides a clear account of the *real* significance of the Scrolls for the study of the New Testament. Nor can any say that the price is beyond their purse.

R. McL. Wilson

Two Anglican Essays. By Lord Altrincham. Secker and Warburg. Pp. 128. 10s. 6d.

Lord Altrincham, having recently proffered some suggestions for the improvement of the monarchy, has now in these two essays turned his attention to the Church of England. The second of these, on F. D. Maurice, is an undergraduate effort which he prints with hesitation. The first, though longer and more ambitious, is of no better quality.

The author proposes to reform both the doctrine and the organisation of the Church of England so that 'it may become a spiritual home for the greatest possible number of English people'. This being the end in view, there are naturally great possibilities of innovation. On the side of organisation some interesting suggestions are made, though to a Scottish reader they may not seem very radical, except in relation to the place of women in the Church, a topic on which many will find themselves in substantial agreement with him. It is, however, on his discussion of doctrine that criticism must fasten, and it must be said forthwith that on the evidence of this book the author is but slenderly equipped to tackle the themes on which he ventures.

Doctrine is to be reshaped according to logic and common sense as his lordship understands them. In this way he hopes 'to free the tenets of religion from elementary logical error'. Applying those criteria he makes short work of the Christian Faith as it is presented in the New Testament. An excursus of incredible shallowness on the divine omnipotence and foreknowledge leads to the conclusion that there is no conflict between God and Evil since Evil itself must be part of the divine pattern. There is thus no need to worry about sin or the hope for a Saviour. According to the New Testament Jesus was concerned about sin and came to be the Saviour of men, but this merely shows that His moral values were damaged by His Jewish upbringing. He was neither infallible nor morally flawless, for if He had been, the Incarnation would have been 'a divine fraud'. He was a man of contradictions; this is what makes His example so precious to us.

Having thus got rid of the offence of the Cross 'in all its primitive nastiness', and with it the substance of New Testament Faith, our

author, in pursuit of comprehensiveness, seeks to throw a bridge across the gulf which separates the orthodox Anglican from 'the Christian free-thinker'. Creeds are to be abolished. There is to be 'a simple unelaborated profession of Christianity' but no indication is given to the content of this profession. All tests are to go 'except the tests of knowledge, fitness and sincerity'. We may ask, 'knowledge of what?' and 'fitness for what?' but to these questions this book supplies no answer. This is not Anglican comprehensiveness but Hinduism rendered into English.

Two references to Scotland may be noted. One suggests that Carlyle was the lineal successor to John Knox, 'his theory of hero-worship roughly corresponding to the Presbyterian doctrine of Election'. The other refers to the 'conscientious acrobatics' in which the Sovereign is involved 'as being head of both the English and Scottish Churches'. In fact, however, the Sovereign is not the Head of the Church of Scotland; the 'acrobatics' therefore are a figment of his lordship's imagination.

We are informed in the Foreword that the Faith Press declined to publish this book. Making every allowance for the author's good intentions, there is one reader at least who thinks that they were right, and that it would have been no great loss if Messrs Secker and Warburg had followed their lead. T. M. TAYLOR

Athletes of the Spirit. By PHILIP W. LILLEY. Epworth Press, London, 1957. Pp. 160. 10s. 6d.

THIS book contains nine essays, each devoted to a classic Christian book. The chapters are arranged in chronological order of the births of the authors dealt with, and are—(1) St. Augustine's *Confession*, (2) Thomas à Kempis's *Imitation*, (3) Samuel Rutherford's Letters, (4) Browne's *Religio Medici*, (5) Pascal's *Pensées*, (6) Bunyan's *Pilgrim*, (7) Law's *Serious Call*, (8) Wesley's *Journal*, and (9) John Woolman's *Journal*.

The author writes with a lively enthusiasm for each subject in turn, and it is clearly his intention to communicate not merely knowledge but some of his own enthusiasm also to his reader. He does not regard it as his business primarily to write critically—after all, he does genuinely want to send us back to the authors to whom he introduces us—but the consequence of this is that where the reader knows the work he is dealing with and happens to be out of sympathy with it, this author's treatment lacks the power to persuade the reader to mend his ways. To the present reviewer, for example, the *Imitation* has always presented more difficulty than consolation, and even if this is perhaps an unkind example to take (since the essay on à Kempis manifests more than all the others an awareness

of its subject's limitations) it may be typical of what others may find in reading other chapters. Where, on the other hand, the reader has little or no knowledge of the work introduced (as, in the present reviewer's case, John Woolman), he cannot fail to be interested and to become anxious to repair his ignorance.

Here and there, as is proper, the author interprets and explains. Some may doubt whether he has really presented Augustine in his full stature, for his account of the *Confessions* is faithful to the point of conventionality; and Augustine, especially to the historian, is a puzzling and even an exasperating figure. On p. 83 there is a comment on Bunyan's character, 'Ignorance', which raises an issue at the very heart of puritanism, but misses an opportunity of saying something of real importance. On p. 57 the quotation from Browne's 'The night is come like to the day' does not agree with the version in the *Oxford Book of Christian Verse* (p. 163: Lilley, 'Howe'er', *O.B.C.V.*, 'Now ere'). On p. 35, l. 4, there is a misprint, and the previous sentence contains a small infelicity, and seven lines from the bottom of the same page there is an omitted word; on p. 59 a letter has dropped out of the name 'Richelieu'.

Against these very small points of adverse criticism, the reviewer would record his personal admiration for the chapters on Browne, Pascal and Law, and a sincere commendation of a labour of love which, thus published, forms a most welcome gesture towards the widening of a layman's Christian culture and the dissipation of the prevailing ignorance of our literary heritage. ERIK ROUTLEY

John Wesley. By MARTIN SCHMIDT. Bd. 1. 1703-1738. Zürich.

IT is curious that in the last hundred years there has not been a full-scale biography of John Wesley in English. For a modern scholarly account of Wesley, we have had to rely on the work by the Belgian Franciscan Piette, which, in spite of its virtues, was tendentious and in its account of Protestant history before Wesley was frequently misleading. In contrast, Dr Schmidt's book provides the first volume of a full and thorough life of Wesley for the contemporary scholar and also a much better introduction to the historical environment and Protestant ancestry of Wesley. Dr Schmidt is well-known in Germany for his research in English Puritanism, as well as for his profound acquaintance with the history of Pietism: this enables him to discuss Wesley not only in terms of English History, but also on the full scale of eighteenth century European religious history. The exact scholarship shown by the author—the notes alone are a sound introduction to the study of the early Wesley—shows the highest standard of any work hitherto under-

taken on Wesley, with the possible exception of that of Tyerman. We have suffered too long in English religious history from the practice of writing of our religious leaders entirely in English terms and without allowing for the real influence of parallel continental movements. Dr Schmidt plainly shows us the influence of German Pietism on Wesley through the Moravians, the 'Pietas Hallensis' and the conflicting purposes of Salzburgers and Herrnhuters. Through using the archives at Halle and those of the Herrnhuters he brings out new and illuminating material for the study of Wesley's formative years. Here we see Wesley's faith in close relation to the Pietist conception of faith. The tradition of Methodist historians of Wesley has been to sift thoroughly his Anglican background and his personal experiences at Epworth and elsewhere, to account for Wesley's particular development. Dr Schmidt gives us together with these a much more theological understanding of Wesley's development, and also a thorough review of the formative experience of Wesley as a clergyman and frustrated missionary in Georgia.

He is right to insist that: Wesley's 'Biographie muss darum eine theologische Biographie sein.' Dr Schmidt begins by pointing to the tradition of spiritual biography in England in Puritan times and to the infiuence of Roman Catholic mysticism as suitable starting points from which to begin the study of Wesley's life (the life of the last great organiser of a church in the modern age), and develops this through a historical summary of the English Reformation and its consequences down to 1662 and after. (He might have written here about Horneck and the Religious Societies at the end of the seventeenth century: perhaps he intends to deal with these in the second volume.) Then in turn are discussed the family and home of Wesley, the period of his childhood and youth, his early studies and religious interests, and the student circle of his Oxford days. All these are considered with continual reference to the theological influences on and development of Wesley. Finally, the Georgia period is dealt with in a fulness and depth that have not been equalled before, and this is followed by an account of the conversion which includes a theological discussion of its importance and the influences leading to it. Dr Schmidt sees the conversion as the climax of the previous theological and spiritual development of Wesley and he refuses to treat it in purely psychological terms—its best interpretation is theological.

Since Methodism has proved to be a powerful force not only in England but also throughout the world, it is well to have before us a work of such thorough scholarship undertaken with care and objective understanding. To those of us who are by historical descent and theological tradition more immediately the heirs of the

Protestant Reformation, Methodism represents a new direction. A piety and practical theology influenced by Pietism, later Puritanism, Roman Catholic mysticism and High-Church Anglicanism set forth by a man whose first deep biblical studies began with the Arminian Grotius would inevitably take a direction different from that shown in sixteenth century Lutheranism and Calvinism. For example, to equate holiness with happiness (a root of later perfectionism?) is neither Lutheran nor Reformed. Protestantism was given a new interpretation by the impact of Wesley: Methodists as well as non-Methodists should give greater recognition to the significance of this fact—Dr Schmidt's book by its profound understanding as well as its sympathy will help both to this desirable end. It may be that (in spite of Piette on the one hand and some Methodists on the other) Wesley was nearer to Loyola than to Francis or to Luther.

BASIL HALL

Constrained by Jesus' Love. By J. VAN DEN BERG. J. H. Kok N.V., Kampen. Fl. 6.90.

THE New Testament text which provides the title (the favourite text of Mary Slessor) is suitable indeed for a book which is 'an inquiry into the motives of the missionary awakening in Great Britain in the period between 1698 and 1815'. In parts this has been essayed before, but never perhaps with such comprehensive thoroughness. It is the kind of task which, once done, does not need to be done again for a long time. For that reason, among others, this is an important, definitive book. The writer himself has not been a missionary, though the Preface suggests that he had set his heart on Indonesia. He acknowledges much indebtedness to New College, Edinburgh. As he surveys all who have helped him, he feels constrained to end the foreword with a verse from the Psalms—making an interesting and almost inspired mistake in one word—'What shall I render to the Lord for all His *benefices* toward me?'

In the crisis of our time, the Church is thrown back again on the old basic question, Why foreign missions? It is against the background of history that the quest for the missionary motive has to go on. The period chosen, 1698-1815, is one of the most important and decisive for the subject, leading up to the bursting forth of the modern missionary movement. The roots of the great expansion after 1815 are deep in the century before.

Dr Van Den Berg starts with the Reformers whose attitude to missions was rather reserved or negative, and proceeds to examine British missions prior to 1700. He goes on to deal with the forces which led to the Great Awakening under Wesley, with all the characteristic elements of revival movements. He considers how far the 'hell-fire'

motive dominated this awakening, and concludes that there is little reference to this in Wesley, but much more in Whitefield and Edwards. The 'great break-through of the missionary idea' came in a short period, 1792-1813—a period which has been gone over by many writers in recent years, in connexion with several ter-jubilee celebrations. The Scottish part in the whole enterprise is reliably told, but in this connexion reference should be made to the recent excellent study of Alexander Duff, entitled *The Study of Missions in Theological Education* by Dr Olav G. Myklebust.

There are twelve pages of Bibliography. Footnotes are ample, almost too ample. For every position taken up, there is vast supporting evidence provided. Some great and many interesting figures flit through these pages. Scottish readers may well sit up and feel that they need to do some exploration when they read a sentence like: 'Perhaps the most important example of Scottish missionary interest in this period (early eighteenth century) is Robert Millar, minister at Paisley', or 'in 1797, the aged John Mill, minister of Dunrossness, Shetland, who had personally known Whitefield' was deeply concerned in the formation of the London Missionary Society. It is helpful indeed to have at the end of each main section of the period chosen an analysis of how various motives blended together, in differing proportion from time to time—the political, the cultural, the eccclesiological, the eschatological—the motives also of debt, compassion; the ascetic, the romantic, the theocentric, and the supreme command of Christ. The missionary movement is but another name for the presence and activity of God in history.

GEORGE S. GUNN

The Story of the Church. By A. M. RENWICK. 4s. 6d.
Authority. By D. MARTYN LLOYD-JONES. 3s.
'Fundamentalism' and the Word of God. By J. I. PACKER. 4s. 6d.
Basic Christianity. By JOHN R. W. STOTT. 3s. 6d.
The Lord from Heaven. By LEON MORRIS. 4s.

ALL these publications of the Inter-Varsity Fellowship are to be recommended. They are worth the money in every way, and indeed they are marvels of cheap and good production. Even those who, for reasons of intellectual and spiritual honesty, are unable to subscribe to the entire I.V.F. emphasis, will be sincerely grateful for these books.

Professor Renwick's review of the history of the Church from the first to the twentieth century is necessarily the longest; and it is a competent, balanced, and discerning piece of work. Securely grounded in the tradition of the Free Church of Scotland of which he is a professor, Dr Renwick is able to look out upon the whole

wide scene with an understanding and sympathetic eye. A conservative in the best sense of the word, there is a fairness and graciousness in all his judgments. He uses the work of many scholars with gratitude and respect; the bibliography is representative and extensive; and, when he finds that he has to disagree, his criticism is clear but kindly. For its size, it is as reliable a one-volume history as there is in existence. It would have been much easier to have written a far larger book. The more restricted task is admirably done.

Dr Martyn Lloyd-Jones, one of London's best-known preachers, begins his book of three chapters by estimating very truly how many and severe losses have followed the loss of authority in the Church, and its replacement by some 'spurious artificial substitute.' As in most that he has written, there is a somewhat austere element in this book. In his chapter on the Bible, the most distinctive of the three, although he recognises real difficulties and problems, he finally reduces the whole discussion to the sharp alternative, 'Christ or the critics'. This will not do. Many 'critics', faithful biblical scholars of the past and the present, were and are devout Christians, great servants of Christ, and wholehearted in their humble and adoring acceptance of their Saviour and Lord.

This is also what is very largely overlooked in Dr Packer's book. Others who do not accept the theory of the inspiration of the Bible commonly known as 'fundamentalism' are as truly 'evangelical' as those who do. Many who have no use for 'liberal subjectivism' would nevertheless insist that evangelical Christianity must not be tied to any view of inspiration except that the Bible is for its true purpose, the unique, perfect and irreplaceable Book. There is much in Dr Packer's book that everyone will agree with. This might have been left out to leave space for dealing with the many real difficulties attached to the doctrine of verbal inerrancy. Phrases like 'what Scripture says, God says' or 'its text is word-for-word God-given' merely beg the question. He admits, however, the distinction between the content and the form of the written Word of God—but that needs to be followed up more fully and fearlessly. He also rejects the 'dictation' theory of inspiration; but his distinction between the 'literal' and the 'literalistic' does not carry us far. In referring to Dean Burgon's notorious declaration in 1860, 'Every book of it, every chapter of it, every verse of it, every syllable of it, every letter of it is the direct utterance of the Most High', Dr Packer declares that this is 'nothing more than a rhetorical affirmation of the divine origin of all Scripture,' affirming the fact of inspiration, not the mode of it. If so, like other rhetorical affirmations, it is singularly inept and misleading.

In *Basic Christianity*, Mr Stott has given us precisely what ought to come under that title. It is written to help those who 'are friendly towards Christianity, but are not convinced of its truth, and have a sneaking suspicion that it is not intellectually respectable'. Beginning right away with the figure of Jesus Christ, His claims and His character, Mr Stott goes on to examine the fact, the nature and the consequences of sin. He then discusses how Christ meets all this in His death, and by the operation of the Spirit in the life of the Church; and the last section analyses the cost of our decision to be a Christian. In every part the argument is unfolded in close contact with the Scriptures. The book should serve its aim with many in leading them to faith, and it will also confirm others in the faith.

The fifth book is a most satisfying 'study of the deity and humanity of Jesus Christ.' It shows how the whole evidence of the New Testament supports a perfect balance of true manhood and true Godhead in His unique, supernatural Person. In the training of candidates for Church membership, this would be a most serviceable handbook.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Comparative Liturgy. By ANTON BAUMSTARK, revised by BERNARD BOTTE, O.S.B., and translated by F. L. CROSS, D.D. A. R. Mowbray and Co., London, 1958. Pp. 250. 35s.

DR CROSS has rendered great service to English readers by this translation of a very important work. Baumstark gave a series of lectures which were published in 1939 under the title *Liturgie comparée* and went into a second edition. Then it went out of print and a third edition was issued after careful revision by Dom Botte. In that edition the text remained much the same, but Dom Botte added many notes in some of which he expressed his own veiws where they differed from those of Baumstark. Dr Cross has further checked the references and improved them and has added to the indexes. The translation is more readable than the original, which was sometimes rather difficult. One may regret that references are not given to English translations of standard works such as those of Duchesne. One must also note that references to the Psalms, which are frequent in some chapters, are to the Vulgate and not to the Authorised Version. The production of the book is good, and only a few printer's errors have been noticed.

Dom Botte's foreward to the third edition has also been translated, and in this he pays a warm tribute to Baumstark's qualities as a liturgist. Two particular characteristics are stressed—his wide knowledge of sources, especially in connexion with Eastern liturgies, very evident in the text, and his power of synthesis, a quality very essential when dealing with so much detail.

Baumstark begins with a discussion of the aims and methods of the Comparative Study of Liturgy, referring to the use of the same method in other subjects. Liturgy, he says, is in a relatively favourable position owing to the diversity and multiplicity of Rites. Comparison shows both differences and agreements and it is the task of the student to discover what these mean. From this it is possible to propound certain laws of liturgical evolution. Thereafter the author proceeds to apply the method in 'separate fields in the vast domain of liturgical studies. First he takes the 'great liturgical units', e.g. the Divine Office with its important components such as the Canon of the Nine Odes, and the Divine Liturgy with its Jewish as well as its Christian ancestry. Then the method is applied to the elements of which these services are composed, to prayers and formulae, liturgical poetry, psalmody, lections, and to liturgical actions, including anointing and other manual acts. Finally the method is applied to the great feasts of the Christian Year, both Temporale and Sanctorale.

The bibliographical appendix is of the greatest value, containing as it does very extensive lists of source material. The documentation throughout is very full, and the English reader will be introduced to many important writers. More than that, he will be inspired with a deeper understanding of the spirit of the Liturgy.

It is clear that the comparative method is fruitful for the understanding of the development of the forms of worship and that it adds greatly to our knowledge and to our interest. Here is certainly a work which no student of worship can neglect. It is perhaps particularly important in connexion with the increasing modern interest in the Christian Year.

JOHN A. LAMB

Christian Praise. The Tyndale Press, London, 1957. Music edition, pp. 466. 15s.; words only editions at 5s. and 3s 6d.

THIS new hymn-book has been produced to meet the needs of schools, Bible classes, young people's fellowships and similar bodies. It was felt that the denominational books were perhaps not representative enough. One might have thought, however, that the hymn-books of the particular sections of the Church had been growing more and more inter-denominational in their nature. How many hymns are to be found, for example, in all three books of very different styles, *The English Hymnal*, *Songs of Praise*, and *Congregational Praise*.

However, there is little doubt that this book will meet the needs of many forms of fellowship. Much has been drawn from the more recent books as well as from older ones, but there are also many new hymns and tunes, many of which are interesting though of varied

merit. Many of these are of an introspective nature, and others are of the Sankey type suited to mission work.

It should be noted that a number of hymns are set to unusual tunes, e.g. 'O for a closer walk with God' to Dykes' 'Beatitudo', 'Thou hidden love of God' to Monk's 'St. Matthias'. Newton's 'Begone unbelief' is set to Gauntlett's 'Houghton'; and Dykes' 'Melita' is used for the hymn 'We have not known Thee as we ought', Hopkins' 'Ellers' for 'God made me for Himself to serve Him here', and 'Old 124th' (mutilated by the omission of the third line) for 'Weary of self and laden with my sin'. Opinion on the suitability of some of these marriages will vary. The editors have followed the usual practice of making changes in words.

The declared intention of the editors has been a very worthy one, to choose hymns that set forth divine praise and the Gospel in biblical terms, and many of their selections are quite happy. There is a very good selection of Christmas carols; the canticles are included, set to Anglican chants; and each hymn has a text at its head. The indexes are useful, and a new feature which should prove helpful is that there is not only an alphabetical but also a metrical index of tunes with the first line of each tune printed. The book is well produced, and though the type is small, it is very readable, while the music is also very clear. JOHN A. LAMB

Le Réveil de 1830 à Paris et les Origines des Diaconesses de Reuilly. By G. LAGNY. Librairie Protestante, Paris. 600 fr.

AN episode in the story of a Reformed Church about whose history most of us in Scotland know too little is uncovered for us in this fascinating book. The evangelical revival of 1830 in Paris was no isolated phenomenon. It owed its origin largely to a similar revival in Geneva in 1817, of which Robert Haldane was the chief motivating force; and it resulted in a great volume of works and organisations of lasting importance: Sunday Schools, social work, a Bible Society, Church publications, new hymns and, most important of all, la Société des Missions évangéliques de Paris.

All this, interesting in itself, is given us as the setting for the story of the foundation in 1841 of the community of the Deaconnesses of Reuilly (Paris), the most controversial of all the aspects of the renewed life of the French Reformed Church in the middle of last century. Controversial, because it was, as the author says, the first Protestant religious community in France, and one of the first in the Protestant Church as a whole. This conception of *la diaconie communautaire*, which was the object of sharp criticism in the first two decades of the existence of the community at Reuilly, has now, we are told, gained fairly general acceptance in the Reformed

Church in France; although Dr Marc Boegner in his preface hints that to some in the Church the ministry of deaconnesses seems out of date. But the issues raised in this book are still very much live issues today in branches of the Church, including the Church of Scotland, where questions are being asked as to the proper meaning of an 'Order' of Deaconesses, and in discussions on inter-church relations where the nature of the diaconate is under discussion.

There seem to have been in the mind of the founder, Pastor Vermeil, two leading ideas; and it is not very clear whether he regarded them as being necessarily connected or not. First, he wanted to revive religious communities in the Reformed Church as what he considered an important contribution to the newly discovered wholeness of the Church. Second, he wanted to see a reappearance within the Reformed Church of the deaconesses of the primitive Church; though we are told that the name 'deaconess' is not used in a technical sense as the feminine of 'deacon', but rather in its etymological sense of a 'servant of the Lord'. These two ideas of 'deaconess' and 'community' were also held together in the mind of others on the Continent at about the same time: notably Pastor Fliedner of Kaiserswerth and Pastor Haerter of Strasbourg; and this association of ideas is surely the basis of the institution of 'Orders' of Deaconesses in other Churches. But one wonders how far the foundation of communities as a necessary sphere for the exercise of the vocation of deaconess was due to the social conditions and conventions of last century, which would no doubt have made it impossible for women to serve the Church in any other way; and how far the association of 'deaconess' and 'community' is theologically justifiable. In other words, if in the Churches of the Reformation we seek for a revival of the diaconate as a distinctive ministry within the Church, is this to be *la diaconie communautaire*, or should it be the ministry of individual deacons or deaconesses for whom the community in which they find strength and scope is the Church itself?

That is the kind of question which one finds oneself asking as one reads this book.

There are many interesting facets to the story as it is told: the influence of such people as Elizabeth Fry of England and Pastor Bodelschwingh of Germany; the enormous amount of service given by the small number of deaconesses to all kinds of people in need; the emphasis on teaching as well as on nursing and other works of charity; the perplexing number of defections from among the first Sisters; the social and educational difference between the ladies of the Council and the Sœur-Directrice on the one hand and the rest of the deaconesses on the other, which manifests itself especially in

the difficulty of finding a successor to the first Sœur-Directrice; and the description of 'le type de la diaconesse huguenote', in which simplicity, humility and sacrificial love are the manifestations *par excellence* of a consecrated life. In addition there are interesting side-lights on the problem of the relations between Church and State in nineteenth-century France.

This is the very readable story of a great venture of faith and of service to the Church and to society. It will be found to be of quite particular interest to those concerned with the kind of questions about the diaconate indicated above. MARY I. LUSK

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